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Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Major Problems with Major Questions
Full text linkThis July in West Virginia v. EPA, the Supreme Court formally recognized the “major questions doctrine.” That doctrine, which can be traced to a 1986 law review article published by then-Judge Stephen Breyer, calls on courts to consider a legal question’s “political importance” when interpreting statutes.
The major questions doctrine is a product of legal pragmatism—a theory of statutory interpretation advanced by Justice Breyer which often elevates statutory purpose and consequences over text. The doctrine is inconsistent with textualism—an interpretive theory that emphasizes statutory text, structure, and history to understand a statute as the public originally understood it. The takeaway is clear: textualists should reject Justice Breyer’s major questions doctrine
“Recommend . . . Measures”: A Textualist Reformulation Of The Major Questions Doctrine
Full text linkFollowing Biden v. Nebraska, defenders of the major questions doctrine (which requires administrative agencies to identify “clear congressional authorization” to regulate “major” issues) can be categorized as falling within one of two camps. The first camp includes Justices Gorsuch and Alito, who view the major questions doctrine as a substantive canon. The second camp includes Justice Barrett, who explained in Nebraska that she is “wary” of adopting new substantive canons, and indicated that she considers the major questions doctrine to be a linguistic canon. Interestingly, both camps have relied on an influential scholar to advance their positions: then Professor (now Justice) Barrett. This Article will therefore also work within Justice Barrett’s scholarly framework, but will do so to make two points. First, that textualists have reason to object to both the substantive and linguistic conceptions of the major questions doctrine that are currently on offer. And second, that the major questions doctrine can be reformulated into a new substantive canon that textualists can embrace
Placing Legal Context In Context
Full text linkIn Biden v. Nebraska, Justice Barrett authored a concurrence in which she characterized the major questions doctrine as a linguistic canon that accounts for the “legal context” surrounding delegations of power. Some scholars have critiqued Justice Barrett\u27s concurrence on the grounds that empirical research suggests that ordinary readers do not account for “majorness” in the way that the major questions doctrine requires. This Essay argues that those critiques miss the mark because they conflate factual context with legal context. Justice Barrett\u27s concurrence should be considered within the broader textualist tradition of understanding “ordinary meaning” as a legal concept, and not simply an empirical fact. But to say that Justice Barrett\u27s concurrence should be understood within that broader textualist tradition is not to say that her concurrence is immune from criticism. To the contrary, this Essay contends that Justice Barrett\u27s concurrence does not account fully for legal context concerning the President\u27s lawmaking functions. The upshot is that textualists eager to embrace the major questions doctrine are better off reconceptualizing the doctrine as a substantive canon that polices the precise lines delineating the lawmaking powers vested in the President and Congress
Federalism in the Algorithmic Age
Full text linkThe robots will not be pleased with Frank Pasquale. In New Laws of Robotics, the Brooklyn Law professor outlines two possible futures that can emerge from a growing conflict between human and robotic thought. The first is a future of robotic dominance. In that future, decisions traditionally made by human professionals (e.g., who goes to jail, what medicines are prescribed, and what news gets published) are decided by robots powered by artificially intelligent algorithms. The second future offers robots a less-favored role in the ordering of human affairs. Pasquale earns the displeasure of our would-be robotic overlords by outlining the path to this second future, where human professional judgment is enhanced by (but not replaced with) robotic systems
The Limits of the Freedom Act\u27s Amicus Curiae
Full text linkThe federal government’s power to engage in surveillance for national security purposes is extensive. In an effort to reform the current national surveillance regime, scholars have called for, among other things, the creation of a “special advocate” to counter the government’s arguments before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Feeling political pressure to improve an ever-unpopular national surveillance regime, lawmakers passed the USA FREEDOM Act (“Freedom Act”). Section 401 of the Freedom Act provides for the creation of an “amicus curiae,” a position that differs from earlier conceptions of a “special advocate” in important respects. This Essay examines those differences, and counsels against conflating the Freedom Act’s amicus curiae with a true special advocate. By doing so, this Essay highlights the need for continued calls for a special advocate
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Placing Legal Context In Context
No full textIn Biden v. Nebraska, Justice Barrett authored a concurrence in which she characterized the major questions doctrine as a linguistic canon that accounts for the “legal context” surrounding delegations of power. Some scholars have critiqued Justice Barrett\u27s concurrence on the grounds that empirical research suggests that ordinary readers do not account for “majorness” in the way that the major questions doctrine requires. This Essay argues that those critiques miss the mark because they conflate factual context with legal context. Justice Barrett\u27s concurrence should be considered within the broader textualist tradition of understanding “ordinary meaning” as a legal concept, and not simply an empirical fact. But to say that Justice Barrett\u27s concurrence should be understood within that broader textualist tradition is not to say that her concurrence is immune from criticism. To the contrary, this Essay contends that Justice Barrett\u27s concurrence does not account fully for legal context concerning the President\u27s lawmaking functions. The upshot is that textualists eager to embrace the major questions doctrine are better off reconceptualizing the doctrine as a substantive canon that polices the precise lines delineating the lawmaking powers vested in the President and Congress
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