215 research outputs found
Russia: An Abnormal Country
No full textAndrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman recently rendered a summary verdict on the post Soviet Russian transition experience finding that the Federation had become a normal country with the west's assistance, and predicting that it would liberalize and develop further like other successful nations of its type. This essay demonstrates that they are mistaken on the first count, and are likely to be wrong on the second too. It shows factually, and on the norms elaborated by Pareto, Arrow and Bergson that Russia is an abnormal political economy unlikely to democratize, westernize or embrace free enterprise any time soonRussian economy; transition economics; comparative economic systems
Post-war Russian economic growth : not a riddle
No full textIn a recent article Steven Rosefielde (2003) has advanced three propositions. He suggests that according to the best available statistics the post-war growth of the Russian economy under the command system was surprisingly good; in fact, he argues that it was too good. The standard for this judgement is economic theory, which holds that non-market systems must fail by comparison with market economies; Rosefielde associates specifically this view with the 'Washington consensus'. He concludes that it is the statistics that are at fault: they 'lied and were misconstrued' by Western 'statistically oriented comparativists' in a way that was unduly favourable to the command system.
In this comment I argue that Rosefielde has misread both the facts and the theory. There is no riddle in the statistics. His conclusion, therefore, must fall
Economic Optimization and Technical Efficiency in Russian Enterprises Jointly Regulated by Profits and State Incentives
No full textWestern analysts have seriously misforecast Russia's economic transition. They believed that privatized post-Soviet firms operating in a liberal environment would quickly prosper by becoming responsive to market demand, and economizing costs as reguired by the logic of profit maximization. Little attention was paid to the institutional setting on the tacit assumption that market forces would bring about the requistite adaptations. This paper attempts to assess why the efficiency of the self regulating economic system emerging in Russia hasn't yet risen to the western capitalist norm by examining contemporary Russian institutional arrangements in Soviet perspective. It will be shown that while the incentives and constraints which conditioned Soviet enterprise bonus maximization have changed, the warped logic and culture of administrative optimization claborated nearly a decade ago in Steven Rosefielde and R.W. Pfouts, "Economic Optimization and Technical Efficiency in Soviet Enterprises Jointly Regulated by Plans and Incentives". European Economic Review. Vol. 32, № 6, 1988, pp. 1285-1299, remains intact.Western analysts have seriously misforecast Russia's economic transition. They believed that privatized post-Soviet firms operating in a liberal environment would quickly prosper by becoming responsive to market demand, and economizing costs as reguired by the logic of profit maximization. Little attention was paid to the institutional setting on the tacit assumption that market forces would bring about the requistite adaptations. This paper attempts to assess why the efficiency of the self regulating economic system emerging in Russia hasn't yet risen to the western capitalist norm by examining contemporary Russian institutional arrangements in Soviet perspective. It will be shown that while the incentives and constraints which conditioned Soviet enterprise bonus maximization have changed, the warped logic and culture of administrative optimization claborated nearly a decade ago in Steven Rosefielde and R.W. Pfouts, "Economic Optimization and Technical Efficiency in Soviet Enterprises Jointly Regulated by Plans and Incentives". European Economic Review. Vol. 32, № 6, 1988, pp. 1285-1299, remains intact
The Kremlin Strikes Back
No full textAmerica and Europe responded to Russia&apos;s annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014 by discarding their policy of East-West partnership and reverting intermittently to a policy of cold war. The West believes that this on-again/off-again second Cold War will end with Russia&apos;s capitulation because it is not a sufficiently great power, while the Kremlin&apos;s view is just the opposite; Vladimir Putin believes that if Moscow has strategic patience, Russia can recover some of the geostrategic losses that it incurred when the Soviet Union collapsed. The Kremlin Strikes Back scrutinizes the economic prospects of both sides, including factors like military industrial prowess, warfighting capabilities, and national resolve, addressing particularly hot-button issues such as increasing military spending, decreasing domestic spending, and other policies. Stephen Rosefielde aims to objectively gauge future prospects and the wisdom of employing various strategies to address Russian developments.</jats:p
Les limites du libéralisme économique soviétique : la perestroïka va-t-elle passer à la trappe ?
No full textThe Limits of Soviet Economie Liberalism : Perestroïka in Limbo.
Western proponents of laissez-faire and their followers in the East have long argued that Soviet economic performance could be greatly enhanced by repudiating administrative-command planning in favor of a free market. All that was required to exit the treadmill of cosmetic reform was an act of political will. Since markets were assumed to be more productive than controlled economic systems, it was contended that marketization in any degree would improve economic performance, and legitimate the rapid adoption of a full fledged market regime.
The Gorbachev revolution has falsified this expectation. It has demonstrated that it is far easier to unleash the forces of liberalism than it is to orchestrate an orderly transition to market socialism. Glasnost', demokratizatsiia, novoe myshlenie, and perestroika have simultaneously raised expectations, and triggered an acute economic and political crisis that shows no signs of abating. This has left the regime in limbo, drifting toward the right.
