283 research outputs found
Voting on majority rules
No full textWe analyze an overlapping generations model of voting on “reform projects”.
These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure
and later pay off. Since the time during which old people get the benefit is shorter,
or because older people are more wealthy and hence pay more taxes, they are more
conservative (against reforms) than young people.
We show that if people vote on which majority should be required in future
elections for a bill to become a law, the winning proposal specifies a supermajority.
This result is very robust even if age related conflict is only one determinant among
others for voting behavior in the society
Cooperation in Stochastic OLG Games
No full textThis paper builds on Cremer’s (1986) seminal analysis which shows that
(almost) complete cooperation can be achieved as an equilibrium in a game
played by overlapping generations of players if the institution in which
players cooperate is infinitely lived.
We analyze a similar model in which the costs of cooperation are subject
to random shocks. Even if these random shocks are very small, the range
of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained is decreased considerably
in comparison to the deterministic case. Furthermore, we show how
the efficient outcome can be approximated if the level of cooperation can
be varied continuously and the cooperation technology has decreasing or
constant returns to scale, while this is not possible in the case of increasing
returns to scale
Paying Politicians
No full textConsider a situation where a society has to elect an official who provides a
public service for the citizens. Candidates differ in their competence and every
potential candidate has private information about his opportunity cost to perform
the task of the elected official. We develop a new citizen candidate model with a
unique equilibrium to analyze citizens’ candidature decisions. Under some weak
additional assumptions, bad candidates run with a higher probability than good
ones, and for unattractive positions, good candidates free-ride on bad ones
Strong and Coalition-Proof Political Equilibria under Plurality and Runoff Rule
No full textIn this paper, we look at the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium
of voting games. Specifically, we analyze voter coordination through the concepts
of strong equilibrium and coalition–proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff
rule elections.
We completely characterize these equilibria in the 3 candidate case, and provide
results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case
Metallkomplexe mit biologisch wichtigen Liganden, LXV
No full textCp*Co(CO)I2 (Cp* = 5-C5Me5), [(6-arene)RuCl2]2 (arene = p-cymene, hexamethylbenzene), and [Cp*MCl2]2 (M = Rh, Ir) react with -amino amides and various peptide esters to give the N,O-chelate complexes [Cp*(I)Co - NH2C(H)(R1)C(NHR2)-O]+ (1), [(6-arene)(Cl)Ru - NH2C(H)(R1)C(NHR2)O]+ (2), and [CP*(Cl)M - NH2CH2C(NHR)O]+ (M = Rh, Ir) (5, in solution), respectively. In the solid state the ligands are 1N-bonded in 5. By deprotonation of the peptide bond in 2 and 5 the neutral N, N-chelate complexes (6-arene)(Cl)Ru - NH2C(H)(R1)C(O)-2 (6) and Cp*(Cl)M - NH2C(H)(R1)C(O)NR2 (M = Rh, Ir) (7) have been obtained. Glycinenitrile is 1-bonded in (6-p-cymene)(Cl)2Ru(NH2CH2CN) (3) and Cp*(Cl)2Rh(NH2CH2CN) (4). Double deprotonated triglycine methyl ester is a N,N,N-tridentate ligand in (6-C6Me6)Ru(NH2CH2C(O)NCH2C(O)-NCH2CO2Me) (8). The anions of L-asparagine and of aspartame (L-aspartyl-L-phenylalanine methyl ester) give the complexes 9-12 with tridentate O,N,O- or O,N,N-chelate ligands. The crystal structures of 1d (L = glyglyOEt), 5a (L = glycinamide), 6e (L = glyglyOEt), and 7k (L = glyglyglyOEt) have been determined by X-ray structural analysis
Topics on firm heterogeneity and economic policy
No full textThis thesis presents a series of works exploring individual firm behavior and how that affects the macroeconomics data.
Chapter one explores the trends in competition, markups and market shares in a general equilibrium model. Over the last 30 years markups, as well as advertising expenses, have increased substantially. Moreover, there is a positive correlation between marketing expenditures and markups, a feature that standard models of monopolistic competition based on Dixit-Stiglitz have found it difficult to obtain. The model here adds endogenous market expansion choice (through product marketing) for firms to an otherwise standard monopolistic competition model. The marketing is modeled as a contest in which heterogeneous firms can shift the demand of the variety they produce, but also suffer from other firms engaging in the same activity. In the model's equilibrium, product marketing and pricing decisions interact with each other, altering markups proportional to the level of marketing expenditures by individual firms. This is another result that many empirical studies find. The model also creates a link between total factor productivity and markups through investments in product marketing. The model shows that markups and market concentration depends on the variance of total factor productivity. It also illustrates how the elasticity of substitution in an industry can affect the markup distribution.
