200,732 research outputs found
Stringer, J M (John Mason), QX6449
No full textThis record was harvested from a previous catalogue system and will be withdrawn in 2025. Information in this record may be superseded or incomplete. Visit this record in UMA's new catalogue at: https://archives.library.unimelb.edu.au/nodes/view/419756Surname: STRINGER. Given Name(s) or Initials: J M (JOHN MASON). Military Service Number or Last Known Location: QX6449. Missing, Wounded and Prisoner of War Enquiry Card Index Number: 21245.244335
Item: [2016.0049.52017] "Stringer, J M (John Mason), QX6449
The Trials and Tribulations of an Unpaid, Overworked Writer : The MTV College Stringer Program
No full textii, 72 p.The author describes her experience as the local college stringer for the Kalamazoo/Battle Creek area in Winter 1998
The Use of Objective and Subjective Measures: Implications for Incentive System Design
No full textThis study examines the question, is the use of subjective measures an ex post adjustment of objective measures to take into account three types of risk: target difficulty (after controlling for budget loss), shared risk (after controlling for business unit strategy) and downside risk? We examine this question using data from a sample of 522 managers and professionals in period 0 (and 434 in period 1) from a large Australasian corporation over a two year period. Period 0 is a pre shock period and period 1 is a post shock period. We find that for the overall two years that the subjective is an upward adjustment to the objective to take into account: (1) target difficulty, the spread between upper limit and lower limit of unit performance; (2) shared risk, that is organizational interdependencies; and (3) downside risk, which is the opportunity loss function that the employees faced in not meeting the maximum bonus allowed.
However, in examining the pre shock period and post shock period, the results indicate that the subjective evaluation has been used differently for each period for two type of risk (target difficulty, shared risk). (1) With regard to target difficulty for the pre shock period, the subjective makes an upward adjustment to the objective; but for the post shock, the subjective makes a downward adjustment. One plausible explanation is that during the post shock, quite a few managers and professionals were already on the maximum of the objective measures (given that there may have been gamesmanship at setting targets and upper limits for an anticipated poor economic period). Therefore, the subjective can be a downward adjustment to reflect this gamesmanship. (2) In regard to shared risk (the percentage of transfer revenues), for the pre shock period the subjective was a downward adjustment, while for the post shock period the subjective adjustment is an upward adjustment to the objective measure. This implies that for the pre shock or times of economic stability, the subjective could be used to reduce some of the free rider challenges that face incentive systems. Conversely for the post shock period, or during times of economic instability, the subjective adjustment is to encourage resource sharing and greater coordination and communication. Overall, our results indicate that the subjective measure is used as an ex post adjustment to the objective measure. This could be in response to flaws in the objective (financial) performance measures as subjective measures as this enables other factors to be taken into account.UnpublishedNon Peer ReviewedAlchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, The American Economic Review, 62 (5), p.777-795). Anthony, R. and Govindarajan, V. (2007), Management Control Systems, 12th Edition, Irwin, Singapore. Arvey, R.D. and Murphy, K.R. (1998). Performance Evaluation in Work Settings, Annual Review of Psychology, 49, p. 141-68. Arya, A., Fellingham, J., and Glover, J., (1997). Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23, p.7-30.
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Heneman, R.L., (1986). The Relationship between supervisory ratings and results-oriented measures of performance: A Meta-Analysis, Personnel Psychology. 39. Heneman, R.L., Fay, C.H. and Wang, Z. (2002a). Compensation Systems in the Global Context, 5-34. In Heneman, R.L. (ed.), Strategic reward Management: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation, Information Age Publishing: Connecticut. Heneman, R.L., Ledford, G.E. Jr. and Gresham, M.T. (2002b). The changing nature of work and its effects on compensation design and delivery, 35-73. In Heneman, R.L. (ed.), Strategic reward Management: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation, Information Age Publishing: Connecticut. Holthausen, R. W., Larcker, D. F., and Sloan, R. G. (1995). Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19 (1), 29–74. Itoh, H. (1991). Incentives to help in multi-agent situations. Econometrica, 59, p.611-636. Ittner, C. D., Larcker, D. F. and Meyer, M.W. (2003a). Subjectivity and the weighting of performance measures: Evidence from a balanced scorecard, The Accounting Review, 78 (3), 725-759. Jensen, M., 2001, “Corporate Budgeting is Broken – Let’s Fix It,” Harvard Business Review, Vol. 70, No. 10, 2001, pp. 95-101.
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Kaplan, R.S. and Norton, D.P. (2008). Mastering the Management System. Harvard Business Review 86 (1), January, 63-77. Langfield-Smith, K. (2007). A review of quantitative research in management control systems and strategy. In Chapman, Hopwood and Shields (Eds.), Handbook of Management Accounting Research. Elsevier, Oxford, 753-784. Lawler, E. E. III. (2000). Rewarding Excellence, Pay Strategies for the New Economy, Jossey-Bass Inc: San Francisco. Lipe, M.G. and Salterio, S.E. (2000). The balanced scorecard: Judgemental effects of common and unique performance measures. The Accounting Review, 75 (3), 283-298.
