31,688 research outputs found
The *subjectivity* of subjective experience - A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective
No full textThis is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered.
This is a revised version, including two pictures
"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2001
No full textThis is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use.
This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file.
This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to "cut and paste" from the original file. To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Last update of current version: July 13th, 2001
The problem with Metzinger
No full textThis article provides a critical treatment of the ontology underlying Thomas Metzinger\u27s Being No One. Metzinger asserts that interdisciplinary empirical work must replace \u27armchair\u27 a priori intuitions into the nature of reality; nonetheless, his own position is riddled with unquestioned a priori assumptions. His central claim that \u27no one has or has ever had a self\u27 is meant to have an ominous and futuristic ring, but merely repeats a familiar philosophical approach to individuals, which are undermined by reducing them downward to their material underpinnings, and \u27overmined\u27 by reducing them upward to their functional effects. Ultimately, Metzinger blends a rigid form of traditional materialism with an ontology of processes and events that is too reminiscent of late 1990\u27s continental philosophy. In both directions, the novelty and fertility of Metzinger\u27s position can be called into question
Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität phänomenalen Bewußtseins vor dem Hintergrund einer naturalistischen Theorie mentaler Repräsentation
No full textThis book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences
"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2001
Full text linkThis is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use.
This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file.
This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to "cut and paste" from the original file. To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Last update of current version: July 13th, 2001
Duchowość a uczciwość intelektualna. Esej
Full text linkZnajdujemy się na początku historycznego okresu, który będzie miał na wielu poziomach silny wpływ na nasz obraz samych siebie. Ten coraz szybszy rozwój stanowi dla nas poważne wyzwanie. Kluczowe pytanie brzmi: Czy „zsekularyzowana duchowość” jest możliwa (lub choćby pojmowalna), czy nowoczesna i duchowa koncepcja siebie oddaje sprawiedliwość tej historycznej zmianie w naszym obrazie samych siebie i jednocześnie pragnieniu (ważnej nie tylko dla profesjonalnych filozofów) intelektualnej uczciwości
The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective.
Full text linkIn this chapter I will briefly sketch the outline of a representationalist theory of subjective experience. A representationalist theory is one that chooses to analyze its target properties those aspects of the domain which eventually are to be explained  on a certain level of description: by describing conscious systems as representational systems and conscious states as representational states, one hopes to achieve progress with regard to the relevant properties
La filosofía de la mente de Thomas Metzinger: : Neurofenomenología, consciencia artificial y pesimismo
Full text linkIn this article we review Thomas Metzinger’s neurophenomenological method and its ability to respond to some problems in philosophy of mind, avoiding difficulties present in other kinds of materialism. Metzinger defines mental states according to brain states, however, unlike eliminative materialism, he does consider phenomenal experience as real and rejects its conceptual or epistemic reduction. This peculiarity saves his proposal from criticisms such as that of José Ignacio Murillo or Graham Harman, which seem directed at other types of materialisms. Therefore, we consider it necessary to rethink the ethical consequences of the categorical denial of free will and the affirmation of the possibility of conscious artificial machines that Metzinger’s proposal entails.En el presente artículo hacemos una revisión del método neurofenomenólogico de Thomas Metzinger y su capacidad para responder a problemas habituales de filosofía de la mente y evitar dificultades de otros materialismos. Metzinger define estados mentales en función de estados cerebrales, sin embargo, frente al materialismo eliminativo, sí considera como real la experiencia fenoménica y rechaza su reducción conceptual o epistémica. Esta peculiaridad salva su propuesta de críticas como la de José Ignacio Murillo o Graham Harman, que parecen dirigidas a otros tipos de materialismos. Por ello, consideramos necesario repensar las consecuencias éticas de la tajante negación del libre albedrío y la afirmación de la posibilidad de máquinas artificiales conscientes que conlleva la propuesta de Metzinge
La filosofía de la mente de Thomas Metzinger: : Neurofenomenología, consciencia artificial y pesimismo
No full textIn this article we review Thomas Metzinger’s neurophenomenological method and its ability to respond to some problems in philosophy of mind, avoiding difficulties present in other kinds of materialism. Metzinger defines mental states according to brain states, however, unlike eliminative materialism, he does consider phenomenal experience as real and rejects its conceptual or epistemic reduction. This peculiarity saves his proposal from criticisms such as that of José Ignacio Murillo or Graham Harman, which seem directed at other types of materialisms. Therefore, we consider it necessary to rethink the ethical consequences of the categorical denial of free will and the affirmation of the possibility of conscious artificial machines that Metzinger’s proposal entails.En el presente artículo hacemos una revisión del método neurofenomenólogico de Thomas Metzinger y su capacidad para responder a problemas habituales de filosofía de la mente y evitar dificultades de otros materialismos. Metzinger define estados mentales en función de estados cerebrales, sin embargo, frente al materialismo eliminativo, sí considera como real la experiencia fenoménica y rechaza su reducción conceptual o epistémica. Esta peculiaridad salva su propuesta de críticas como la de José Ignacio Murillo o Graham Harman, que parecen dirigidas a otros tipos de materialismos. Por ello, consideramos necesario repensar las consecuencias éticas de la tajante negación del libre albedrío y la afirmación de la posibilidad de máquinas artificiales conscientes que conlleva la propuesta de Metzinge
Coscienza e fenomenologia del sé
No full textNella prospettiva che Metzinger difende nelle lezioni raccolte in questo volume, l’io, come scrive nell’introduzione Alfredo Paternoster, «viene a configurarsi come nulla di più di un’utile recita, una sorta di allucinazione, costruita però con materiali genuini». Sullo sfondo dell’eredità di Hume, ripresa oggi da Dennett, Metzinger delinea un ampio programma di ricerca, anche empirica, inteso a mostrare come si pervenga a una rappresentazione del sé; tale rappresentazione tuttavia non attesta l’esistenza di qualcosa come una coscienza
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