328,535 research outputs found
Helen E. Nash Oral History
No full textHelen E. Nash was interviewed by Marion Hunt on April 20, 1999 for approximately 71 minutes.https://digitalcommons.wustl.edu/oralhistories/1114/thumbnail.jp
Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results
No full textThis paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-consequentialist nature, which draws on the evidence taken from experimental and behavioral economics. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially-honest agents, which presume that there is at least one individual in society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategy-space reductions. As a consequence, it shows that in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.Nash implementation, canonical-mechanisms, s-mechanisms, self-relevant mechanisms, partial-honesty, permissive results
Computing Good Nash Equilibria in Graphical Games
No full textThis paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al.~\cite{kls} as a way to represent all Nash equilibria of a graphical game. In~\cite{egg}, it was shown that the best response policy has polynomial size as long as the underlying graph is a path. In this paper, we show that if the underlying graph is a bounded-degree tree and the best response policy has polynomial size then there is an efficient algorithm which constructs a Nash equilibrium that guarantees certain payoffs to all participants. Another attractive solution concept is a Nash equilibrium that maximizes the social welfare. We show that, while exactly computing the latter is infeasible (we prove that solving this problem may involve algebraic numbers of an arbitrarily high degree), there exists an FPTAS for finding such an equilibrium as long as the best response policy has polynomial size. These two algorithms can be combined to produce Nash equilibria that satisfy various fairness criteria
A Distributed Algorithm for Optimising over Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
No full textWe develop an efficient algorithm for computing pure strategy Nash equilibria that satisfy various criteria (such as the utilitarian or Nash--Bernoulli social welfare functions) in games with sparse interaction structure. Our algorithm, called Valued Nash Propagation (VNP), integrates the optimisation problem of maximising a criterion with the constraint satisfaction problem of finding a game's equilibria to construct a criterion that defines a c-semiring. Given a suitably compact game structure, this criterion can be efficiently optimised using message-passing. To this end, we first show that VNP is complete in games whose interaction structure forms a hypertree. Then, we go on to provide theoretic and empirical results justifying its use on games with arbitrary structure; in particular, we show that it computes the optimum >82% of the time and otherwise selects an equilibrium that is always within 2% of the optimum on average
Nash House Walk Through with J.E. Nash, Jr. Prior to Restoration
No full textThis personal video was created in 2004 and features Jesse E. Nash, Jr. and George Arthur walking through the Rev. J.E. Nash house describing the different rooms and historical details prior to the Nash house restoration. Jesse E. Nash, Jr. passed away in 2016.https://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/nash-house/1000/thumbnail.jp
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An Experiment on Nash Implementation
No full textWe perform an experimental test of a modification of the controversial canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using three subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as three outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism successfully implements the desired
outcome a large majority of the time, providing empirical evidence for the feasibility of such implementation. In addition, the performance is further improved by imposing a fine on a dissident,
so that the mechanism implements strict Nash equilibria. While our environment is stylized, our results offer hope that experiments can identify reasonable features for practical implementation mechanisms.Publicad
Estimated Solutions for Nash Equilibria in Differential Games
No full textreservedIn questa tesi si analizza un gioco differenziale alla Nash in forma open-loop, con l'obiettivo di ottenere le condizioni necessarie per l'esistenza di un equilibrio di Nash e di studiarne il sistema dinamico associato. È stato introdotto il metodo di Picard per calcolare una soluzione approssimata, accompagnato dalla dimostrazione della convergenza uniforme, ed infine sono state realizzate rappresentazioni grafiche per l'analisi del gioco. I risultati ottenuti possono trovare applicazione in ambito economico, finanziario e industriale.
Si segnala che, nel corso della tesi, sono state apportate delle correzioni rispetto alle pubblicazioni di riferimento, con conseguenti differenze nelle conclusioni, sia nell'analisi tramite calcoli che nei grafici presentati
Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result
No full text[Moore and Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin's classic paper [Maskin, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38]. A recent work [Wu, http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4294, \emph{Inter. J. Quantum Information}, 2010 (accepted)] shows that when an additional condition is satisfied, the Maskin's theorem will no longer hold by using a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this result holds in the macro world by using an algorithmic mechanism. In this paper, we will investigate two-agent Nash implementation by virtue of the algorithmic mechanism. The main result is: The sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation with two agents shall be amended, not only in the quantum world, but also in the macro world.Quantum game theory; Mechanism design; Nash implementation.
Letter, E. J. (Elvira Jane) Nash
No full textLetter, E. J. (Elvira Jane) Nash, probably from the home of her uncle Ira Norris Nash in Neshoba County, Mississippi, to cousin Carrie concerning her desire for news of her brother Jimmy serving in Wirt Adams Cavalry Regiment, news of the Battle of Shiloh, the wounding of her cousin John Nash and the death of her cousin Ira Nash at Shiloh, and the grief of the family, especially her aunt and uncle. She writes of Ira\u27s faith and his last letter to his family, and asks for prayer as she finds herself cherishing hatred and a hope of revenge upon the instigators of this conflict. She writes of her brother Wiley needing books and clothes and of her desire to go home, especially if her brother Jimmie comes home. 4 page folded document. 1862.https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/mss-nash-taylor-collection/1000/thumbnail.jp
Choice-Nash Equilibria
No full textWe provide existence results for equilibria of games where players employ abstract (non binary) choice rules. Such results are shown to encompass as a relevant instance that of games where players have (non-transitive) SSB (Skew-Symmetric Bilinear) preferences, as will as other well-known transitive (e. g. Nash´s) and non-transitive (e. g. Shafer and Sonnenschein´s) models in the literature. Further, our general model contains games where players display procedural rationality.
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