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Mandel, B.J. (1969). The Regression Control Chart. Journal of Quality Technology. 1(1), p.1. Matejka, M., Merchant, K.A., Van der Stede, W.A. (2005). Performance Measurement and Evaluation Practices in Loss-Making Entities: Field and Survey Evidence. Working paper. Matsumura, E.M. and Shin, J.Y. (2006) An Empirical Analysis of an Incentive Plan with Relative Performance Measures: Evidence from a Postal Service. The Accounting Review, 81 (3), 533-566.
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Merchant, K.A. (1990). How Challenging Should Budget Targets Be? Management Accounting, November, p.46-48.
Merchant, K.A. and Manzoni J. (1989). The Achievability of Budget Targets in Profit Centres: A Field Study, The Accounting Review, LXIV (3), 539-558. Merchant, K. A., Van der Stede, W. and Zheng, L. (2003). Disciplinary constraints on the advancement of knowledge: the case of organizational incentive systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28, 251-286. Miceli, M.P. and Heneman, R.L. (2002). Contextual determinants of variable pay plan design: a proposed research framework. In Strategic reward Management: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation, Heneman, R.L. (ed.) Information Age Publishing: Connecticut, 213-231. Moers, F. (2005). Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: the impact of diversity and subjectivity, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 30, 67-80. Murphy, K.J. (2001) Performance standards in incentive contracts, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3), 245-278. Rajan, M.V. and Reichelstein, S. (2006). Subjective Performance Indicators and Discretionary Bonus Pools. Journal of Accounting Research, 44 (3), p.585-. Ramakrishnan, R.T.S. and Thakor. (1991) Cooperation versus competition in agency. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, 248-283. Stringer, C. P. (2006). Performance management: An empirical study. Dunedin, New Zealand: University of Otago, 465p. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Reference Number: 0020060331. Stringer, C.P. (2009). Performance evaluation. Paper to be presented at the Performance Measurement Association Conference, Dunedin, 14-17 April, 2009. Tae Sik Ahn (2008). The Effects of Subjective Measures on Ratee Incentive, presented at American Accounting Association Conference, Anaheim, 3-6 August. http://aaahq.org/AM2008/abstract.cfm?submissionID=907 Walsh, P. (2000). Targets and how to assess performance against them. Benchmarking: An International Journal, 7 (3), p.183-. Woods, A. (2008) Subjective adjustments to objective performance measures: An empirical examination of the economic benefits and social costs in complex work settings, Paper presented at AAA Annual Conference, Anaheim, US 4-6 August
Determination of Bent-Cap and Stringer Deflections for Timber Railway Bridges Under Live Load
No full textMany aging timber railroad bridges are currently in use throughout the United States, and these bridges are being exposed to increasingly heavy loads from rolling stock and other harsh conditions. This could lead to flexural failure or horizontal shear cracking of the stringers, which could result in a split stringer. The maximum flexural stress in a split stringer is two times larger than that of an unimpaired stringer when exposed to the same load. This thesis outlines the instrumentation and analysis of a small-scale timber bridge model and two large-scale bridges in order to better understand a timber railroad bridge���s response to a live load. String potentiometers were used to measure bent-cap and stringer deflections, and wheel path position sensors were created and installed in order to determine vehicle speed and position as it traversed the bridge. Each test included different experimental parameters, such as different vehicle speeds and vehicle types.
During the course of each experiment, the bent-caps experienced very little deflection when under live load. It was also determined that vehicle speed did not significantly affect bent-cap deflection, total stringer mid-span deflection, or net stringer mid-span deflection. In the past, it has been assumed that stringers comprising a chord acted as one member. However, the results of this research demonstrated that each stringer in a chord experienced extremely different deflections in response to a vehicle traversing the bridge. This research also demonstrated a significant difference between the magnitude of the maximum total mid-span stringer deflections and the maximum net mid-span stringer deflections. The total mid-span stringer deflections were anywhere from 36% to 80% higher than the net deflections. It was also concluded that the maximum mid-span stringer deflection that occurred as a freight train traversed a bridge were due to the trucks that were on each side of the couplings connecting the rolling stock. In addition, the mid-span deflections of a split stringer were found to be four times larger than that of an unimpaired stringer when exposed to the same live load
On the asymptotic behaviour of the Stringer bound
No full textThe Stringer bound is a widely used nonparametric 100(1) % upper condence bound for the fraction of errors in an accounting population. This bound has been found in practice to be rather conservative, but no rigorous mathematical proof of the correctness of the Stringer bound as an upper condence bound is known and also no counterexamples are available. In a pioneering paper Bickel (1992) has given some xed sample support to the bound's conservatism together with an asymptotic expansion in probability of the Stringer bound, which has led to his claim of the asymptotic conservatism of the Stringer bound. In the present paper we obtain expansions of arbitrary order of the coecients in the Stringer bound. As a consequence we obtain Bickel's asymptotic expansion with probability 1 and we show that the asymptotic conservatism holds for condence levels 1 , with 2 (0; 12]. It means that in general also in a nite sampling situation the Stringer bound does not necessarily have the right condence level. Based on our expansions we propose a modied Stringer bound which has asymptotically precisely the right nominal condence level. Finally, we discuss other consequences of the expansions of the Stringer bound such as a central limit theorem, a law of the iterated logarithm and the functional versions of them. Key words & Phrases: order statistics, conservatism of a test, Edgeworth expansion, linear combinations of order statistics, Stringer bound. 1
