1,720,986 research outputs found
Measuring the (Income) Effect of Disability Insurance Generosity on Labour Market Participation
Get PDFWe analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36 percent increasein the generosity of disability insurance (DI) for claimants who are, as a result oftheir lack of skills and of the labour market conditions they face, deemed unlikely tofind a job. The selection process for treatment is therefore conditional on having alow probability of employment, making evaluation of its effect intrinsically difficult.We exploit the fact that the benefit increase is only available to individuals aged 55or older, estimating its impact using a regression discontinuity approach. Our firstresults indicate a large drop in employment for disabled individuals who receive theincrease in the benefit. Testing for the linearity of covariates around the eligibility agethreshold reveals that the age at which individuals start claiming DI is not continuous:the benefit increase appears to accelerate the entry rate of individuals aged 55 or over.We obtain new estimates excluding this group of claimants, and find that the policydecreases the employment probability by 8 percent. We conclude that the observedDI generosity elasticity of 0.22 on labour market participation is mostly due to incomeeffects since benefit receipt is not work contingent in the system studied.labour economics ;
Measuring the (Income) Effect of Disability Insurance Generosity on Labour Market Participation
Get PDFWe analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36 percent increase in thegenerosity of disability insurance (DI) for claimants who are, as a result of their lack of skillsand of the labour market conditions they face, deemed unlikely to find a job. The selectionprocess for treatment is therefore conditional on having a low probability of employment, makingevaluation of its effect intrinsically difficult. We exploit the fact that the benefit increase isonly available to individuals aged 55 or older, estimating its impact using a regressiondiscontinuity approach. Our first results indicate a large drop in employment for disabledindividuals who receive the increase in the benefit. Testing for the linearity of covariatesaround the eligibility age threshold reveals that the age at which individuals start claiming DIis not continuous: the benefit increase appears to accelerate the entry rate of individuals aged55 or over. We obtain new estimates excluding this group of claimants, and find that the policydecreases the employment probability by 8 percent. We conclude that the observed DI generosityelasticity of 0.22 on labour market participation is mostly due to income effects since benefitreceipt is not work contingent in the system studied.labour organization;
Sick Leave Cuts and (Unhealthy) Returns to Work
No full textWe investigate the impact on work absence of a massive reduction in paid sick leave benefits. We exploit a policy change that only affected public sector workers in Spain and compare changes in the number and length of spells they take relative to unaffected private sector workers. Our results highlight a large drop in frequency mostly offset by increases in duration. Overall, the policy did reduce the number of days lost to sick leave. For some however, return to work was premature as we document very large increases in both the proportion of relapses and, especially in the number of working accidents. The displacement towards this latter (unaffected) benefit cancels out almost two-fifths of the estimated gains in terms of days lost to absences from cutting sick leave generosity
Measuring the (income) effect of disability insurance generosity on labour market participation
No full textWe analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36 percent increase in the generosity of disability insurance (DI) for claimants who are, as a result of their lack of skills and of the labour market conditions they face, deemed unlikely to find a job. The selection process for treatment is therefore conditional on having a low probability of employment, making evaluation of its effect intrinsically difficult. We exploit the fact that the benefit increase is only available to individuals aged 55 or older, estimating its impact using a regression discontinuity approach. Our first results indicate a large drop in employment for disabled individuals who receive the increase in the benefit. Testing for the linearity of covariates around the eligibility age threshold reveals that the age at which individuals start claiming DI is not continuous: the benefit increase appears to accelerate the entry rate of individuals aged 55 or over. We obtain new estimates excluding this group of claimants, and find that the policy decreases the employment probability by 8 percent. We conclude that the observed DI generosity elasticity of 0.22 on labour market participation is mostly due to income effects since benefit receipt is not work contingent in the system studied
Is there an earnings loss before becoming disabled?
No full textAlthough a number of papers in the literature have shown the employment and wage differences between disabled and non-disabled individuals, not much is known about the differences before entering the disability system. Therefore, in this paper we make use of a large microeconomic dataset from the Spanish Social Security administration and apply matching models to compare the annual earnings growth of individuals who are disabled due to a working accident (sudden health shock) to those that become disabled due to an ordinary illness. Our results reinforce the findings of Kofi Charles (2003) and show that the wage growth patterns of both groups of workers become significantly different four years before entering the DI system although these differences start to accelerate from the third year before DI. Our estimates suggest that one year before entering the system, there is a difference of 47 euros/month in the wages of the two groups
Evaluating the impact of a reduction in the generosity of disability benefits: The 2008 Spanish reform
Get PDFWe evaluate the effects of a reduction in the generosity of disability benefits in Spain that occurred in 2008. The main objective of the reform was to reduce the amount of benefits for individuals that do not have a long contributory history as the reform introduced a disincentive to apply to the system if the individual does not have 35 years of effective contributions. Theoretical insights are gained with a life-cycle model with heterogeneous disabled workers. The model's simulations predict a reduction in the incentives to apply for disability benefits for partially disabled individuals who do not reach the 35 years of contributions. Diff-in-diff estimates are consistent with our model predictions
Partial Disability System and Labor Market Adjustment: The Case of Spain
No full textAlthough partially disabled individuals in Spain are allowed to combine the receipt of disability
benefits with a job, the empirical evidence shows that employment rates for this group of
individuals are very low. Therefore, in this paper we construct labor market model with search
intensity and matching frictions in order to identify the incentives and disincentives to work
provided by the partial disability system in Spain from the point of view of both disabled
individuals and employers. According to the model, the high employment rate gap observed
between nondisabled and disabled workers can be partially explained by the presence of a lower
level of productivity and higher searching costs among disabled individuals that discourage them
from looking for jobs. Moreover, the design of the Spanish Disability System also contributes in
explaining this gap. We also analyze the role of business cycle conditions in shaping the labor
market transitions of disabled individuals
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Why are so many disabled individuals not working in Spain? A job search approach
Get PDFUnlike other disability systems in developed economies, the Spanish system allows partially disabled individuals to work while receiving disability benefits. The puzzle is, however, that employment rates in this group of individuals are very low. The aim of this paper is to understand the incentives and disincentives to work provided by the partial disability scheme in Spain. We first present a theoretical job search model for partially disabled individuals and then estimate a complementary log-log duration model. According to both models, the probability of finding a job falls with the level of disability, the age at which the individual starts receiving disability benefits, and the increase in the local unemployment rate. Moreover, as a result of an increase in the level of disability benefits we find a strong substitution effect that reduces the probability of disabled individuals older than 55 years finding a job to almost zero, in both of the two models. We simulate that the strong substitution effect would be replaced by an equally large income effect even if the increase in the benefits would not be suspended if the individual finds a job
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