1,720,987 research outputs found
Privacy regulation and online concentration during demand peaks: evidence from the E-commerce sector
No full textIn this paper, we study how the introduction of the GDPR affected online traffic and concentration. We rely on a unique dataset collecting information on websites' visits in the E-commerce sector, and we implement a difference-in-differences model that exploits the geographical origin of website traffic. We classify websites according to their pre-GDPR amount of visits to capture potential heterogeneous effects based on websites' size. We exploit the advent of the 2018 Black Friday to assess how online consumption and concentration react in a period of demand peak when constrained by privacy regulation. Our findings show that (1) online traffic decreases after GDPR, (2) the impact is higher for small websites which however gain traffic during demand peaks, and (3) online concentration decreases in Germany but increases in Italy
Privacy regulations and online safety: evidence from adult-only websites
No full textWe study the effects of the introduction of a more stringent privacy legislation on the consumption of websites that increase consumers' exposure to privacy risk. We exploit panel data on online traffic on top 1000 domains in US and EU, before and after the introduction of the GDPR. We find that the traffic on Adult-only websites increased by 11% after the enactment of the GDPR, whereas it decreased by 7% in other websites. We show through a theoretical model that, because of their high privacy risk, the demand of Adult-only websites is analogous to that of a Giffen good
Bargaining, vertical mergers and entry
Get PDFThis paper analyzes vertical integration incentives in a bilaterally duopolistic industry where upstream producers bargain with downstream retailers on terms of supply. In the applied framework integration does not affect the total output produced, but it affects the distribution of rents among players. Vertical integration incentives depend on the strength of substitutability or complementarity between products and the shape of the unit cost function. I demonstrate furthermore that in contrast to the widely prevailing view in competition policy, vertical integration can under particular circumstances convey more bargaining power to the merged entity than a horizontal merger to monopoly. The model is applied to analyze strategic merger incentives to influence entry decisions. Mergers can facilitate and deter entry. While horizontal mergers to deter entry are never profitable, firms on different market levels may strategically choose to integrate vertically to keep a potential entrant out of the market. I provide conditions for such entry-deterring vertical mergers to occur
Technologie-Lizenzierung in der Europäischen Wettbewerbskontrolle: ein Überblick
No full textIn den letzten Jahren ist die Lizenzierung neuer Software- und Elektronikprodukte in Europa und den USA anhand einiger prominenter Fälle intensiv diskutiert worden. So gab die Europäische Kommission Anfang 2011 erst grünes Licht für die Übernahme des Sicherheitssoftware- Herstellers McAfee durch Intel, nachdem Intel sich verpflichtet hatte, wichtige Informationen über Schnittstellen seiner Produkte offen zu legen und somit die Kompatibilität mit Produkten anderer Hersteller zu gewährleisten. Zuvor spielte Technologie-Lizenzierung in den Qualcomm- und Microsoft-Fällen eine wichtige Rolle. Gleichzeitig wurde der für die Lizenzierung von Technologien relevante europäische Rechtsrahmen angepasst. Neben der Darstellung der einschlägigen ökonomischen Theorien und ausgewählter Entscheidungen der EU-Kommission in Lizenzierungsfällen gibt dieser Artikel einen Überblick über die aktuellen Änderungen im EU-Rechtsrahmen
Online privacy and market structure: Theory and evidence
No full textThis paper investigates how privacy regulation affects the structure of online markets. We provide a simple theoretical model capturing the basic trade-off between the degree of privacy intrusion and the informativeness of advertising. We derive empirically testable hypotheses regarding a possibly asymmetric effect of privacy regulation on large and small firms using a diff-diff-diff model with heterogeneous treatment timing. Our theoretical model predicts that privacy regulation may affect predominantly large firms, even if - as our data confirms - these large firms tend to offer more privacy. Our empirical results show that, if any, only large firms were negatively affected, suggesting that privacy regulation might boost competition by leveling out the playing field for small firms
Learning from data and network effects: The example of internet search
No full textThe rise of dominant firms in data driven industries is often credited to their alleged data advantage. Empirical evidence lending support to this conjecture is surprisingly scarce. In this paper we document that data as an input into machine learning tasks display features that support the claim of data being a source of market power. We study how data on keywords improve the search result quality on Yahoo!. Search result quality increases when more users search a keyword. In addition to this direct network effect caused by more users, we observe a novel externality that is caused by the amount of data that the search engine collects on the particular users. More data on the personal search histories of the users reinforce the direct network effect stemming from the number of users searching the same keyword. Our findings imply that a search engine with access to longer user histories may improve the quality of its search results faster than an otherwise equally efficient rival with the same size of user base but access to shorter user histories
Technology Licensing by Advertising Supported Media Platforms: An Application to Internet Search Engines
No full textWe develop a duopoly model with advertising supported platforms and analyze incentives of a superior firm to license its advanced technologies to an inferior rival. We highlight the role of two technologies characteristic for media platforms: the technology to produce content and to place advertisements. Licensing incentives are driven solely by indirect network effects arising from the aversion of users to advertising. We establish a relationship between licensing incentives and the nature of technology, the decision variable on the advertiser side, and the structure of platforms’ revenues. Only the technology to place advertisements is licensed. If users are charged for access, licensing incentives vanish. Licensing increases the advertising intensity, benefits advertisers and harms users. Our model provides a rationale for technology-based cooperations between competing platforms, such as the planned Yahoo-Google advertising agreement in 2008.
Complementarities in learning from data: insights from general search
No full textABS 2International audienceThe ability to make accurate predictions relating to consumer preferences is a key factor of a digital firm's success. Examples include targeted advertisements and, more broadly, business models relying on capturing consumers' attention. The prediction technologies used to learn consumer preferences rely on consumer generated data. Despite the importance of data-driven technologies, there is a lack of knowledge about the precise role that data-scale plays for prediction accuracy. From a policy perspective, a better understanding about the role of data is needed to assess the risks that “big data” might pose for competition. This article highlights potential complementarities between different data dimensions in algorithmic learning. We analyze our hypothesis using search engine data from Yahoo! and provide evidence that more data in the within-user dimension enhances the efficiency of algorithmic learning in the across-user dimension. Our findings suggest that ignoring these complementarities might lead to underestimating scale advantages from data
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