1,721,097 research outputs found
Varieties of capitalism in an internationalized world: domestic institutional change in European telecommunications
No full textThis article examines how internationalization affects domestic decisions about the reform of market institutions. A developing literature argues that nations maintain different “varieties of capitalism” in the face of economic globalization because of diverse domestic settings. However, in an internationalized world, powerful forces for change applying across border scan affect decision making within domestic arenas. The article therefore analyzes how three factors (transnational technological and economic developments, overseas reforms, and European regulation) affected institutional reform in a selected case study of telecommunications regulation in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy between the 1960s and 2002. The author argues that when different forms of internationalization are strong and combined, they can overwhelm institutional inertia and the effects of different national settings to result in rapid change and cross-national convergence in market institutions. Hence different varieties of capitalism may endure only when international pressures are low and/or for limited periods of time
Populism and cultural heritage policies: public statues in Europe
No full textCultural heritage is a central domain for key populist themes of threats to national identity and protection of 'the majority' against cosmopolitan, 'wokist' elites. The article explores how differing government discursive strategies towards populism influence heritage policies. It takes the case of contested public statues. In France, the government has adopted a discursive strategy of 'patriotic Republicanism' that reduced the discursive space for contestation and policy has remained largely unchanged. But in Britain and Hungary, governments have increasingly adopted populist discourses, leading to countervailing discursive coalitions, contestation and change in agendas and decisions in both populist and non-populist directions. The proposition developed is that national governments pursuing populist discursive strategies triggers anti-populist discursive coalitions, with contestation and changes in agendas, institutions and individual decisions. Conversely, governments developing their own nationalistic discourses reduces the scope for populist ones but also leads to freezing of existing policies
Governing markets in Gulf States
No full textGulf states have altered the institutions of market governance as part of new strategies to develop their domestic markets and attract outside investment. In a sharp break from traditional institutions, several states have created new sectoral independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in key sectors. The paper examines when, how and why these agencies have been created in two economically and politically strategic sectors - stock exchanges for company securities trading and telecommunications - that lie at the heart of new economic strategies. It argues that an analytical framework based on internationalization best explains the pattern of partial adoption of IRAs in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. International factors have provided crucial impetus for reform. The desire to attract non-Gulf capital and expertise has provided a rationale for IRAs; overseas reforms have offered examples to be copied or at least modelled; the recommendations of international organizations and free trade agreements have aided in legitimating reforms. But the impact of international factors has been mediated by domestic conditions, including the extent of oil wealth and the position and strategies of national policymakers. As a result, the spread of IRAs varies significantly among GCC states
Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe
No full textThree aspects of the life of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) after delegation are examined: their independence from elected ofcials, their relationship with regulatees; their decision-making processes. The article suggests that IRAs enjoy considerable insulation from elected politicians in terms of party politicization and tenure. The evidence for relations between IRAs and business regulatees is more mixed: the two have been relatively separate in terms of the professional origins and destinations of senior IRA staff and, in some countries, there has been considerable legal con ict between them. However, in an important and visible eld such as merger control, IRAs have undertaken little activity. The greatest changes introduced by IRAs have been in decision-making processes, which they have opened up, in contrast to closed processes before delegation
The creation of European regulatory agencies and its limits: a comparative analysis of European delegation
No full textAgency creation at the European Union (EU) level differs from that at the national one. European regulatory agencies (ERAs) have limited formal powers and separation from other actors, resembling networks rather than stand-alone agencies. ERAs for economic regulation have been created later and in smaller numbers than for social regulation. Using a historical rational analysis, this paper argues that past delegations to other non-majoritarian institutions at the EU and national levels condition the creation of European agencies. The Commission has defended its existing role and powers, accepting ERAs when they aid its strategy to increase its own reach and ensuring that it has many controls over them. When member states have created independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), those IRAs have defended their autonomy and resisted strong ERAs. Formalized EU networks of IRAs have hindered the establishment of powerful ERAs and when created, ERAs have involved layering and conversion of those networks. Hence formal delegation to ERAs has been limited and uneven
"The Commission and national governments as partners: EC regulatory expansion in telecommunications 1979-2000"
Full text linkGeneral integrationist models underline conflicts between the Commission and national governments. They cite telecommunications as an exemplar of the Commission imposing its choices on unwilling member states. However, a close examination of the development of substantive EC regulation in telecommunications shows that the Commission and national governments acted in partnership. Major conflicts concerned constitutional issues rather than substantive ones. How and why the partnership came to exist is analyzed using a principalagent framework. The paper argues that formal and informal institutional controls made the Commission very sensitive to the preferences of national governments in substantive EC telecommunications regulation. Four processes of decision making whereby both formal controls and less formal institutions (norms) operated to prevent agency losses for governments are found: the participation of national governments at all stages of decision making; incrementalism; compromises and linkages; national discretion in implementation. Effective controls resulted, through these processes, in partnership between the Commission and national governments in developing substantive EC regulation
The Europeanisation of Regulation. The Case of Telecommunications
Full text linkDigitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020
Regulatory Agencies, the State and Markets: A Franco-British Comparison
Full text linkThe article examines whether and how independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) have altered the
strategies, relationships and power of French policy makers in markets and whether they led to
convergence with Britain in state-market relations. It relates these questions to broader debates about
the extent to which previous policy-making systems have been transformed, whether Europe has one
regulatory state or several, whether France has become a form of ‘liberal market economy’ and the
power of the state after reform of markets. It argues that although, as in Britain, France has established
IRAs with responsibilities for ensuring competition in key economic domains, French state strategies
remained very different from British ones and markets operate very differently in the two countries.
Moreover, the break with the past has been limited: public policy makers continue to have significant
capacities to mould markets and delegation to IRAs has often reinforced the power of existing elites
and aided the adaptation of traditional French industrial strategies to new conditions. Thus even if
France has adopted the formal institutions of competitive markets, it has not converged with a liberal
market economy such as Britain in terms of strategies and behaviour. State forms and instruments may
have altered, but an activist French industrial policy is alive and well
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