1,720,987 research outputs found
(Almost) no evidence of self–other differences in risk preference and cognitive processing among professionals in risky-choice framing tasks [Author Accepted Manuscript]
No full textA substantial body of research has shown that risky decisions made for others often differ from those made for oneself. However, findings remain mixed, and there is still ongoing discussion about when and for whom self-other differences are most likely to emerge or be strongest. Building on previous research, which has primarily focused on lay samples and the outcomes of decision-making rather than the underlying processes, the current study reports on four preregistered experiments examining self–other differences across various professional domains, while also testing the commonly assumed cognitive mechanisms. Participants (total N = 1,337) were financial advisors at a large trade union (Experiment 1), leaders at a local government organization (Experiment 2) and a large hospital (Experiment 3), and a general sample of employees and leaders (Experiment 4). Participants completed a risky choice problem tailored to reflect their professional background (Experiments 1-3), where they were asked to choose between a safe and risky option either for themselves or for a hypothetical other, in both gain and loss frames. They then reported the extent to which they engaged in intuitive and analytical processing, and their emotional arousal. There was no evidence for consistent self-other differences in risk and no moderation by frame. In addition, there were no self-other differences in cognitive processing or affect. However, there was a main effect of framing in all experiments—that is, greater risk-seeking in loss (vs. gain) frames.reviewedacceptedVersio
(Almost) No Evidence of Self–Other Differences in Risk Preferences and Cognitive Processing Among Professionals in Contextualized Risky-Choice Framing Tasks
No full textA substantial body of research has shown that risky decisions made for others often differ from those made for oneself. However, findings remain mixed, and there is still ongoing discussion about when and for whom self-other differences are most likely to emerge or be strongest. Building on previous research, which has primarily focused on lay samples and the outcomes of decision-making rather than the underlying processes, the current study reports on four preregistered experiments examining self–other differences across various professional domains, while also testing the commonly assumed cognitive mechanisms. Participants (total N = 1,337) were financial advisors at a large trade union (Experiment 1), leaders at a local government organization (Experiment 2) and a large hospital (Experiment 3), and a general sample of employees and leaders (Experiment 4). Participants completed a risky choice problem tailored to reflect their professional background (Experiments 1–3), where they were asked to choose between a safe and risky option either for themselves or for a hypothetical other, in both gain and loss frames. They then reported the extent to which they engaged in intuitive and analytical processing, and their emotional arousal. There was no evidence for consistent self-other differences in risk and no moderation by frame. In addition, there were no self-other differences in cognitive processing or affect. However, there was a main effect of framing in all experiments—that is, greater risk-seeking in loss (vs. gain) frames
Emotion Regulation via Self- Distancing. Consequences for Risk-Taking and Cognitive Processing.
Full text linkEmotions often carry relevant information that guides decisions, particularly in ambiguous situations. However, without proper regulation, emotions can become a source of unwanted bias. The current dissertation examines how emotion regulation influences decision-making under risk and uncertainty while also specifying the cognitive-processing mechanisms. Three preregistered empirical papers demonstrate how emotion regulation via self-distancing reduces emotional influences in decision-making under risk and uncertainty through changes in cognitive processing. Overall, the findings suggest that decision-makers who reflect on emotional problems from a more psychologically distant perspective rely less on their gut feelings and instead process information more analytically. These changes in cognitive processing, in turn, lead to downstream consequences for decision-makers’ risk-taking.publishedVersio
Replication of Study 1 in "Differentiating Social and Personal Power" by Lammers, Stoker, and Stapel (2009)
Full text linkWe performed an independent, direct, and better powered (N = 295) replication of Study 1, an experiment (N = 113) by Lammers, Stoker, and Stapel (2009). Lammers and colleagues distinguished between social power (influence over others) and personal power (freedom from the influence of others), and found support for their predictions that the two forms of power produce opposite effects on stereotyping, but parallel effects on behavioral approach. Our results did not replicate the effects on behavioral approach, but partially replicated the effects on stereotyping. Compared to personal power, social power produced less stereotyping, but neither form of power differed significantly from the control condition, and effect sizes were considerably lower than the original estimates. Potential explanations are discussed.acceptedVersio
The Dark Versus Bright Side of a Smiley: A Preregistered Replication of Experiment 3 in Glikson et al. (2018) “The Dark Side of a Smiley”
Full text linkThe present paper reports an independent and better powered (N = 847 vs. N = 85) replication of Experiment 3 in Glikson et al. (2018). The authors of the original study reported support for their proposition that due to perceptions of (in)appropriateness, the use of smileys may backfire and produce less favorable perceptions of competence in a formal work-related setting, yet more favorable perceptions of warmth in an informal work-related setting. Our results, in contrast, indicated that smileys produce a negative effect on perceptions of competence and a positive effect on perceptions of warmth, regardless of the level of formality. Moreover, our results did not support the reported moderated mediation model involving perceptions of appropriateness. Potential explanations for the discrepancies in results are discussed. We provide data, code, and materials on https://osf.io/n7yc4/.The Dark Versus Bright Side of a Smiley: A Preregistered Replication of Experiment 3 in Glikson et al. (2018) “The Dark Side of a Smiley”publishedVersio
