108 research outputs found
A Difficulty with Oaths: On Trust, Trustworthiness, and Signalling
No full textIn the wake of the Enron and Worldcom financial scandals that rocked Wall Street in 2002, the US government’s financial regulatory body, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) took the unprecedented step in June 2002 of requiring that the chief executives and chief financial officers of America’s 947 biggest companies to swear on oath that their company results and financial reports were to the best of their knowledge accurate. The one-off order was quickly followed by the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxely act, which will require many more CEOs and CFOs to certify their company reports and financial statements at regular intervals. In this paper we apply a simple signalling model to examine whether or not this type of institutional signal of trustworthiness is always efficient. We find that in the presence of signalling costs, the separating equilibrium can be socially inefficient as well as causing a general loss of trust.asymmetric information, institutional signals, oaths, risk, trust,
Then come and join the noble band, Humanity salvation [first line of chorus]
No full textstrophic with choruspiano and voiceDedicated to the Father Matthew Total Abstinence Societies.9202Johns Hopkins University, Levy Sheet Music Collection, Box
072, Item 125Words by Edward Harrigan. Music by Dave Braham
Then come and join the noble band, Humanity salvation [first line of chorus]
No full textstrophic with choruspiano and voiceDedicated to the Father Matthew Total Abstinence Societies.9202Johns Hopkins University, Levy Sheet Music Collection, Box
072, Item 125Words by Edward Harrigan. Music by Dave Braham
Comment on Braham and Steffen
No full textThe paper ‘Voting Power in Games with Abstentions’ by Matthew Braham and Frank Steffen is a contribution to a very young and as yet under-developed part of the theory of voting power. I will first make some general remarks in order to put this paper in context. Then I will go on to comment on the substance of the paper
The Project of Freedom: Unity in Diversity
No full text’ (with M. Braham), in: M. Meyer, J. Helfer, R. Groetker(eds.), ,: Stiftung, 2019
The Project of Freedom: Unity in Diversity
No full text’ (with M. Braham), in: M. Meyer, J. Helfer, R. Groetker (eds.), ,: Stiftung, 2019
A Public Help Index
No full textWe modify the Public Good Index (Holler, 1978) taking into account all winning coalitions instead of the minimal ones, as considered by Holler. An axiomatic characterization of the new index, monotonicity properties and an algorithm are supplied
Individual control in decision-making and attitudes towards inequality: The case of Italy
No full textPower is commonly defined as the control exercised by one or more persons over the choices, behaviours and attitudes of another or others. In this paper we focus on a different form of control, i.e., the control that a person exercises on her own choices, behaviours and attitudes. We conceptualize this different form of control by using the Millian idea of autonomy freedom. We argue that the power required for an individual to be in control of her own actions is exercised through her level of autonomy freedom. Autonomy freedom is, therefore, instrumental for an individual to have self-control over her own life. We claim that the extent of autonomy freedom significantly affects an individual's attitudes toward income inequality. More specifically, we point out, and empirically demonstrate, that individuals who enjoy high levels of autonomy freedom value income differences more than those whose degree of autonomy freedom is low © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Coalition formation theories revisited: an empirical investigation of Aumann's hypothesis
No full textRobert J Aumann, the 2005 Nobel laureate in Economics, hypothesized in 1995 that, in forming a majority coalition government in real life, the party charged with forming the coalition will choose to form the coalition that maximizes its Shapley-Shubik index. We subjected this hypothesis to empirical testing in nine countries. It was found that for the data sets investigated, this hypothesis produces the smallest number of correct predictions. Three variations of this hypothesis appear to perform somewhat better: restricting the maximization process to the set of closed majority coalitions, or likewise but with a further requirement that the coalition selected be of minimal size or of minimal range. However, none of these variations achieves a level of predictive performance comparable to the Leiserson-Axelrod closed minimal range theory or to the Gamson-Riker minimum size principle. We therefore conclude that Aumann’s hypothesis should be rejected, and that considerations of maximizing a priori voting power do not seem to account for the actual behavior of political parties in forming governmental coalitions
Experimental Evidence on Individual and Collective Decision-Making in Ethical Dilemmas and Unfair Contests
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