1,720,978 research outputs found
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
We provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
The Employees’ Dilemma: Balancing Internal Reporting, Whistleblowing, and Insider Trading Risks
The Essay examines how recent developments in insider trading regulations and whistleblower reward programs can lead to unintended and counterproductive results of discouraging employees from using internal reporting channels within corporate compliance programs. While the presence of a robust and well-functioning corporate compliance program is a critical factor both in mitigating the level of public enforcement actions against companies and in protecting corporate managers from liability in private litigation, these programs often provide little incentive for employees to report potential misconduct internally.
Corporate compliance programs are designed to promote the upward information flow within the company, which is essential for early detection and regulation of corporate wrongdoing at an early stage. However, internal reporting typically offers no monetary rewards and can document an employee’s knowledge of corporate misconduct, increasing their risk of violating insider trading laws—particularly under internal insider trading policies that broadly define prohibited trading activities. In contrast, employees’ failure to report—without engaging in wrongdoing themselves— are generally disciplined only in extreme circumstances where obvious red flags exist.
This employees’ dilemma, where internal reporting may place them at a disadvantage in pursuing external whistleblowing and expose them to greater insider trading risks, calls for attention. Striking a balance between encouraging internal reporting and protecting employees’ interests is crucial for companies to effectively detect and prevent corporate wrongdoing, ultimately enhancing the function of compliance programs
Shareholder Direct Democracy
This Article explores the ongoing tension between what shareholders want and what corporate management perceives as beneficial for the shareholders. Beyond the fundamental right to elect directors, federal regulation enables shareholders to engage directly with management on various issues by adding their proposals to a proxy ballot for shareholder voting. However, this unique form of shareholder direct democracy has transformed into a fierce battleground between shareholders and management, as exemplified in ExxonMobil’s litigation against its shareholders to block their proposal. Why do many companies emphasize their efforts to engage with shareholders yet resist shareholder proposals?
This Article argues that companies’ efforts to exclude proposals from the ballot undermine the value of the shareholder proposal process as a means of gathering information and better understanding preferences. To retain the benefits, while mitigating the costs associated with the shareholder proposal process, it advocates for a more permissive approach to include proposals on the ballot, and a gradual transition from an approval-based to a disclosure-based regime. Once shareholder voting occurs, in turn, companies are better positioned to interpret voting outcomes, assess the representativeness of shareholder preference, and determine when and how to implement the expressed shareholder preference. This discretion is constrained not just by the voting-centric shareholders in future director elections but also by trading-centric shareholders, who may sell stock instead of voting when dissatisfied, necessitating management to consider broader market reactions to implementation.
The Article makes three key contributions. First, it examines the interplay between the voting- and trading-centric shareholders in the context of the shareholder proposal process, offering new insights into the representativeness of the shareholder voting outcomes. Second, it employs an interdisciplinary approach, bridging legal, finance, and political science literature on direct democracy, laying the groundwork for collaboration to better calibrate the relationship between shareholder democracy and managerial discretion. Third, it offers practical implications for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), courts, and corporations, addressing ongoing legal issues and contributing to the evolving discourse surrounding shareholder proposals
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The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of Related Party Transactions
A transaction between a corporation and its director or officer (a “related party transaction”) presents conflicts of interest that could harm, or alternatively, could also benefit the corporation. To sort beneficial related party transactions from detrimental ones, the current legal regime relies on both ex ante screening and ex post litigation. Disclosure plays an essential role in both stages. Based on a set of hand-collected data on actual disclosures from Fortune top fifty companies, this Article casts doubt on the effectiveness of the current regulation of related party transactions. The ambiguity of the federal securities regulations leaves too much room for manipulation. An approving committee of each company exercises considerable discretion not only over which proposed transactions to approve, but also over which transactions to disclose to its shareholders and what information to include in the disclosures. In the context of state corporate law, uncertainty exists in fiduciary duty of loyalty litigation regarding when and whether a court should bypass the fairness test and apply the business judgment rule to a related party transaction that satisfies certain safe harbor conditions, such as approval by disinterested directors. This Article proposes a fix by linking the strategic disclosure problem to the question of the applicable standard of review in fiduciary duty of loyalty litigation. To that end, the court should consider a disclosure under federal securities law as a strong signal of fairness of the disclosed transaction and be more willing to apply the business judgment rule rather than the fairness test in state duty of loyalty litigation. Potential benefits of the proposal include creating better incentives to disclose related party transactions, giving litigants more predictable rules, and allowing for richer accumulation of disclosure data over time, thus providing better guidance to companies and market participants in distinguishing between beneficial and harmful related party transactions
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
We conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
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Shareholder Voice in Corporate Charter Amendments
State corporate laws require shareholder approval for corporate charter amendments, but only the board of directors has the power to propose how to amend charters. The directors’ exclusive power over charter amendment proposals creates a potential for managerial opportunism by refusing to propose amendments that empower shareholders or by pursuing amendments that favor managers. While shareholder approval can theoretically serve as a check against such opportunism, dispersed shareholders’ rational apathy and collective action problems, can also prevent them from being effective monitors. Prior scholarship has thus viewed charter amendments with suspicion, but there has been no systematic, empirical examination to confirm or refute the possibilities of managerial opportunism. Based on hand-collected data on charter amendments of the top 250 U.S. companies over the past twenty-one years, this Article demonstrates that the recent trend of shareholder engagement has enabled them not only to check management-initiated amendments, but also to pressure directors into proposing shareholder-initiated amendments. Concerns over managerial opportunism, however, remain valid, as the data reveal subtle ways in which directors have preempted shareholders’ voice with compromised terms. This Article updates our theoretical understanding of corporate charter amendments by reflecting the new dynamic with shareholder engagement, as well as normatively claims that state and federal authorities should secure even-handed procedures so as to give both shareholders and managers a meaningful voice in the charter amendment process
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