Replication of Study 1 in "Differentiating Social and Personal Power" by Lammers, Stoker, and Stapel (2009)
No full textWe performed an independent, direct, and better powered (N = 295) replication of Study 1, an experiment (N = 113) by Lammers, Stoker, and Stapel (2009). Lammers and colleagues distinguished between social power (influence over others) and personal power (freedom from the influence of others), and found support for their predictions that the two forms of power produce opposite effects on stereotyping, but parallel effects on behavioral approach. Our results did not replicate the effects on behavioral approach, but partially replicated the effects on stereotyping. Compared to personal power, social power produced less stereotyping, but neither form of power differed significantly from the control condition, and effect sizes were considerably lower than the original estimates. Potential explanations are discussed
Speakers’ Choice of Frame Reveals Little About Their Trait Emotions but More About Their Preferences and Risk Perception
Full text linkPeople’s decisions depend on how situations are described or framed to them. But how do speakers frame outcomes to others? What factors predict whether a speaker chooses to frame an investment opportunity in terms of its chances of failure or success? Drawing on the appraisal tendency framework, we investigated whether emotions associated with uncertainty (worry) might increase speakers’ preference for negative framing, whereas emotions associated with certainty (anger) might increase speakers’ preference for positive framing. Across two well-powered preregistered studies (NTotal = 1,350), participants responded to measures of dispositional worry and anger and completed framing tasks in different contexts. We told participants that a job applicant/investment in a medical treatment had an estimated chance of failure vs success (e.g., 40% chance of failure and 60% chance of success) and asked them whether they would describe the predicted outcome to their manager in terms of chances of failure or chances of success. Overall, we found little evidence for our hypothesized influence of dispositional worry and anger on framing using our preregistered analysis. However, exploratory analyses revealed that the predicted associations appeared when participants perceived high levels of risk in the decision scenarios. A stronger effect on frame preference was found for risk perception and willingness to recommend a decision, indicating that frames reveal more about such idiosyncratic responses than about emotional traits. Preregistrations, data, code, and materials can be found at https://osf.io/3e98a/.publishedVersio
Noise and Cognitive Flexibility: Exploring the Moderating Roles of Eastern and Western Perspectives of Mindfulness, and the Mediating Mechanisms of Arousal and Cognitive Processing
Full text linkMasteroppgave(MSc) in Master of Science in Leadership and Organizational Psychology - Handelshøyskolen BI, 2018Using a between-subject experimental design, the current thesis takes an
exploratory approach in examining the effects of open-office noise on cognitive
flexibility. In attempts of gaining a holistic understanding of this relationship, we
investigated the mediating effects of arousal and cognitive processing, as well as
the moderating roles of Eastern and Western trait mindfulness. Three central
models were employed in order to see whether a) arousal and cognitive processing
would comparably mediate the relationship (parallel mediation), b) if arousal and
cognitive processing would mediate sequentially (serial mediation), and c) if
arousal and cognitive processing would behave differently with the inclusion of
Eastern or Western trait mindfulness as a moderator (moderated mediation).
Although parallel and serial mediation analyses did not reveal any significant
findings, we found a significant moderated mediation model with Western
mindfulness. Practical implications and limitations are discussed
Noise and Cognitive Flexibility: Exploring the Moderating Roles of Eastern and Western Perspectives of Mindfulness, and the Mediating Mechanisms of Arousal and Cognitive Processing
No full textMasteroppgave(MSc) in Master of Science in Leadership and Organizational Psychology - Handelshøyskolen BI, 2018Using a between-subject experimental design, the current thesis takes an
exploratory approach in examining the effects of open-office noise on cognitive
flexibility. In attempts of gaining a holistic understanding of this relationship, we
investigated the mediating effects of arousal and cognitive processing, as well as
the moderating roles of Eastern and Western trait mindfulness. Three central
models were employed in order to see whether a) arousal and cognitive processing
would comparably mediate the relationship (parallel mediation), b) if arousal and
cognitive processing would mediate sequentially (serial mediation), and c) if
arousal and cognitive processing would behave differently with the inclusion of
Eastern or Western trait mindfulness as a moderator (moderated mediation).
Although parallel and serial mediation analyses did not reveal any significant
findings, we found a significant moderated mediation model with Western
mindfulness. Practical implications and limitations are discussed
Fear and anxiety differ in construal level and scope [Elektronisk resurs]
No full textThe fear-anxiety distinction has been extensively discussed and debated among emotion researchers. In this study, we tested this distinction from a social-cognitive perspective. Drawing on construal level theory and regulatory scope theory, we examined whether fear and anxiety differ in their underlying level of construal and scope. Results from a preregistered autobiographical recall study (N = 200) that concerned either a fear situation or an anxiety situation and a large dataset from Twitter (N = 104,949) indicated that anxiety was associated with a higher level of construal and a more expansive scope than fear. These findings support the notion that emotions serve as mental tools that deal with different challenges. While fear prompts people to seek immediate solutions to concrete threats in the here and now (contractive scope), anxiety prompts them to deal with distant and unknown threats that require more expansive and flexible solutions (expansive scope). Our study contributes to a growing literature on emotions and construal level and points to interesting avenues for further research
- …
