151,680 research outputs found
Prisoners’ gang-related activity: the importance of bullying and moral disengagement
No full textGang-related activity can have a significant impact on the effective management of prisons in the UK, yet little is known about the characteristics of the prisoners involved. I it this study, 141 adult male prisoners' gang-related activity was examined in relation to their bullying behaviour and use of moral disengagement. Results showed that prisoners most involved in gang-related activity were likely to have spent a longer total time in the prison system, be perpetrators of bullying and have high levels of moral disengagement. Findings also show that moral disengagement partially mediates the relationship between bullying and gang-related activity Implications for treatment programmes and the prison estate are discussed
Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
No full textMoral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism
La diversità degli interessi nell'atto di autonomia privata: la fattispecie del contratto misto
No full textWould Aristotle have seen the wrongness of slavery if he had undergone a course of moral enhancement?
No full textThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Cambridge University Press via the DOI in this record.I agree with those proponents of bio-medical moral enhancement who claim that we face large-scale global moral problems which are currently un-recognised or un-acted upon. But I argue that the proposed bio-medical means for tackling them is misconceived. I show that both bio-medical and ‘traditional’ conceptions of moral enhancement share a misleading picture of the relation between the moral psychology of individuals and the socially structured moral problems with which they are faced. The argument unfolds in three stages. First I reflect on prominent historical cases of large-scale progressive moral change to assess the role of the agents’ moral psychology in bringing that about and sustaining it. Second, I identify some current cases of people recognising one or more of (what I call) the ‘new moral problems’ but not acting in accordance with that recognition. Third, I adumbrate an alternative stance to the idea of both traditional and bio-medical moral enhancement
The Objectivity of Moral Judgements
No full textThe problem I wish to address is one that is widespread in analytic moral philosophy viz., that of transcending individuality in an attempt to develop theories and arguments that generally explain what occurs when we make moral judgements. I argue that none of these attempts is plausible on the grounds that moral judgements are necessarily personal, but in a way that still allows for moral objectivity. Such objectivity, I argue, is grounded in what it is for one's moral understanding to deepen, and involves considering morality as more than purely a guide to conduct. Moral subjectivity implies a lack of understanding of the meaning of one's actions in terms of the humanity of others, and also of what one becomes as a consequence of those actions. I reject the notion that objectivity can only be found through impersonal thinking such as that of propositions and mathematics, and suggest that the grammar of objective moral understanding differs from impersonal propositional forms insofar as it does not admit of external justification. On this basis I argue that the cognitivist / non-cognitivist models of moral thought are misguided. In support of my argument concerning the nature of moral objectivity, I draw on Wittgenstein's later conception of the nature of language, and use it to examine concepts such as trust, cynicism, sentimentality, love and maturity. I maintain that such concepts are legitimate and can be used objectively, even though they have no absolute standards and thus cannot admit of external justification. I argue that it is not rational to dismiss them in favour of formal argument or to try to impose formal argument upon them. The latter strategy, I claim, violates the grammar that gives them sense viz., (among other things) the context in which they are uttered that includes the individuality of the speaker. Thus I conclude that since moral judgments contain such concepts, it makes little sense to transcend individuality in an attempt to be objective or develop explanatory arguments based on theories
Disgust as embodied moral judgment.
No full textHow, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments
Moral perfectionism and moral values, virtues, and judgments: Further investigations
No full textIn a first psychological investigation of moral perfectionism, Yang, Stoeber, and Wang (2015) adapted items from the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale to differentiate perfectionistic personal moral standards and concern over moral mistakes. Examining a sample of Chinese students, Yang et al. found that personal moral standards showed unique positive relationships with moral values, virtues, and judgments, whereas concern over moral mistakes did not. The present study aimed to replicate Yang et al.’s findings in a sample of Western students (N = 243), additionally including measures of moral identity and moral disengagement. Furthermore, the study examined whether moral perfectionism explained variance in moral attitudes beyond general perfectionism. Results largely replicated Yang et al.’s findings. Personal moral standards (but not concern over moral mistakes) showed unique positive relationships with moral values, virtues, and judgments and a unique negative relationship with moral disengagement. Furthermore, moral perfectionism explained significant variance in moral attitudes beyond general perfectionism. The present findings suggest that moral perfectionism is a personality characteristic that is relevant in both Asian and Western cultures and explains individual differences in moral attitudes beyond general perfectionism
Moral judgment reloaded : a moral dilemma validation study
No full textThe study was funded by the research project FFI2010-20759 (Spanish Government: Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness), and by the Chair of the Three Religions (Government of the Balearic Islands) of the University of the Balearic Islands, Spain. Julia F. Christensen and Albert Flexas were supported by FPU PHD scholarships from the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (AP2009-2889 and AP2008-02284). Nadine K. Gut was supported by a scholarship of the School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, UK.We propose a revised set of moral dilemmas for studies on moral judgment. We selected a total of 46 moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability, and Intention) and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression style, question formats) that have been shown to influence moral judgment. Second, we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing that emotional arousal in response to moral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set confirming that people's moral judgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account of moral judgment. Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing the importance of the factor Intentionality in moral judgment. Additionally, due to the importance of cross cultural studies in the quest for universals in human moral cognition, we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Catalan, and Danish). The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set.Peer reviewe
Animals, moral risk and moral considerability
No full textI believe that accounts of the moral considerability of animals can be strengthened in an interesting and novel way if attention is paid to moral risk and epistemic responsibility. In this thesis I argue for a sentience-based account of moral considerability. The argument from marginal cases gives us a reason to prefer accounts of moral considerability that include animals; if we think marginal humans are morally considerable we must accept that animals are too. Moral uncertainty gives us another reason to include animals. When we are making moral decisions we ought to minimise the amount of moral risk we take. I call this the 'cautious approach '. We cannot know for certain which account of moral considerability is correct. Given that we are trying to do what is right we should avoid any course of action that may be wrong. I will argue that accounts of moral considerability that exclude animals are taking an unnecessary moral risk: animals might be morally considerable and if they are most of our current treatment of them is wrong. When assessing risk one of the things that needs to be taken into account are benefits and losses. I will argue that conceding animals moral status will benefit humans. I argue that we should favour a sentience-based account of moral consideration because it is the least risky and most epistemically responsible; this gives us extra reasons to prefer it. I outline respect utilitarianism, which makes provision for protecting individuals. On this account we ought to give the interests of sentient beings (at least all vertebrates) equal consideration. Animals' interests not to be eaten and/or used for testing are sufficiently weighty to dictate that most westerners ought to become vegan and testing on animals should stop
Moral anger is more flexible than moral disgust
No full textThe research examines whether anger rather than disgust will be more likely to be responsible for changes in moral judgment, after individuals consider potential circumstances. Participants first read a scenario that described a moral violation (harm/fairness versus purity) and then gave their initial moral judgment and emotions toward the act. They were then asked to list things that could change their opinion and were provided with an opportunity to fill out the measures again, re-evaluating the scenario with these changes in mind. It was found that ratings of disgust did not change after generating potential circumstances; however, anger changed in differential ways for the two violation types. We also found that anger but not disgust predicted change in moral judgment. These findings suggest that moral anger is a more flexible emotion than moral disgust because anger is more likely to respond to changes in circumstances
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