143 research outputs found
The Power and Promise of Developmental Systems Theory
No full textI argue that it is time for many feminists to rethink their attitudes towards evolutionary biology, not because feminists have been wrong to be deeply sceptical about many of its claims, both explicit and implicit, but because biology itself has changed. A new appreciation for the importance of development in biology has become mainstream and a new ontology, associated with developmental systems theory (DST), has been introduced over the last two decades. This turn challenges some of the features of evolutionary biology that have most troubled feminists. DST undermines the idea of biologicales sence and challenges both nature /nurture and nature/culture distinctions. Freed from these conceptual constraints, evolutionary biology no longer poses the problems that have justified feminist scepticism. Indeed, feminists have already found useful applications for DST and I argue that they should expand their use of DST to support more radical and wide-ranging political theories.Si les féministes n’ont pas eu tort d’être profondément sceptiques face aux nombreuses revendications de la biologie, leur attitude face à cette science doit être remise en question car la biologie s’est transformée au courant des dernières décennies. La «théorie des systèmes de développement» (developmental systems theory-TDS) est une théorie qui s’est considérablement développée et qui a pris beaucoup d’ampleur. Cette théorie n’accepte pas le concept d’essence biologique ce qui pose un défi important à la distinction nature/culture. Une des conséquences de cet apport théorique est que le scepticisme des féministes face à la biologie de l’évolution n’est plus justifié car la biologie ne comporte plus les contraintes essentialistes qui s’avéraient contentieuses. En effet, certaines féministes ont déjà trouvé des applications utiles pour la TDS et nous avançons que les féministes doivent maintenant élargir l’utilisation de la TDS car la porté de celle-ci pourrait être significative dans d’autres domaines tel celui de la théorie politique
Are There Two Sexes? Yes and No, But Mostly No (and Gender is Something Else Anyway—More or Less)
No full textThis paper brings a species-inclusive, biologically grounded lens to the question, are there two and only two sexes? Insofar as the terms associated with sex are used to pick out taxa where reproduction is typically achieved through the fusion of two gametes of different sizes, the answer is yes. Insofar as the terms associated with sex are used to pick out morphs within a species the answer is often no, though the question is an empircal one and must be addressed species by species. Within our own species, where we have species-typical primary and secondary sex characteristics that typically align with gametic differences, there are many naturally occuring developmental differences that do not so align. Gender, though often confused with sex, is something else altogether, being a socio-cultural kind rather than a biological one. However, because the social roles and norms associated with a particular gender are imposed, typically, on the basis of a sex ascription, gender is frequently experienced as inextricably entwined with sex. Moreover, in cultural animals, the traits are frequently the result of the interactions between biological and social causes. I conclude that the idea that there are two and only two sexes in our own species and gender can be reduced to secondary sex characteristics is clearly false
Are There Two Sexes? Yes and No, But Mostly No (and Gender is Something Else Anyway—More or Less)
No full textThis paper brings a species-inclusive, biologically grounded lens to the question, are there two and only two sexes? Insofar as the terms associated with sex are used to pick out taxa where reproduction is typically achieved through the fusion of two gametes of different sizes, the answer is yes. Insofar as the terms associated with sex are used to pick out morphs within a species the answer is often no, though the question is an empircal one and must be addressed species by species. Within our own species, where we have species-typical primary and secondary sex characteristics that typically align with gametic differences, there are many naturally occuring developmental differences that do not so align. Gender, though often confused with sex, is something else altogether, being a socio-cultural kind rather than a biological one. However, because the social roles and norms associated with a particular gender are imposed, typically, on the basis of a sex ascription, gender is frequently experienced as inextricably entwined with sex. Moreover, in cultural animals, the traits are frequently the result of the interactions between biological and social causes. I conclude that the idea that there are two and only two sexes in our own species and gender can be reduced to secondary sex characteristics is clearly false
Scaffold: A causal concept for evolutionary explanations
No full textThis is the author accepted manuscript. the final version is available from Cambridge University Press via the DOI in this recordThe concept of scaffold is widespread in science and increasingly common in evolutionary biology (Chiu and Gilbert 2015; Love and Wimsatt 2019; Black et al. 2020). While this concept figures in causal explanations, it is far from clear what scaffolds are and what role they play in those explanations (Charbonneau 2015). Here we present evolutionary scaffolding explanation as a distinct type of explanatory strategy, distinguishing it from other types of causal explanation in evolutionary biology. By doing so, we clarify the meaning of “scaffold” as a causal concept and its potential contribution to accounts of evolutionary novelty and major transitions.New Frontiers in Research FundGordon and Betty Moore Foundatio
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