1,721,286 research outputs found
The "New Political Economy": Recent Books by Allen Drazen and by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
No full textThe last fifteen years have seen an explosion of contributions in the field of political economy. Two new books, Political Economy in Macroeconomics by Allan Drazen and Political Economy: Explaining Economic Policy by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, organize this literature and evaluate what has been learned. Drazen mostly focuses on applications for macroeconomic policy, while Persson and Tabellini focus on the various tools that can be used to analyze the political process, and the institutional details of decision-making.
The "New Political Economy": Recent Books by Allen Drazen and by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
No full text The last fifteen years have seen an explosion of contributions in the field of political economy. Two new books, Political Economy in Macroeconomics by Allan Drazen and Political Economy: Explaining Economic Policy by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, organize this literature and evaluate what has been learned. Drazen mostly focuses on applications for macroeconomic policy, while Persson and Tabellini focus on the various tools that can be used to analyze the political process, and the institutional details of decision-making. </jats:p
Democracy and Development: Devil in the Details
No full textThis paper illustrates three specific instances where thed e tails ofd emocratic reform influence the e#ect on economic outcomes. Se ction I of the paper clarifies our empirical strategy. Section II zooms in on political economic reforms,d rawing on Francesco Giavazzi and Gui d o Tabellini (2005). Democratizations as well as liberalizations ind uc e accelerations of growth. But the sequence of reforms is crucial: countries li beralizing their economy before extend ing political rightsd o better. Secti on III consid ers d i#erent forms ofd emocracy,d rawing on Torsten Persson (20 05). Specific d emocratic institutions influence the fiscal and trad e polic ies implemented afterd emocratization, which may explain why presid ential d emocracy lead s to faster growth than parliamentaryd emocracy. Finally, Se ction IVd istinguishes expected and actual political reforms,d rawing on Persson and Tabellini (2005). Taking expectations of regime change int o account helps id entify a stronger growth e#ect ofd emocrac
Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution
Full text linkThis paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy–the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment–can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite a general Ramsey policy, including time varying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004).time consistency; Ramsey policy; surprise inflation
Multiple Equilibria in the Welfare State
Full text linkExcess distortions in the welfare state might be the consequence of the government's lack of ability to commit not to help "unlucky" agents. Incentive considerations that are crucial in standard insurance in the presence of moral hazard, plays no role in this case. As a consequence, the government might provide too much insurance. Still, equilibria with incomplete insurance and above-minimum effort might arise. Two possible reasons for multiple equilibria are explored in the paper, namely that marginal utility of consumption is positively associated with effort and that economic policy is costly. It is shown that the equilibria can be Pareto rankable. Borrowing analytical tools from recent developments in dynamic games (Matsui and Matsuyama, 1995), stability conditions of different equilibria are analyzed.
Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy [Elektronisk resurs] : A Comment
No full textAlso: "A Reply" by: Mats Persson, Torsten Persson and Lars E.O. Svensson (All IIES).</p
Gender quotas and the crisis of the mediocre man
No full textQuotas aren't anathema to meritocracy: they increase competence levels by displacing mediocre men, write Tim Besley, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson and Johanna Rickn
Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy : A Comment
No full textAlso: "A Reply" by: Mats Persson, Torsten Persson and Lars E.O. Svensson (All IIES).Published in connection with a visit at the IIES
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