1,721,007 research outputs found
Gender Differences in Competitiveness:Friends matter
We run an experiment with Danish school children (7-16 years old) to shed new light on gender differences incompetitive behavior. Danish girls are not significantly less likely than boys to choose a competitive schemewhen we control for individual performance, risk preferences, confidence, stereotypes, and interactions with theopposite gender. However, for the children who perform above average we find a gender gap of 11.8 percentagepoints. Our elicitation of the network of friends allows us to study the association between a child’s and theirfriends’ competitiveness: for each (extra) friend that is competitive, girls choose to compete more often (+9.6percentage points). The same is not true for boys. Finally, boys become better at making the correct decision withage, but girls avoid competition when they should choose it
Editorial:Uncovering Dishonesty
Every day the news reports about scandals in the public and private sectors. Recent examples include cases of briberies (Samsung Electronics, Sang-Hun, Kwaak, & Mozur, 2017), falsified information (Kobe Steel, Obayashi, 2018, Volkswagen emissions scandal (n.d.), 2018), or illegal charging of customers (e.g., Wells Fargo, Wells Fargo account fraud scandal). Arguably, such publicly documented instances of dishonesty account for a small part of the costs associated with dishonesty in the world only. Next to (documented and non-documented) cheating by organizations, many people show examples of dishonest behavior in their private lives, e.g., cheating on taxes, committing insurance frauds, or wardrobing. Moreover, studies have suggested that observing dishonesty can affect own dishonest behavior (e.g., Gino et al., 2009, Scigala et al., in press). Overall, dishonest behavior has severe consequences for societies, with costs up to several millions, or even billions, of US dollars every year (e.g., European Commission, 2014, Hardoon and Heinrich, 2011)
How Does Dishonesty Diffuse? An Experiment Comparing Spread and Concentrated Incentives
We experimentally test if the propensity to cheat changes when subjects face different distributions of the same monetary incentive. Such a manipulation represents a costless intervention in the many situations where multiple reports are required simultaneously, like timesheets or expense reimbursements. In our experiment, subjects have to roll a die in private five times and report the outcomes. In the LAST treatment, only the fifth reported roll determines the payoff, whereas in the SUM treatment, all five reports contribute proportionally to the payoff. The possible reward from reporting remains the same, but the two treatments differ in the effort required to obtain it: inflating one report or many. We find that subjects report significantly higher numbers in LAST compared to the average report in SUM. Looking at the total of reports, it does not differ by treatment since subjects do not inflate the reported rolls when there is no incentive. Dishonesty differs as there are more opportunities, having the positive effect of reducing the total profit obtained from cheating, but the negative effect of spreading the lies across all the opportunities. The total amount of cheating made remains stable across conditions, but it costs less when the incentive is spread on multiple reports
Tax me if you can:An artifactual field experiment on dishonesty
In this paper, we test whether increased salience of a tax charge increases dishonesty using a version of the die-under-cup paradigm. Participants earn money in proportion to the outcome reported and, thus, have an incentive to over-report. We find a significant increase in high outcomes in the presence of a tax frame suggesting that participants use the tax as an excuse to rationalize their dishonest act. In addition, we tested whether adding an explanation for the adoption of the tax would increase honesty. We find evidence for reversed dishonesty with participants reporting significantly more low outcomes. These results warn policy makers about the non-trivial relationship between taxation charges and dishonesty.In this paper, we test whether increased salience of a tax charge increases dishonesty using a version of the die-under-cup paradigm. Participants earn money in proportion to the outcome reported and, thus, have an incentive to over-report. We find a significant increase in high outcomes in the presence of a tax frame suggesting that participants use the tax as an excuse to rationalize their dishonest act. In addition, we tested whether adding an explanation for the adoption of the tax would increase honesty. We find evidence for reversed dishonesty with participants reporting significantly more low outcomes. These results warn policy makers about the non-trivial relationship between taxation charges and dishonesty
Measures of cognitive ability and choice inconsistency
Cognitive skills affect individual choices. Researchers commonly use Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM) tests and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to assess the relationship between cognitive abilities and economic decision making. In this paper, we study the relationship between these measures, and investigate the extent to which they are correlated and whether they are best described as substitutes or complements. Combining a sample of 686 children and a sample of 2,332 adults, we compare individual performances in the RPM test and CRT test. First, we report a significant positive correlation between the two measures of 0.3. Second, we document that performance in both the RPM test and CRT are significant predictors of behavioral inconsistency observed in incentivized time and risk preference elicitation tasks for children and risk preference elicitation task for adults.Peer reviewe
Do Not Trash the Incentive! Monetary Incentives and Waste Sorting
This paper examines whether combining non-monetary and monetary incentives increases municipal solid waste sorting. We empirically investigate this issue, exploiting the exogenous variation in waste management policies experienced during the years 1999–2008 by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso (Italy). Using a panel regression analysis, we estimate that pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) incentive schemes increase by 17% the sorted-to-total waste ratio and that their effect reinforces that of a door-to-door (DtD) collection system, which is equal to 15.7%. Moreover, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to find learning and spatial effects associated to both PAYT and DtD
Unethical Behavior in the Field: Demographic Characteristics and Beliefs of the Cheater
What are the individual demographic characteristics that correlate with unethical behavior? To answer this question we randomly interviewed 541 passengers who used the bus in Reggio Emilia (Italy). Exploiting the high level of fare evasion (43% without a valid ticket) we find that young individuals, males and non-European immigrants in our sample are more likely to travel without a ticket. Interestingly, traveling with other people correlates with the probability of holding a valid ticket but its effect depends on who the passenger and the others are. Finally, we find that all passengers’ beliefs on fine costs, ticket inspection frequency, and percentage of passengers without a ticket are surprisingly close to actual figures. However, cheaters perceive inspections as more frequent than those traveling with a valid ticket
Cognitive fatigue influences students’ performance on standardized tests
Using test data for all children attending Danish public schools between school years 2009/10 and 2012/13, we examine how the time of the test affects performance. Test time is determined by the weekly class schedule and computer availability at the school. We find that, for every hour later in the day, test performance decreases by 0.9% of an SD (95% CI, 0.7–1.0%). However, a 20- to 30-minute break improves average test performance by 1.7% of an SD (95% CI, 1.2–2.2%). These findings have two important policy implications: First, cognitive fatigue should be taken into consideration when deciding on the length of the school day and the frequency and duration of breaks throughout the day. Second, school accountability systems should control for the influence of external factors on test scores
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
- …
