1,721,226 research outputs found
Personal Congratulatory Notes -- 1960-64 -- Correspondence, Miscellaneous -- letter, 1960-08-25
No full textLetter from Ryan, Stephen V. to Sabin, Albert B. dated 1960-08-25.Sabin Collection Fair Use Policy</a
Registration of Name -- 1959-67 -- OPV Production, Miscellaneous -- letter, 1959-12-18
No full textLetter from Ryan, Stephen V. to Sabin, Albert B. dated 1959-12-18.Sabin Collection Fair Use Policy</a
Registration of Name -- 1959-67 -- OPV Production, Miscellaneous -- letter, 1961-10-26
No full textLetter from Ryan, Stephen V. to Sabin, Albert B. dated 1961-10-26.Sabin Collection Fair Use Policy</a
Income Smoothing over the Business Cycle: Changes in Banks’ Coordinated Management of Provisions for Loan Losses and Loan Charge-offs from the Pre-1990 Bust to the 1990s Boom
No full textThe Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry
Full text linkThe typical cost analysis of an environmental regulation consists of an engineering estimate of the compliance costs. In industries where fixed costs are an important determinant of market structure, this static analysis ignores the dynamic effects of the regulation on entry, investment, and market power. I evaluate the welfare costs of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act on the U.S. Portland cement industry, accounting for these effects through a dynamic model of oligopoly in the tradition of Ericson and Pakes (1995). Using the two-step estimator of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), I recover the entire cost structure of the industry, including the distributions of sunk entry costs and capacity adjustment costs. My primary finding is that the Amendments have significantly increased the sunk cost of entry, leading to a loss of between 3.2B in product market surplus. A static analysis misses the welfare penalty on consumers, and obtains the wrong sign of the welfare effects on incumbent firms
Income Smoothing over the Business Cycle: Changes in Banks’ Coordinated Management of Provisions for Loan Losses and Loan Charge-offs from the Pre-1990 Bust to the 1990s Boom
No full textThe Effect of Bank Loan Portfolio Composition on the Market Reaction to and Anticipation of Loan Loss Provision
No full textThe welfare effects of supply side regulations in Medicare Part D
No full textThe efficiency of publicly-subsidized, privately-provisioned social insurance programs depends on the interaction between insurer behavior and public subsidies. We study this interaction within Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plan (PDP) markets.
Using a structural model of supply and demand, we find: consumers purchase too few and too socially-costly PDP plans; insurers price near marginal cost; the primary driver of welfare is the opportunity cost of government spending on other Medicare programs; and the current subsidization policy achieves a level of total welfare close to that obtained under an optimal in-kind subsidy, but is far from the social planner's
first-best solution
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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