The second chapter is based on the work co-authored with Dr. Mattias Polborn, where we analyze a theoretical model in which entrepreneurs' property rights are threatened by ``raiders'' who can challenge them to a contest for control of their firms. Entrepreneurs have heterogeneous productivity and decide how much capital to invest before raiders decide whom to attack. In equilibrium, low productivity entrepreneurs are unaffected by the existence of raiders, while mid- and high-productivity entrepreneurs suffer. However, while raiders essentially act as a tax for the highest productivity entrepreneurs, the investment behavior of mid-productivity entrepreneurs who try to avoid an attack is more drastically affected. Our model provides a novel theoretical explanation for the ``missing middle'' observed in many countries with insecure property rights.
The third chapter analyses the effects of monetary policy on firm's investment decision by adding technology investments into otherwise standard New Keynesian models. In standard New Keynesian models growth rate of the economy is assumed to be exogenous and out of the scopes of monetary authority's control. The framework developed here adds stochastic growth rates determined from firm-specific investments. Firms carry costs from price adjustments and can accumulate technology by technological investments, which aggregates as a level of technology in the economy. Under this setup inflation and monetary shocks have a considerably large impact on the growth rates of the economy. Interest rate change counteracting cycle interferes with growth and the variable levels. Policy rules that penalize for inflation more perform more favorably under this setup.Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2023-05-01The student, Aram Grigoryan, accepted the attached license on 2021-04-13 at 10:24.The student, Aram Grigoryan, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2021-04-13 at 10:55.This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2021-04-14 at 16:01.DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #16298 on 2021-09-16 at 17:03:00Made available in DSpace on 2021-09-17T02:34:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2
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Previous issue date: 2021-04-14Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 118505
Lift date: 2023-09-17T02:34:57Z
Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD systemAuthor requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD systemU of I Onl
Koordinationschemie -gebundener Cyclopentadienyl-Chalkogeno-Ether
No full textCoordination Chemistry of rr-Bonded Cyclopentadienyl Chalcogeno Ethers, I. - Chelate Complexes of Pentakis(methylthio)cymantrene with Metal Carbonyls
[C5(SMe)5]Mn(CO)3 (1) reacts with W(CO)5(THF), Mo(CO)4(C7H8), Cr(CO)3(NCMe)3, and Re(CO)4(-C3H5)/HBF4 to yield the monochelate complexes [[C5(SMe)5]Mn(C0)3][M(CO)4] (M = W: 2; M = Mo: 3) and the dichelate complexes [[C5(SMe)5]Mn(CO)3][M(C0)4]2 (M = W: 4; M = Cr: 5; M = Re BFF4 : 6). The reaction with Mo(CO)3(p-xylene) in THF leads via unstable intermediates, which contain coordinated THF, to a mixture of 3 and [[C5(SMe)5]Mn(CO)3][Mo(CO)4]2 (7). The structures of 3 and 4 in the crystal have been determined by X-ray diffraction methods
Majority-efficiency and Competition-efficiency in a Binary Policy Model
No full textWe introduce a general framework in which politicians choose a (possibly infinite) sequence of binary policies. The two competing candidates are exogenously committed to particular actions on a subset of these issues, while they can choose any policy for the remaining issues to maximize their winning probability. Citizens have general preferences over policies, and the distribution of preferences may be uncertain. We show that a special case of the model, the weighted-issue model, provides a tractable multidimensional model of candidate competition that can generate (i) policy divergence in pure and mixed strategies, (ii) adoption of minority positions, and (iii) inefficient outcomes.multidimensional policy, voting, citizen-candidate, normative analysis of political competition
Synthesis of the amides M[N(SiMetBu₂)(SitBu₃)] (M = Li, Na) by N₂-elimination reaction of the triazenides M[tBu₃SiNNNSiMetBu₂] (M= Li, Na)
No full textThe thermolabile triazenides M[tBu3SiNNNSiMetBu2] (M = Li, Na) are accessible from the reaction of tBu2MeSiN3 with the silanides MSitBu3 (M = Li, Na) at −78 °C in THF. At r. t. N2 elimination from the triazenides M[tBu3SiNNNSiMetBu2] (M = Li, Na) takes place with the formation of M[N(SiMetBu2)(SitBu3)] (M = Li, Na). X-Ray quality crystals of Li(THF)[N(SiMetBu2)(SitBu3)] (orthorhombic, Pna21) are obtained from a benzene solution at ambient temperature. In contrast to the structures of the unsolvated silanides MSitBu3 (M = Li, Na), the THF adduct Li(THF)3SitBu3 is monomeric in the solid state (orthorhombic, Pna21)
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