1,721,128 research outputs found
FISCAL AND NON-FISCAL INSTRUMENTS FOR POLLUTION CONTROL
Bachelor'sBACHELOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (HONOURS
Game Theory and Climate Change
Parkash Chander argues that we can make progress on the climate-change impasse through incorporating the insights of game theory. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and discusses the policy recommendations his framework generate
Game theory and climate change
Parkash Chander argues that we can make progress on the climate-change impasse through incorporating the insights of game theory. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates
Multivariate concave and convex stochastic dominance
Stochastic dominance permits a partial ordering of alternatives (probability distributions on consequences) based only on partial information about a decision maker’s utility function. Univariate stochastic dominance has been widely studied and applied, with general agreement on classes of utility functions for dominance of different degrees. Extensions to the multivariate case have received less attention and have used different classes of utility functions, some of which require strong assumptions about utility. We investigate multivariate stochastic dominance using a class of utility functions that is consistent with a basic preference assumption, can be related to well-known characteristics of utility, and is a natural extension of the stochastic order typically used in the univariate case. These utility functions are multivariate risk averse, and reversing the preference assumption allows us to investigate stochastic dominance for utility functions that are multivariate risk seeking. We provide insight into these two contrasting forms of stochastic dominance, develop some criteria to compare probability distributions (hence alternatives) via multivariate stochastic dominance, and illustrate how this dominance could be used in practice to identify inferior alternatives. Connections between our approach and dominance using different stochastic orders are discussed.decision analysis: multiple criteria, risk; group decisions; utility/preference: multiattribute utility, stochastic dominance, stochastic orders
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Risk Aversion and Income Tax Enforcement
This paper characterizes optimal income tax and audit schemes in the presence of costly enforcement when the agent is risk averse and not necessarily risk neutral. It is shown that the results under risk-neutrality (Chander and Wilde (1998)) largely hold under risk aversion. We first show that in an optimal scheme the tax evasion decision of the agent is equivalent to risking his entire income against a possible gain in terms of lower tax payment. We then introduce a measure of aversion to such large risks. In contrast, the Arrow-Pratt coefficients of risk aversion measure aversion to small risks only. We show that the optimal tax function is non-decreasing and concave if the agent’s aversion to large risks, as defined in terms of our measure, is decreasing with income. The optimal audit function is non-increasing and the audits may be random or deterministic.expected utility, risk aversion, principal-agent, adverse selection
Growing importance of global public goods : the case of climate change
Despite the absence of a world government, efforts to supply global public goods continue. But different perceptions of fairness sometimes undermine such efforts as illustrated by the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change
- …
