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    Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 43 (Jun. 27, 2024)

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    The Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether a homeowner’s partial payments failed to satisfy the superpriority lien, meaning that the subsequent HOA foreclosure extinguished the first deed of trust. The Court examined the parameters set forth in Cranesbill which provided for allocation of a defaulting homeowner’s partial payments to an HOA superpriority lien. Court’s applying Cranesbill must: (1) look for direction of the homeowner allocating payment at the time payment was made, (2) then, if the homeowner fails to provide direction, a court must determine if the HOA allocated the payment prior to the dispute over the allocation, and (3) if the allocation by neither homeowner nor the HOA resolves the question, the court considers principles of justice and equity which presume that the superpriority lien is paid first, unless the court has a compelling reason to conclude otherwise. Here, after the Court’s analysis of Cranesbill, the Court held that absent express direction of the homeowner to the contrary, the HOA may not apply a payment in a way that jeopardizes the first deed of trust holder’s interest and deprives the homeowner of the security on the homeowner’s mortgage. The Supreme Court of Nevada disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the homeowner’s partial payments failed to satisfy the superpriority lien, meaning that the subsequent HOA foreclosure extinguished the first deed of trust. Therefore, the Court reversed the lower judgment and remanded for entry of judgment for Deutsche Bank

    Sunrise Hosp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 12 (Mar. 07, 2024)

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    The Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by compelling testimony concerning alleged privileged information under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA). The Court answered this question by considering: (1) whether the PSQIA patient safety work product privilege can be waived and (2) whether the information that Grace seeks to discover constitutes privileged patient safety work product. The Court looked at the plain language of the regulation and found that the regulation describes when patient safety work product shall continue to remain privileged. The regulation does not describe when patient safety work product shall be excepted from privilege–the exceptions are covered in a different section. The district court erred when it found that Sunrise could waive the privilege over patient safety work product under the PSQIA. The Court ultimately rejected the district court’s interpretation and found that the privilege over identifiable patient safety work product is absolute and cannot be waived. The district court was further ordered to vacate its order to compel testimony of Dr. Murawsky and to determine whether Grace seeks to compel identifiable or nonidentifiable patient safety work product, and then rule on the motion to compel accordingly

    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed

    Sunrise Hosp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 12 (Mar. 07, 2024)

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    The Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether the district court exceeded its jurisdiction by compelling testimony concerning alleged privileged information under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA). The Court answered this question by considering: (1) whether the PSQIA patient safety work product privilege can be waived and (2) whether the information that Grace seeks to discover constitutes privileged patient safety work product. The Court looked at the plain language of the regulation and found that the regulation describes when patient safety work product shall continue to remain privileged. The regulation does not describe when patient safety work product shall be excepted from privilege–the exceptions are covered in a different section. The district court erred when it found that Sunrise could waive the privilege over patient safety work product under the PSQIA. The Court ultimately rejected the district court’s interpretation and found that the privilege over identifiable patient safety work product is absolute and cannot be waived. The district court was further ordered to vacate its order to compel testimony of Dr. Murawsky and to determine whether Grace seeks to compel identifiable or nonidentifiable patient safety work product, and then rule on the motion to compel accordingly

    Morrison v. State of Nevada, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 24 (Apr. 4, 2024)

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    Kwame De-Markquise Morrison raised five issues after a jury found him guilty of three counts of sexual assault upon a minor under the age of 14 years and one count of use of a minor under the age of 14 to produce pornography. Morrison contended that the district court erred when it instructed the jury that lack of knowledge, or mistake of fact as to the victim’s age, is not a defense to the charge of use of a minor in producing pornography, NRS 200.710(1). Second, Morrison alleged that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss counsel. Third, he alleged that the district court erred by failing to conduct a Faretta canvass. Fourth, he argued that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. Fifth, Morrison contended the State improperly commented on the evidence during the closing argument. The Nevada Court of Appeals found that the district court provided an inaccurate jury instruction to the jury regarding NRS 200.710(1); nevertheless, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court rejected Morrison’s other four arguments and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion

    Variations on the Author

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    “Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship

    Morrison v. State of Nevada, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 24 (Apr. 4, 2024)

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    Kwame De-Markquise Morrison raised five issues after a jury found him guilty of three counts of sexual assault upon a minor under the age of 14 years and one count of use of a minor under the age of 14 to produce pornography. Morrison contended that the district court erred when it instructed the jury that lack of knowledge, or mistake of fact as to the victim’s age, is not a defense to the charge of use of a minor in producing pornography, NRS 200.710(1). Second, Morrison alleged that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss counsel. Third, he alleged that the district court erred by failing to conduct a Faretta canvass. Fourth, he argued that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. Fifth, Morrison contended the State improperly commented on the evidence during the closing argument. The Nevada Court of Appeals found that the district court provided an inaccurate jury instruction to the jury regarding NRS 200.710(1); nevertheless, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court rejected Morrison’s other four arguments and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion

    Antonio Cruz Aldape v. State of Nevada, 139 Nev. Adv. Op. 42 (Sept. 28, 2023)

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    The Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether the appellant Antonio Aldape could challenge the conditions of his probation if the appeal waiver in the plea agreement only specified that by entering the plea, you “waive your right to a direct appeal of conviction.” Additionally, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of the appellant’s probation conditions, condition 15, mandated by NRS 176A.410(1)(q), prohibiting internet access, and condition 11, pursuant to NRS 176A.400(1)(c)(3), restricting entry into specific geographic areas. The Court applied contract principles to the appellant’s appeal waiver in his plea agreement and held the appellant’s waiver did not preclude challenges to the conditions of his waiver because the State is bound by the plain meaning of the words it used, and the appellant was not canvassed about the appeal waiver’s scope, thus he would not logically understand that it also precluded the right to appeal probation conditions. The Court further found condition 15 mandated by NRS 176A.410(1)(q) facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it restricts more speech than necessary to serve a significant government’s interest and it was not narrowly tailored enough. Finally, the Court rejected the appellant’s challenge that condition 11 pursuant to NRS 176A.400(1)(c)(3) was unconstitutional and the district court abused its discretion imposing such a condition because it is reasonable to restrict convicted sex offenders from areas where children are commonly found
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