1,721,204 research outputs found
Store - Robert Mueller & Brother
No full textRobert Mueller & Brother storefront. Glass window with display of suitcases and travel accessories and travel posters
COPS/Metro Alliance-StMU Oral Histories with Robert Mueller
No full textRobert Mueller spoke about the impact that COPS has had on the city of San Antonio and the surrounding neighborhood. The topics included; gun control, corporate meetings, community impact, how COPS works, and more.https://commons.stmarytx.edu/copsmetro/1026/thumbnail.jp
Robert Mueller House, Decatur, Illinois, 1910 [picture].
No full textPart of the collection: Eric Milton Nicholls collection.; Title from acquisitions documentation.; Inscriptions: "WBG - landscape. MMG 1910, Robert Mueller House, Decatur, Ill."--In pencil on verso.; House designed by Marion Mahony Griffin -- Beyond Architecture, p. 31.; Condition: Good.; Also available in electronic version via the Internet at: http://nla.gov.au/nla.pic-vn3603884-s865; Purchased from Marie and Glynn Nicholls, 2006.; Vernon inventory, Pt. II/2 No.5
Wooden Arch Hangar at Robert Mueller Airport
No full textPhotograph of a wooden arch hangar at Robert Mueller Airport, built summer 1943. Writing on the back of the photograph reads: "The glued, laminated wood arches were built onsite. The curve was formed to templates laid out on the floor and constructed of 1" X 10" yellow pine plank. They were bolted together at the center and hoisted in place to receive the roof joists. Built by J.M. Odom Construction Co. Work supervised by Charles Morton, chief estimator.
Could This Supreme Court Case Affect Robert Mueller?
No full textThis article examines the then-pending Supreme Court case of Raymond J. Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, and its possible implications for Robert Mueller. At issue in Lucia is the question of whether SEC Administrative Law Judges are “officers” or “employees” of the United States. More precisely, Lucia is arguing that SEC Administrative Law Judges—who are appointed by the Chief Administrative Law Judge—are officers of the United States who constitutionally may be appointed only by the president or by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Implicated in this case is the question of whether administrative law judges must be dischargeable at will or whether, as is now the case, they may be fired only for “good cause.” Fundamentally, whittling away at administrative independence from the president could embolden both President Trump and his advisors to aggressively advocate for a strong “unitary-executive” presidency under which the chief executive is entitled to fire at will any “Officers of the United States”—including Robert Mueller
Can President Trump Get Rid of Robert Mueller?
No full textActing Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller as special counsel to lead the federal government’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Since his appointment in 2017, Mueller has issued indictments against individuals from the United States, Russia, and the Netherlands, along with three Russian organizations. He has also secured several guilty pleas from former Trump campaign officials. President Donald Trump has expressed displeasure with the investigation, repeatedly calling it a “witch hunt.” President Trump’s stance on Mueller’s investigation raises the question of whether the President might take steps to remove Mueller from office—and whether doing so would be lawful. U.S. Department of Justice regulations state that the U.S. Attorney General has the sole power to appoint a special counsel, and he may only remove the special counsel for “good cause.” Nevertheless, the White House has recently expressed confidence in the President’s ability to fire Mueller. This series in The Regulatory Review analyzes who has the legal authority to remove Mueller from office and what the proper basis for such removal might be. The series includes three essays from prominent administrative law scholars: Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School; Alan B. Morrison, Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest and Public Service Law at the George Washington University Law School; and Cary Coglianese, Edward B. Shils Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Regulatory Review is pleased to present this series of essays on the President’s removal power. April 16, 2018 | Richard J. Pierce, Jr., George Washington University Law School The easiest way for President Donald Trump to fire special counsel Robert Mueller is to begin by firing Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein. The U.S. Department of Justice regulation that governs special counsel Mueller allows him to be fired only by the U.S. Attorney General and only for “good cause.” Since Attorney General Jeff Sessions has recused himself, Rosenstein now has the exclusive power to fire Mueller. If President Trump fires Rosenstein, as he can at any time without giving any reason, Solicitor General Noel Francisco would then have the power to fire Mueller for “good cause.” April 17, 2018 | Alan B. Morrison, George