1,720,987 research outputs found
Impresa sociale efficiente e complementarietà tra ideologia, governance e accountability: l'evidenza empirica
No full textIntroduzione a: Efficacia, efficienza e stabilità dell'impresa sociale: il ruolo delle motivazioni ideali e quello dei sistemi di governo e di rendicontazione sociale
No full textCome emerge l'impresa sociale? : uno sguardo d'assieme alla teoria della complementarietà tra ideologia, governance e accountability
No full text
Contractarian Compliance and the 'Sense of Justice': A Behavioral Conformity Model and Its Experimental Support
Full text linkThe social contract approach to the study if institutions aims at providing a solution to the problem of compliance with rational agreements in situations characterized by a conflict between individual rationality and social optimality. After a short discussion of some attempts to deal with this problem from a rational choice perspective, we focus on John Rawls's idea of 'sense of justice' and its application to the explanation of the stability of a well-ordered society. We show how the relevant features of Rawls's theory can be captured by a behavioral game theory model of beliefs-dependent dispositions to comply, and we present the results of two experimental studies that provide support to the theory
Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance: the experimental evidence
No full textConformist preferences, Reciprocity, Veil of ignorance, Psychological games, Fairness, Experiments, C7, C9, D63, D64,
Problem solving and governance in the capability-based view of the firm; the roles and theoretical representations of organizational routines.
No full textCompliance by Believing : An Experimental Exploration on Social Norms and Impartial Agreements
Full text linkThe main contribution of this paper is twofold. First of all, it focuses on the decisional process that leads to the creation of a social norm. Secondly, it analyses the mechanisms through which subjects conform their behaviour to the norm. In particular, our aim is to study the role and the nature of Normative and Empirical Expectations and their influence on people's decisions. The tool is the Exclusion Game, a sort of 'triple mini-dictator game'. It represents a situation where 3 subjects - players A - have to decide how to allocate a sum S among themselves and a fourth subject - player B - who has no decisional power. The experiment consists of three treatments. In the Baseline Treatment participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and play the Exclusion Game. In the Agreement Treatment in each group participants are invited to vote for a specific non-binding allocation rule before playing the Exclusion Game. In the Outsider Treatment, after the voting procedure and before playing the Exclusion Game, a player A for each group (the outsider) is reassigned to a different group and instructed about the rule chosen by the new group. In all the treatments, at the end of the game and before players are informed about the decisions taken during the Exclusion Game by the other co-players, first order and second order expectations (both normative and empirical) are elicited through a brief questionnaire. The first result we obtained is that subjects' choices are in line with their empirical (not normative) expectations. The second result is that even a non-binding agreement induces convergence of empirical expectations - and, consequently, of choices. The third results is that expectation of conformity is higher in the partner protocol. This implies that a single outsider breaks the 'trust an
Social Distance, Cooperation and Other-regarding Preferences: A New Approach Based on the Theory of Relational Goods
No full textConformity and reciprocity in the “exclusion game”: an experimental investigation
Full text linkSacconi and Grimalda (2002, 2005a, 2005b) introduced a model in which two basic motives to action are understood as different type of preferences and represented by a comprehensive utility function: the first is consequentialist motivation, whereas the second is a conditional willingness to conform with an ideal, or a moral principle, which they call a conformist, or ideal, motive to action. A moral ideal is meant as a normative principle of evaluation for collective modes of behaviours which provides agents with a ranking of states of affairs resulting from strategic interaction expressing a greater or lesser consistency with the ideal. The principle moreover is seen as resulting from a (possibly hypothetical) contract between the agents involved in the interaction in an ex-ante phase. Thus, the normative principle boils down to a social welfare function that measures the consistency of outcomes with the normative prescriptions provided by the ideal. Hence, agents understand their own and any other agent’s degree of conformity in terms of their contribution to carrying out the ideal given the others’ expected action, and a person’s own motivation to act in conformity with the principle increases with others’ (expected) conformity. In other words, individual conformity with the principle is conditional on others’ conformity with it, as perceived by the agent. This peculiar feature of reciprocity over others’ behaviour calls for an extension of the usual equipment of decision theory, which is provided by the theory of Psychological Games (Geanakoplos et al., 1989). In this paper we design an experiment for preliminary exploration of the empirical validity of the conformist preferences model, applying it to a simple non cooperative game(the Exclusion Game) meant as the problem of dividing a sum between two active players and a third, dummy player (passive beneficiary). Results are encouraging. Behaviours dramatically change passing from the simple exclusion game to a three steps game, in which once the players have first played the typical non cooperative exclusion game, and before playing it again, they participate in a middle phase, where they anonymously agree on a principle of division. Having agreed on a principle, even though this agreement does not implies reputation effects nor is externally enforceable, induces a substantial part of players - who acted selfishly in the first step - to conform to the principle in the third phase. The additional condition being that they believe the other players will also conform to the agreed principle (what here does happen, as a mater of fact). These results strictly accord with the prediction of the conformist preferences model, but cannot be accounted for by alternative theories of reciprocity
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