1,721,054 research outputs found
To Give or Not To Give? Equity, Efficiency and Altruistic Behavior in a Survey-Based Experiment
No full textTo give or not to give? Equity, efficiency and altruistic behavior in an artefactual field experiment
No full textWe investigate the relative importance of the equity and efficiency motives for altruistic behavior using an artefactual field experiment. A set of binary dictator games is implemented within a telephone survey conducted with a representative sample of adults. The results indicate that, overall, equity plays a more important role than efficiency for the decision to give. Relative to the general population, young individuals are less concerned with inequality, while individuals with higher education are more concerned with social welfare. This indicates that lab experiments, generally implemented with young and educated university students, may lead to overestimate the importance of efficiency, relative to equity, as a determinant of altruistic behavior
Experiments with the traveler’s dilemma: welfare, strategic choice and implicit collusion
No full textHappiness and relational goods: well-being and interpersonal relations in the economic sphere
No full textThe present paper provides an introduction to this special issue devoted to Happiness and Relational Goods. We start by presenting a few concepts that have recently appeared in the economic literature with the aim of capturing some of the
peculiarities of personalised interactions. We claim that these concepts can be subsumed fairly well under the concept of ‘relational goods’. We then review the recent empirical literature on happiness and relational goods. Finally, we briefly
introduce the papers contained in this special issue by outlining their respective contributions
Mis-judging merit: The effects of adjudication errors in contests
No full textAdjudication errors in contests have a dual nature: they imply at the same time the unjust exclusion of a meritorious candidate (exclusion error) and the unjust inclusion of a non-meritorious one (inclusion error). We study theoretically and experimentally the effects of adjudication errors on contestants' effort, explicitly disentangling the respective effects of exclusion and inclusion errors. We show how behavioral aspects, such as risk aversion, loss aversion and the framing of the incentive scheme (prize vs. penalty) shape the effects of judgement errors on effort. The experimental findings indicate that mis-judgements negatively affect bids, with exclusion and inclusion er- rors contributing equally to the disincentive effects of adjudication errors. A penalty framing significantly increases bids, relative to a prize framing, both in the absence of judgement errors and in the presence of adjudication errors. On the other hand, no significant interaction is found between the framing of the incentive scheme and the disincentive effects of judgement errors
Boundedly rational opinion dynamics in social networks: Does indegree matter?
Full text linkThis paper investigates opinion dynamics and social influence in directed communication networks. We study the theoretical properties of a boundedly rational model of opinion formation in which individuals aggregate the information they receive from their neighbors by using weights that are a function of neighbors' indegree. We then present the results of a laboratory experiment explicitly designed to test the causal effect of indegree on social influence. We find that the social influence of an agent is positively affected by the number of individuals she listens to. When forming their opinions, agents take into account the structure of their communication network, although only to a limited extent
Financial fragility, heterogeneous agent and aggregate fluctuations: evidence from a panel of us firms
No full textA Prize To Give For: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms
No full textThis article investigates fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as a way to overcome free riding in the private provision of public goods. We focus on an environment characterised by income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. Our analysis compares experimentally the performance of a lottery, an all-pay auction and a benchmark voluntary contribution mechanism. We find that prize-based mechanisms perform better than voluntary contribution in terms of public good provision. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, contributions are significantly higher in the lottery than in the all-pay auction, both overall and by individual income types. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009.
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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