Washington University Law School I agree with much of what my friend and colleague Richard Pierce has written in his essay, but I partially dissent because Pierce, probably like President Donald Trump, has not figured out what comes next. Will Trump appoint someone to replace Mueller? If so, who? And what assurances will that person want before putting his or her neck into a Trumpian noose? Although Congress does not have a formal role in the selection of a replacement, many members on both sides of the aisle would almost certainly insist on holding a hearing and demand to know what happened and whether the Mueller replacement would continue an independent investigation. April 18, 2018 | Cary Coglianese, University of Pennsylvania Law School Presidents are not above the law. And the law states that special counsel Robert Mueller can only be removed “for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of Departmental policies.” Granted, what exactly counts as “good cause” has never been squarely addressed by the courts. Presumably it means that a removal is based on a reason akin to “misconduct,” “dereliction of duty,” “incapacity,” or “conflict of interest.” More than that, it is absolutely clear that “good cause” demands a reason beyond just “anything goes.
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Can President Trump Get Rid of Robert Mueller?
No full textActing Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller as special counsel to lead the federal government’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Since his appointment in 2017, Mueller has issued indictments against individuals from the United States, Russia, and the Netherlands, along with three Russian organizations. He has also secured several guilty pleas from former Trump campaign officials. President Donald Trump has expressed displeasure with the investigation, repeatedly calling it a “witch hunt.” President Trump’s stance on Mueller’s investigation raises the question of whether the President might take steps to remove Mueller from office—and whether doing so would be lawful. U.S. Department of Justice regulations state that the U.S. Attorney General has the sole power to appoint a special counsel, and he may only remove the special counsel for “good cause.” Nevertheless, the White House has recently expressed confidence in the President’s ability to fire Mueller. This series in The Regulatory Review analyzes who has the legal authority to remove Mueller from office and what the proper basis for such removal might be. The series includes three essays from prominent administrative law scholars: Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School; Alan B. Morrison, Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest and Public Service Law at the George Washington University Law School; and Cary Coglianese, Edward B. Shils Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. The Regulatory Review is pleased to present this series of essays on the President’s removal power. April 16, 2018 | Richard J. Pierce, Jr., George Washington University Law School The easiest way for President Donald Trump to fire special counsel Robert Mueller is to begin by firing Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein. The U.S. Department of Justice regulation that governs special counsel Mueller allows him to be fired only by the U.S. Attorney General and only for “good cause.” Since Attorney General Jeff Sessions has recused himself, Rosenstein now has the exclusive power to fire Mueller. If President Trump fires Rosenstein, as he can at any time without giving any reason, Solicitor General Noel Francisco would then have the power to fire Mueller for “good cause.” April 17, 2018 | Alan B. Morrison, George Washington University Law School I agree with much of what my friend and colleague Richard Pierce has written in his essay, but I partially dissent because Pierce, probably like President Donald Trump, has not figured out what comes next. Will Trump appoint someone to replace Mueller? If so, who? And what assurances will that person want before putting his or her neck into a Trumpian noose? Although Congress does not have a formal role in the selection of a replacement, many members on both sides of the aisle would almost certainly insist on holding a hearing and demand to know what happened and whether the Mueller replacement would continue an independent investigation. April 18, 2018 | Cary Coglianese, University of Pennsylvania Law School Presidents are not above the law. And the law states that special counsel Robert Mueller can only be removed “for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of Departmental policies.” Granted, what exactly counts as “good cause” has never been squarely addressed by the courts. Presumably it means that a removal is based on a reason akin to “misconduct,” “dereliction of duty,” “incapacity,” or “conflict of interest.” More than that, it is absolutely clear that “good cause” demands a reason beyond just “anything goes.
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
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