1,720,969 research outputs found
Implications of shadow ban regulation for monetary policy at the zero lower bound
Counter to the credit channel of monetary transmission, monetary policy tightening induces a rise in lending by two different types of non-bank financial institutions (NBFI): shadow banks and investment funds. A monetary DSGE model is able to replicate the empirical facts when augmented with intermediaries that allow for regulatory arbitrage on the one hand, and household portfolio rebalancing on the other. Therefore NBFI reduce the e ectiveness of the bank lending channel, which posits a decrease in bank lending following monetary tightening. Given the pending regulation of the financial system, I study how regulation of the shadow banking sector may affect the monetary transmission mechanism, especially during a zero lower bound (ZLB) episode. I find that bringing shadow banks back onto the balance sheets of commercial banks is beneficial for consumption smoothing. Alternatively, regulating them like investment funds results in a milder recession during, and a quicker escape from, the ZLB. This is because a large demand shock that moves the economy to the ZLB acts in a similar way to a monetary tightening due to the inability to lower the policy rate to the unconstrained level. Consequently, the bank lending channel becomes operational and its effectiveness can be reduced via less reliance on deposit funding
Implications of Shadow Bank Regulation for Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bounds
Counter to the credit channel of monetary transmission, monetary policy tightening induces a rise in lending by two different types of non-bank financial institutions (NBFI): shadow banks and investment funds. A monetary DSGE model is able to replicate the empirical facts when augmented with interme- diaries that allow for regulatory arbitrage on the one hand, and household portfolio rebalancing on the other. Therefore NBFI reduce the effectiveness of the bank lending channel, which posits a decrease in bank lending following monetary tightening. Given the pending regulation of the fnancial system, I study how regulation of the shadow banking sector may affect the monetary transmission mechanism, especially during a zero lower bound (ZLB) episode. I find that bringing shadow banks back onto the balance sheets of commercial banks is beneficial for consumption smoothing. Alternatively, regulating them like investment funds results in a milder recession during, and a quicker escape from, the ZLB. This is because a large demand shock that moves the economy to the ZLB acts in a similar way to a monetary tightening due to the inability to lower the policy rate to the unconstrained level. Consequently, the bank lending channel becomes operational and its effectiveness can be reduced via less reliance on deposit funding
Corporate cash hoarding in a model with liquidity constraints
This paper studies the role of uncertainty in the corporate cash hoarding puzzle. The baseline model is a stochastic neoclassical growth model featuring idiosyncratic and uninsurable technology shocks and a cash-in-advance constraint on new investments on the individual firm level. Individual agents' choices regarding cash holdings are analyzed and the effects of the introduction of a financial sector explored. The resulting aggregate cash holdings of households are non-optimal compared to the complete markets solution and aggregate excess cash increases with uncertainty. Aggregate consumption is also higher, but the added volatility of consumption decreases lifetime utility. Since cash holdings are usually managed by the financial sector, the results suggest a link between firm level risk and the behavior of the banking system
Monetary policy effects on financial intermediation via the regulated and the shadow banking systems
We extend the monetary DSGE model by Gertler and Karadi (2011) with a non-bank financial intermediary to investigate the impact of monetary policy shocks on aggregate loan supply. We distinguish between bank and non-bank intermediaries based on the liquidity of their credit claims. While banks can endogenously create deposits to fund rm loans, non-banks have to raise deposits on the funding market to function as intermediaries. The funding market is modeled via search and matching by non-banks for available deposits of households. Because deposit creation responds to economy-wide productivity automatically, bank reaction to shocks corresponds to the balance sheet channel. Non-banks are constrained by the available deposits and their behavior is better explained by the lending channel. The two credit channels are affcted differently following a monetary policy shock. As a result of these counteracting effects, an increasing non-bank sector leads to a reduced reaction of aggregate loan supply following a monetary policy shock, which is consistent with the data. An extension to deposit like-issuance by the non-bank sector will allow further studies of re-regulating the non-bank sector
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
We provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
The Role of Shadow Banking for Financial Regulation
Macroprudential policies for financial institutions have received increasing prominence since the global financial crisis. These policies are often aimed at the commercial banking sector, while a host of other non-bank financial institutions, or shadow banks, may not fall under their jurisdiction. We study the effects of tightening commercial bank regulation on the shadow banking sector. For this purpose, we develop a DSGE model that differentiates between regulated, monopolistically competitive commercial banks and a shadow banking system that relies on funding in a perfectly competitive market for investments. After estimating the model using euro area data from 1999 – 2014 including information on shadow banks, we find that tighter capital requirements on commercial banks increase shadow bank lending, which may have adverse financial stability effects. In a counterfactual analysis we compare how a macroprudential policy implemented before the crisis on all financial institutions, or just on commercial banks, would have dampened the leverage cycle
Macroprudential regulation and leakage to the shadow banking sector
Macroprudential policies are often aimed at the commercial banking sector, while a host of other non-bank financial institutions, or shadow banks, may not fall under their jurisdiction. We study the effects of tightening commercial bank regulation on the shadow banking sector. We develop a DSGE model that differentiates between regulated, monopolistic competitive commercial banks and a shadow banking system that relies on funding in a perfectly competitive market for investments. After estimating the model using euro area data from 1999-2014 including information on shadow banks, we find that tighter capital requirements on commercial banks increase shadow bank lending, which may have adverse financial stability effects. Coordinating macroprudential tightening with monetary easing can limit this leakage mechanism, while still bringing about the desired reduction in aggregate lending. In a counterfactual analysis, we compare how macroprudential policy implemented before the crisis would have dampened the business and lending cycles
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