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Liquidation ou redressement des entreprises : décision de la banque et impact sur la probabilité de faillite
No full textURL des Cahiers : https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/CAHIERS-MSECahiers de la MSE 1999.100 - Série Blanche - ISSN : 1624-0340Banks are often regarded as responsible on the increasing number of corporate bankruptcies in France. How to explain their choice between contract termination and financial support when a debtor defaults? Does this policy influence debtor's default risk? Clues to bank's behaviour may be found in several literatures. First, models describing the resolution of financial crisis are presented (Van Horne 1976, Guigou 1995). Default risk is exogenous; banks maximise the discounted value of their claim and they only consider the expected profits of the firm. However, contract theory and banking theory analyse contract termination as a necessary incentive mechanism when information is asymmetric (Diamond 1984, Webb 1992). This mechanism may reduce default risk. Contract renegotiation can although be optimal (Bester 1994), even if an influence on debtor's behaviour can be created (Gorton et Khan 1993).Le comportement des banques est souvent évoqué pour expliquer le nombre important de faillites d'entreprises en France. L'objet de cet article est de trouver des éléments explicatifs de l'attitude bancaire au sein de divers courants de la littérature économique. Différents modèles sont ainsi relus à la lumière de deux questions : Quand la banque décide-t-elle de soutenir son client ? Quelle est l'influence de son attitude sur la probabilité de faillite ? Nous analysons d'abord la littérature spécifiquement consacrée à la résolution des crises d'illiquidité (Van Horne 1976, Guigou 1995). La décision de la banque est dans ce cadre uniquement fonction de la valeur actualisée de sa créance, donc des potentialités de redressement de la firme. Elle n'influence pas le risque de défaut qui est ici exogène. Les littératures relatives aux relations de crédits et à la théorie des contrats (Diamond 1984, Webb 1992) nous permettent ensuite d'appréhender la nécessité d'une politique de mise en liquidation stricte pour endiguer le hasard moral lorsque l'information est asymétrique. Le risque de défaut peut alors être réduit. La spécificité des banques, mise en avant par la théorie bancaire, peut cependant rendre optimale une renégociation des contrats en cas de défaut de l'entreprise (Bester 1994), même si son impact sur le comportement futur du débiteur ne doit pas être omis (Gorton et Khan 1993)
Les asymétries d'information influencent-elles le choix de la banque principale entre soutien et mise en faillite de l’entreprise ? Une vérification empirique par un modèle Probit
No full textInternational audienc
Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise ? Comprendre la décision de la banque
Get PDFInternational audienceBanks have to choose between debt re-negotiation and liquidation of their financially distressed corporate debtors. We review different models to identify key determinants of their choice. The literature on the resolution of financial distress shows that the banks' decision is based on the financial and economic characteristics of the distressed firms. If information is asymmetric, incentive considerations induce banks to be severe. However, if banks own (or are supposed to own) information that other stakeholders do not have, banks may help their debtors in an opportunistic way.Afin de comprendre pour-quoi une banque décide la mise en faillite ou au contraire le soutien de son client en défaut de paiement, nous proposons une relecture de mo-dèles issus de champs théoriques dis-tincts. La littérature consacrée à la ré-solution des crises financières montre que la décision de la banque dépend des potentialités de redressement de la firme. Mais la théorie des contrats prouve la nécessité pour la banque d'une attitude stricte pour limiter l'aléa moral. La théorie bancaire montre que si la banque dispose d'un avantage informationnel par rapport aux tiers, elle peut adopter un com-portement laxiste voire opportuniste
MULTIPLE BANKING RELATIONSHIPS: CHOICE OF THE NUMBER OF MAIN BANKS AND CHOICE OF THE NUMBER OF BANKS: Choix du nombre de banques et choix du nombre de banques principales
No full textInternational audienceThis empirical paper focuses on the total number of banks and the number of main banks (banks that play an important and durable role in the financing) of firms. We test two major results of the theoretical literature: Low quality firms are likely to choose a high number of banks, in order to escape from a close monitoring. Strong multiple banking relationships benefit high quality firms, for they don’t pay the infor- mational rent that a single bank would have extracted. We use accounting variables and credit declarations for industrial French firms. We show that the total number of banks increases when the economic profitability of the firm decreases. No important link appears between the performance of the firms and their number of main banks.Nous vérifions empiriquement l’impact de la qualité d’une entreprise sur le nombre et la concentration des banques qui la financent en nous fondant sur les conclusions de la littérature théorique. Nous utilisons un échantillon de PME indus- trielles françaises pour lesquelles nous disposons de données comptables et d’informations relatives à l’octroi de prêts bancaires. Le nombre total de banques auprès desquelles les firmes s’endettent apparaît d’autant plus élevé que la qualité des entreprises est faible, de manière à échapper à une surveillance trop étroite. En revanche, la qualité des entreprises ne semble que peu liée, et négativement, avec leur stratégie de nouer une relation privilégiée avec plusieurs banques, stra- tégie supposée permettre de ne pas subir de capture informationnelle
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Multiple Banking Relationships: Do SMEs Mistrust Their Banks?
No full textThis article focuses on the use of multiple banking relationships by SMEs, a key issue given their strong dependence on bank financing in a context of increasing financial constraints and higher risk of credit rationing since the crisis. We investigate whether the use of multiple banking relationships is explained by firms’ characteristics or by the quality of the banking relationship. We exploit the results of an original survey conducted on a sample of French SMEs in December 2012. According to the traditional theoretical framework of multiple banking, we find that older, bigger, and betterperforming firms are more likely to access multiple banking relationships. We further find that innovative firms are more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships. We also highlight the explanatory power of an alternative model based on the quality of banking relationship: when the manager trusts its main bank, or when he is closer to his loan officer, the firm will be less likely to engage in multiple banking relationships
Estimation du risque de défaut par une modélisation stochastique du bilan : application à des firmes industrielles françaises
No full textInternational audienceThis paper proposes to estimate corporate default risk and to predict bankruptcy via an Asset Liability Management (ALM) method of risk estimation, which is an alternative to multivariate models such as multiple discriminant analysis or neural networks. The method is based on corporate bond valuation models. Whereas ALM is almost exclusively used by banks and insurance companies, we assess probabilities of default for French manufacturing firms. Following Janssen [1992], we suppose that the dynamics for the total assets and the total liabilities can be described by geometric Brownian motions. The probability of insolvency -- i.e. the probability that net worth is negative -- is then estimated and analysed as the probability of default. Firms are partitioned into two groups, based on the computed probabilities and a threshold level. The rate of correct classification is assessed from bootstrap samples and compared to other business failure prediction models. The assessed probabilities provide a good indicator of corporate bankruptcy risk for one to three years prior to failure
« Multiple banking relationships: do SMEs mistrust their banks? »
No full textInternational audienceThis paper focuses on the determinants of the use of multiple banking relationships by SMEs. We exploit the results of an original survey conducted on a sample of French SMEs in December 2012. We first provide evidence that access to multiple banking relationships is influenced by firms’ characteristics. We find that older, bigger, high-performing and innovative firms are more likely to develop multiple banking relationships. More originally, we also highlight the explanatory power of the quality of banking relationship mainly assessed by the trust on the part of the CEO: when the manager mistrusts its main bank, the firm will be more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships
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