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Political legislation cycles:A comparative approach
Get PDFThis dissertation reassesses electoral opportunism through the lens of the Political Legislation Cycles theory (PLC): the deliberate manipulation of both the timing and substance of laws to sway voters. Whereas the Political Budget Cycle has been studied extensively, evidence on PLCs is fragmented and largely confined to single-country cases. The thesis offers the first systematic, multi-level investigation, combining three empirical pillars: a panel study of twenty countries, a sub-national analysis of Italy’s regions, and a comparative reading of legislative content in eight nations.Across countries, PLC magnitude is significantly influenced by government type, electoral system, fiscal decentralization, and level of democracy. The analysis shows that the total number of laws tends to decrease at the beginning of legislative terms and rises significantly toward their end, particularly during the final six months. However, the magnitude of this cycle varies considerably across countries. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems generate cycles that are approximately larger by 67 percentage point than those in majoritarian systems. Similarly, presidential systems, especially when characterized by divided government, exhibit stronger PLCs compared to parliamentary systems. Moreover, countries with high levels of fiscal decentralization show legislative cycles that are 64 percentage points greater than those in more centralized states. Finally, the relationship between the level of democracy and the magnitude of PLCs is found to be nonlinear. At the sub-national level, fiscal autonomy and political context are critical. The study of Italian regions reveals that legislative cycles are paradoxically more pronounced in regions with less fiscal autonomy. These regions, often operating under soft budget constraints, are more likely to engage in electorally motivated legislative activity. Cycles are also larger in economically disadvantaged regions and in those governed by coalitions politically aligned with the central government, underscoring the influence of intergovernmental fiscal relationships on electoral incentives.Furthermore, the subject matter of legislation is strategically timed. Legislators tend to prioritize different types of laws at different points in the electoral term. The production of highly visible, broad-benefit public goods legislation surges significantly in the months preceding an election, while private goods legislation, which benefits narrower interest groups, shows a much weaker cycleOverall, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the literature on political economy and legislative studies by moving beyond single-case analyses to provide a robust, comparative framework for understanding PLCs. The findings show that legislative cycles are far from uniform and are shaped by institutional frameworks, fiscal dynamics, and political incentives. The research develops quantitative metrics for assessing electoral accountability and proposes targeted reforms: strengthening transparency and legislative oversight especially in propotional electoral systems; enhancing subnational fiscal autonomy with effective accountability mechanisms; implementing objective, need-based intergovernmental transfers; and auditing legislative outputs to reduce the strategic emphasis on public goods before elections and private-interest laws earlier in the term. By identifying the institutional roots of legislative opportunism, this thesis provides scholars and policymakers with actionable insights for enhancing democratic accountability and improving the quality of governance in the fields of law and economics, public choice, fiscal decentralization, and comparative politics.<br/
Political legislation cycles:A comparative approach
Get PDFThis dissertation reassesses electoral opportunism through the lens of the Political Legislation Cycles theory (PLC): the deliberate manipulation of both the timing and substance of laws to sway voters. Whereas the Political Budget Cycle has been studied extensively, evidence on PLCs is fragmented and largely confined to single-country cases. The thesis offers the first systematic, multi-level investigation, combining three empirical pillars: a panel study of twenty countries, a sub-national analysis of Italy’s regions, and a comparative reading of legislative content in eight nations.Across countries, PLC magnitude is significantly influenced by government type, electoral system, fiscal decentralization, and level of democracy. The analysis shows that the total number of laws tends to decrease at the beginning of legislative terms and rises significantly toward their end, particularly during the final six months. However, the magnitude of this cycle varies considerably across countries. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems generate cycles that are approximately larger by 67 percentage point than those in majoritarian systems. Similarly, presidential systems, especially when characterized by divided government, exhibit stronger PLCs compared to parliamentary systems. Moreover, countries with high levels of fiscal decentralization show legislative cycles that are 64 percentage points greater than those in more centralized states. Finally, the relationship between the level of democracy and the magnitude of PLCs is found to be nonlinear. At the sub-national level, fiscal autonomy and political context are critical. The study of Italian regions reveals that legislative cycles are paradoxically more pronounced in regions with less fiscal autonomy. These regions, often operating under soft budget constraints, are more likely to engage in electorally motivated legislative activity. Cycles are also larger in economically disadvantaged regions and in those governed by coalitions politically aligned with the central government, underscoring the influence of intergovernmental fiscal relationships on electoral incentives.Furthermore, the subject matter of legislation is strategically timed. Legislators tend to prioritize different types of laws at different points in the electoral term. The production of highly visible, broad-benefit public goods legislation surges significantly in the months preceding an election, while private goods legislation, which benefits narrower interest groups, shows a much weaker cycleOverall, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the literature on political economy and legislative studies by moving beyond single-case analyses to provide a robust, comparative framework for understanding PLCs. The findings show that legislative cycles are far from uniform and are shaped by institutional frameworks, fiscal dynamics, and political incentives. The research develops quantitative metrics for assessing electoral accountability and proposes targeted reforms: strengthening transparency and legislative oversight especially in propotional electoral systems; enhancing subnational fiscal autonomy with effective accountability mechanisms; implementing objective, need-based intergovernmental transfers; and auditing legislative outputs to reduce the strategic emphasis on public goods before elections and private-interest laws earlier in the term. By identifying the institutional roots of legislative opportunism, this thesis provides scholars and policymakers with actionable insights for enhancing democratic accountability and improving the quality of governance in the fields of law and economics, public choice, fiscal decentralization, and comparative politics.<br/
