1,721,053 research outputs found
Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation
Full text linkIn the wake of 25 UN Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (and counting), international cooperation on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to avoid substantial and potentially irreversible climate change remains an important challenge. The limited impact that the Kyoto Protocol and its successor, the Paris Agreement, have had on curbing emissions demonstrate both the difficulties in negotiating ambitious environmental agreements and the reluctance of countries to comply with their agreed emission targets once they have joined the treaty. Therefore, a better understanding of the obstacles and opportunities that the interactions between domestic and international policy pose for the design of successful international climate cooperation is of utmost importance. To shed light on the roots of the stalemate (and suggest possible ways out), this article reviews, and draws lessons from, a growing theoretical, experimental and empirical literature that accounts for the hierarchical interplay between domestic political pressure and international climate policy
Evolutionary escape from the climate dilemma: Comment on "Climate change governance, cooperation and self-organization" by Pacheco, Vasconcelos and Santos
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Game Theory: Building Up Cooperation
No full textCan we achieve the ambitious mitigation targets needed to avert dangerous global warming? Research now shows that local sanctioning institutions may succeed where global agreements fall short. © 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
Climate clubs in the laboratory
Full text linkInternational efforts to mitigate climate change are lagging behind. We study in an experiment a stylized climate club along the line of Nordhaus’s proposal to assess the behavioral effects on cooperation and surplus. We also evaluate in isolation the effects of different elements of the club design. Overall, a climate club increases cooperation but not surplus, with respect to voluntary cooperation in a baseline public good game
How green are green economists?
No full textThis paper analyzes the decision of "green" economists to participate in the carbon offset market, and how this decision is related with the views that these experts hold on offsets. It also compares the preferences of economists with those of the general public, as emphasized in the literature. The paper exploits a unique dataset examining the decision to purchase carbon offsets at two academic conferences in environmental and ecological economics. We find that having the conference expenses covered by one's institution increases the likelihood of offsetting, but practical and ethical reservations as well as personal characteristics and preferences also play an important role. We focus on the effect of objecting to the use of offsets and discuss the implications for practitioners and policy-makers. Based on our findings, we suggest that ecological and environmental economists should be more involved in the design and use of carbon offsets
Essays on fairness heuristics and environmental dilemmas
No full textThe issues explored in this work concern individual behaviour and its departure from the rationality paradigm. While different in terms of underlying methodology, the chapters share the unifying theme of
fairness as a guiding principle for human behaviour, as well as a focus on its relevance for environmental dilemmas.Le questioni affrontate nella tesi riguardano i comportamenti individuali e i relativi scostamenti dal paradigma di razionalità. Nonostante l'utilizzo di metodologie diverse nei tre capitoli, essi hanno in comune il tema unificante di equità come principio guida del comportamento umano, così come una particolare attenzione alla sua rilevanza nei dilemmi ambientali
Strategic dimensions of solar geoengineering: economic theory and experiments
Full text linkSolar geoengineering denotes a set of technologies that would enable a fast and relatively cheap global temperature reduction. Besides potential physical side-effects, a major concern is the strategic dimension: Who is going to use solar geoengineering and how would it affect others? How does the presence of solar geoengineering change the strategic incentives surrounding other climate policy instruments such as mitigation? We review the existing theoretical and experimental contributions to those questions and outline promising lines of future economic research
How developed countries can learn from developing countries to tackle climate change
Full text linkClimate change and global poverty are the most pressing issues of this century. If insufficiently addressed, climate change will exacerbate poverty and inequality within and across nations. Addressing it requires that people in developed and developing countries adopt new behaviors and technologies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to a changing climate. A major contribution of the 2019 Nobel Laureates consists in providing new tools to advance knowledge on the mechanisms driving the diffusion of non-normative behaviors, by combining social network analysis with field experiments. To inform climate policy, we encourage research that applies this methodological innovation to understand the extent to which diffusion mechanisms may be crucial to accelerate the transition toward greener economies. Scholars working in developed countries have much to learn from recent advances in development economics. We identify fruitful areas for research in the global North
Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements
Full text linkAbstractWe investigate the effect of domestic politics on international environmental policy by incorporating into a classic stage game of coalition formation the phenomenon of lobbying by special-interest groups. In doing so, we contribute to the theory of international environmental agreements, which has overwhelmingly assumed that governments make decisions based on a single set of public-interest motivations. Our results suggest that lobbying on emissions may affect the size of the stable coalition in counterintuitive ways. In particular, a powerful business lobby may increase the government's incentives to sign an agreement, by providing it with strong bargaining power with respect to that lobby at the emission stage. This would result in lower total emissions when the number of countries involved is not too large. We also show that things change radically when lobbying bears directly on the membership decisions, suggesting that both the object and timing of lobbying matter for the way in which membership decisions, emissions and welfare are affected
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