1,721,171 research outputs found
Licensing policy and technology adoption in standard setting organizations
No full textThe standard setting organizations' decisions on licensing policy and standard's technological specification, and the ensuing implications for social welfare are analyzed. The author finds the conditions under which a licensing rule that grants monopoly power to the licensors whose technology is adopted in the standard can be employed by the members of the consortium (ex‐post licensing). Moreover, it is shown that the adoption of ex‐post licensing might lead to the inefficient exclusion of an efficient stand‐alone licensor. Finally, the author discusses the conditions under which a policy of ex‐ante licensing can be less efficient than ex‐post licensing
STUDIO DI FATTIBILITA' PER L'UTILIZZO DELLE ACQUE REFLUE DEPURATE DEL DISTRETTO INDUSTRIALE ASI - CONSORZIO ASI - FOGGIA
No full textInfluenza dello stato idrico del terreno sulla temperatura radiativi superficiale della coltura del pomodoro da industria.
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Three Essays in Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance.
Full text linkSoft bankruptcy allows a poor performing entrepreneur to renegotiate the terms of outstanding financial contracts, but at the same time it allows lenders to increase recovery rates. Hinging on this basic trade-off, the first Chapter of this thesis shows that a soft bankruptcy law designed as pure financial renegotiation may lead to investments that are biased towards the achievement of short-term results. However, if a soft bankruptcy code would encourage the entrepreneur to undertake a process of economic reorganization, the short-termism problem would be attenuated. Alternatively, the employment of contractual clauses that provide lenders with a tough punishment in case of entrepreneur's bad performance, like management turnover, can alleviate the short-term bias. In the second Chapter, I analyze technology adoption in a standardization consortium composed by a majority of vertically-integrated firms and a pure innovator, and its implications for social welfare. Like in most certification bodies, parties negotiate over the royalties after manufacturers' technology adoption and this generates a hold-up problem. Integrated operators can employ a standard with their inputs and circumvent the hold-up problem, or buy from the specialized firm and enjoy the cost-savings produced by its technology. I show that cross-licensing may lead to the inefficient exclusion of the pure innovator and that a policy of early-licensing commitments would result in efficient adoption choices. The third Chapter analyzes the profitability of vertical integration when downstream firms deal with suppliers of complementary intermediate goods with market power. The Chapter shows that the results in this setting are different from those of the models with substitute input-goods. In particular, vertical integration is not necessarily profitable, because the integrated firm faces the problem that the complementary input producer expropriates the higher profits earned downstream by the integrated chain. Interestingly, this effect is particularly strong the more efficient the integrated firm is.Corporations -- Finance; Industrial organization; Bankruptcy -- Industrial organization;
Bankruptcy law and corporate investment decisions
No full textMajor European countries have recently adopted bankruptcy codes that strengthen entrepreneurs’ power to renegotiate outstanding liabilities. Renegotiation in bankruptcy allows lenders to increase recovery rates, however it also weakens the contract’s ability to solve the moral hazard problem embedded in the production project. Hinging on this trade-off, I show in which circumstances a soft bankruptcy law that resembles Chapter 11 in the balance of lenders’ and entrepreneur’s rights encourages the choice of investments that privilege the achievement of long-term results. However, I also show that, in contrast to the common wisdom, soft bankruptcy can lead to the choice of investments that are biased towards the achievement of short-term outcomes
A simple model of vertical search engines foreclosure
No full textBy means of a simple model with consumers’ search, the paper analyzes a monopolistic general search engine incentives to bias organic and sponsored search results in order to favor an integrated website. In the model, manipulation takes place whenever the general search engine places prominently its own vertical search engine instead of the most relevant for consumers. The main finding is that the incentives to manipulate search results are stronger in the organic search case. In the sponsored search case the general search platform internalizes the impact of manipulation on profits, since the less a prominent vertical search engine is relevant to consumers, the lower is the price- per-click that the general search engine can charge
Confronto tra metodi e regimi irrigui su coltura di pomodoro da industria nel Metapontino.
No full textEffetti dell’irrigazione in fasi biologiche diverse e della densità di piante sul comportamento bio-agronomico del cotone nel Metapontino.
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