Political legislation cycles:A comparative approach
Get PDFThis dissertation reassesses electoral opportunism through the lens of the Political Legislation Cycles theory (PLC): the deliberate manipulation of both the timing and substance of laws to sway voters. Whereas the Political Budget Cycle has been studied extensively, evidence on PLCs is fragmented and largely confined to single-country cases. The thesis offers the first systematic, multi-level investigation, combining three empirical pillars: a panel study of twenty countries, a sub-national analysis of Italy’s regions, and a comparative reading of legislative content in eight nations.Across countries, PLC magnitude is significantly influenced by government type, electoral system, fiscal decentralization, and level of democracy. The analysis shows that the total number of laws tends to decrease at the beginning of legislative terms and rises significantly toward their end, particularly during the final six months. However, the magnitude of this cycle varies considerably across countries. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems generate cycles that are approximately larger by 67 percentage point than those in majoritarian systems. Similarly, presidential systems, especially when characterized by divided government, exhibit stronger PLCs compared to parliamentary systems. Moreover, countries with high levels of fiscal decentralization show legislative cycles that are 64 percentage points greater than those in more centralized states. Finally, the relationship between the level of democracy and the magnitude of PLCs is found to be nonlinear. At the sub-national level, fiscal autonomy and political context are critical. The study of Italian regions reveals that legislative cycles are paradoxically more pronounced in regions with less fiscal autonomy. These regions, often operating under soft budget constraints, are more likely to engage in electorally motivated legislative activity. Cycles are also larger in economically disadvantaged regions and in those governed by coalitions politically aligned with the central government, underscoring the influence of intergovernmental fiscal relationships on electoral incentives.Furthermore, the subject matter of legislation is strategically timed. Legislators tend to prioritize different types of laws at different points in the electoral term. The production of highly visible, broad-benefit public goods legislation surges significantly in the months preceding an election, while private goods legislation, which benefits narrower interest groups, shows a much weaker cycleOverall, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the literature on political economy and legislative studies by moving beyond single-case analyses to provide a robust, comparative framework for understanding PLCs. The findings show that legislative cycles are far from uniform and are shaped by institutional frameworks, fiscal dynamics, and political incentives. The research develops quantitative metrics for assessing electoral accountability and proposes targeted reforms: strengthening transparency and legislative oversight especially in propotional electoral systems; enhancing subnational fiscal autonomy with effective accountability mechanisms; implementing objective, need-based intergovernmental transfers; and auditing legislative outputs to reduce the strategic emphasis on public goods before elections and private-interest laws earlier in the term. By identifying the institutional roots of legislative opportunism, this thesis provides scholars and policymakers with actionable insights for enhancing democratic accountability and improving the quality of governance in the fields of law and economics, public choice, fiscal decentralization, and comparative politics.<br/
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Get PDFWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Political legislation cycles
No full textThis thesis examines Political Legislation Cycles (PLC), defined as the strategic manipulation of the timing and content of legislative production around elections, as a key manifestation of agency problems between voters and politicians. While Political Budget Cycles have been widely studied, PLCs remain largely explored through single-country cases. This dissertation offers the first comparative, multi-level analysis of the institutional, budgetary, and political drivers of PLCs, investigating how, why, and under what conditions legislators exploit the legislative process for electoral gain. Using a rigorous empirical design, the thesis tests PLC theory across three levels: (1) a panel study of twenty countries, (2) a subnational analysis of Italian regions, and (3) a content-based classification of laws in eight countries. The results highlight the central role of institutional design. Legislative activity declines early in the term, followed by a surge before elections, especially in the last six months. The magnitude of these cycles depends on context: proportional systems produce cycles about 67 percentage points larger than majoritarian ones; presidential systems with divided government show stronger cycles than parliamentary ones; and fiscally decentralized countries experience cycles about 64 points higher than centralized states. The democracy–PLC relationship is non-linear. Further, PLCs are more pronounced in Italian regions with lower fiscal autonomy, weaker economies, or alignment with central governments. Content analysis reveals that public goods-oriented laws peak before elections, while private-interest laws display weaker cycles. Overall, the thesis offers new tools to measure political accountability and guide reforms to strengthen democratic governance
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Get PDFWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
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