Fatigue analysis of stringer to floor beam connections in through plate girder and through truss railroad bridges
No full textDue to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 44-46).Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.The objective of this thesis is to determine fatigue stresses in the stringer to floor beam connections of through plate girder (TPG) and through truss (TT) bridges in order to predict failure. Field observations by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) indicate failure in the stringer to floor beam connections of both the TPG and TT bridges, although a higher frequency of failure appears in the TT bridges. Accordingly, this study includes 1) creating analytical models for the TPG and TT bridges, 2) determining member internal forces, 3) developing force envelopes, 4) determining maximum internal stresses, and 5) comparing these results to field observations. First, bridge models for the TPG and TT bridge were assembled using a finite element analysis program in order to evaluate member internal forces. The TPG bridge model was taken from the plans of an existing bridge designed in 1912 and located near TX Highway 21 between College Station and Caldwell, TX. The TT bridge model was taken from the plans of an existing bridge designed in 1902 in the Chicago Office of the American Bridge Company. Next, a finite element analysis was conducted to obtain member internal forces. The resulting forces were compiled to create axial load, shear force, and moment envelopes. These envelopes were constructed to provide the magnitudes and location of the maximum forces required for analysis. These forces were also used to develop maximum tensile stresses for the rivets in the floor beams. After examining the results, the following conclusions were drawn. Axial load was predicted to be a source of higher failure frequency within TT bridges versus TPG bridges. Lower chord deformation in the TT bridge caused elongation of the floor system that, in turn, produced axial loads in the bridge members. The TPG bridge members, however, carried no axial load. Shear force was not predicted to be a contributing factor for increased connection failure rates in the TT bridges as compared to the TPG bridges, but bending moment was. This result, however, was sensitive to the degree of fixity in the stringer to floor beam connection
On the asymptotic behaviour of the Stringer bound
No full textThe Stringer bound is a widely used nonparametric 100(1−alpha�)% upper confidence
bound for the fraction of errors in an accounting population. This bound has been
found in practice to be rather conservative, but no rigorous mathematical proof
of the correctness of the Stringer bound as an upper confidence bound is known
and also no counterexamples are available. In a pioneering paper Bickel (1992)
has given some fixed sample support to the bound’s conservatism together with an
asymptotic expansion in probability of the Stringer bound, which has led to his
claim of the asymptotic conservatism of the Stringer bound. In the present paper
we obtain expansions of arbitrary order of the coefficients in the Stringer bound.
As a consequence we obtain Bickel’s asymptotic expansion with probability 1 and
we show that the asymptotic conservatism holds for confidence levels 1 − alpha �, with alpha \in (0, 1/2 ]. It means that in general also in a finite sampling situation the Stringer
bound does not necessarily have the right confidence level. Based on our expansions
we propose a modified Stringer bound which has asymptotically precisely the right
nominal confidence level. Finally, we discuss other consequences of the expansions
of the Stringer bound such as a central limit theorem, a law of the iterated logarithm
and the functional versions of them
The Effect of a Riveted Stringer on the Stress in a Sheet With a Circular Cutout
No full textA theoretical investigation was made into the effect of a rivet-attached stringer on the stress concentrations in a thin elastic sheet with a circular cutout. The sheet and stringer are loaded (at infinity) by a uniform tensile stress parallel to the stringer. The results are expressed in terms of a “correction factor.”</jats:p
Ultra-wideband microwave leakage monitoring for stringer debonding detection in carbon composite fuselage structures
No full textUltra-wideband guided electromagnetic waves have been proposed recently for non-destructive testing and structural health monitoring applications. However, many possibilities are still unexplored given by the multitude of possible microwave waveguides. The present work introduces the concept of microwave leakage monitoring to detect stringer debondings in hollow carbon composite structures. The principle is to monitor the wave propagation characteristics within the cavity formed by the stringer and the airframe skin using transmission measurements. Changes in the transmission path, e.g. occurring from microwave leakage in the debonded region, can be assessed through a damage indicator approach.
To proof this concept, an experimental campaign was carried out according to the building block approach typically used in aeronautics. First, a small-scale specimen with a debonded stringer was investigated in the laboratory. Then, a large-scale fuselage structure was used for technology demonstration enabling stringer debonding with increasing severity through static and fatigue loading. The paper shows that the microwave characteristics in the waveguide (stringer tunnel) is affected by the debonding conditions according to its severity and depth. This allows designing a structural health monitoring system based on guided electromagnetic waves trapped in the tunnel
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