Where will it end ? Will free market forces ultimately prevail, or are other outcomes more probable ? This essay explains why free market optimism is likely to be misplaced. Although the current impasse could be resolved by devising a sound program of incremental reform, or adopting a stabilization policy restoring the pre-perestroika system of administrative command planning, neither option is apt to be seized. Liberals have yet to formulate a viable plan, and Gorbachev still resists the status quo ante. As a consequence, the forces of despotism are growing, and may soon extinguish Gorbachev's capricious experiment in laissez-faire market socialism.Les partisans du laissez-faire en Occident et leurs émules en Europe de l'Est ont longtemps affirmé que les performances de l'économie soviétique ne s'amélioreraient nettement que si 1'U.R.S.S. renonçait à la planification imperative pour adopter l'économie de marché. Il suffisait de le vouloir pour sortir de l'ornière des réformes de façade. Les marchés étant par définition plus productifs que les économies centralement gérées, il était hors de question d'introduire un nombre plus ou moins grand d'éléments du marché dans l'espoir d'obtenir des résultats économiques satisfaisants. Seule l'adoption accélérée d'un système de marché à part entière était justifiée.
La révolution gorbatchévienne a infirmé cette théorie. Elle a montré qu'il était beaucoup plus facile de lâcher les forces du libéralisme que d'orchestrer une transition dans l'ordre au socialisme de marché. Glasnost', demokratizacija, novoe myslenie et perestrojka ont à la fois fait naître d'énormes espoirs et provoqué une crise économique et politique aiguë qui ne paraît nullement s'apaiser. Le régime est resté en suspens, tout en dérivant vers la droite.
Comment tout cela se terminera-t-il ? Les forces du marché libre finiront-elles par l'emporter ou d'autres issues sont-elles plus probables ? L'auteur entend expliquer en quoi l'optimisme des adeptes du marché libre n'est pas de mise. Il serait possible de sortir de l'impasse actuelle en appliquant un programme cohérent de réforme par étapes ou en menant une politique de stabilisation, destinée à rétablir le système impératif de planification antérieur à la perestroïka, mais aucune de ces deux options n'a de chance d'être retenue. Les libéraux n'ont toujours pas formulé de projet viable et Gorbatchev refuse le retour au statu quo antérieur. De ce fait, les forces du despostisme reprennent de la vigueur et pourraient bien anéantir prochainement l'expérience fantasque de socialisme de marché à la sauce libérale.Rosefielde Steven. Les limites du libéralisme économique soviétique : la perestroïka va-t-elle passer à la trappe ?. In: Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 22, 1991, n°2. pp. 59-70
Impact Of Trade with China On The Unemployment Rate In Taiwan
No full textThe Sunflower Movement protests that occurred in March of 2014 in Taiwan in response to the passing of a bilateral free trade agreement with Mainland China drew attention to the concerns over the impact of increased trade on the domestic unemployment rate. This paper looks at the effect that increased imports and exports to China as well as to the rest of the world has on the aggregate unemployment rate in Taiwan. Using the official trade statistics and unemployment rates provided by the Taiwanese government, this research uses a vector autoregressive model to test that impact and finds that an increased trade with China increases the aggregate unemployment rate in Taiwan. Trade with the rest of the world not including China has the opposite effect where an increase in trade here will decrease the unemployment rate. Looking at the separate effect of imports versus exports on the unemployment rate, the vector autoregressive model shows that both imports and exports from China increases the aggregate unemployment rate. Imports and exports from the rest of the world not including China, however, decrease the aggregate unemployment rate in Taiwan.Bachelor of Art
Prevention and crisis management : lessons for Asia from the 2008 crisis
No full textBy Rosefielde, Steven, Masaaki Kuboniwa, and Satoshi Mizobata The book draws the lesson from the crisis that economic booms need to be carefully monitored especially when they result from deficit spending, expansionary monetary policies, financial deregulation and mercantilist trade policies. Have we learned the lessons? Steven Rosefielde adds that merely imposing stronger financial regulation and modestly tightening the short-term budget will not prevent recurring crises. Instead, a more comprehensive solution should include structural reform of governance and establishment of monitoring agencies that oversee speculation and potential bubbles. As the world becomes more interconnected and China rises as the second largest economy in the world, future financial crises may be more complicated and have even bigger impacts on the global economy. Overall, measures for preventing and managing crises should consider not only domestic circumstances, but also global imbalances.</p
Grexit and Brexit: Rational choice, compatibility, and coercive adaptation
No full textAbstract
This article combines a rational choice framework with an analysis of
contemporary European Union institutions to elucidate the causes of Grexit and
Brexit. It shows that the sustainability of the EU in part or whole in “normal”
times depends on member compatibility and coercive adaptation. If members share
the same values, including a common vision of transnational governance and a
commitment to mutual support (solidarity), the EU should be able to stick
together through thick and thin. If, on the contrary, members hold incompatible
outlooks on the distribution of transnational powers and solidarity, then the EU
will be vulnerable to dismemberment. The EU today is prone to disunion because
its members no longer share a common view of mutually acceptable transnational
government and policy; powerful members insist upon bending recalcitrant members
to their will (coercive adaptation), and participants hold contradictory
attitudes towards solidarity on a variety of issues. Winston Churchill and
Robert Schuman in the late 1940s hoped that their post-war Europe project would
be something more than a “single market”; that it would become the cornerstone
of European peace. They appreciated the value of cooperative economy, but
considered material benefits icing on the cake. Brexit and Grexit are best seen
in this larger perspective underscoring the wisdom of conciliation
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