7 research outputs found
Imprese dell' Offitioso, accademico intronato /
No full textIncludes errata at end of both pts.Includes indexes.T.p. woodcuts of Medici arms (pt. 1), Gonzaga arms impaling Medici (pt. 2). Woodcut emblematic ill. Tail-pieces of printer's ornaments.Pt. 1 dated 1629. Pt. 2 has separate t.p. dated 1628, and is separately signed and paged.By Alcibiade Lucarini. See Praz.Praz, M. Studies in 17th-century imagery (2nd ed.)Mode of access: Internet.Armorial bookplate on front pastedown (lion's head erased and in chief a crowned eagle). Ownership inscription of Dominicus Portius.Binding: both pts. in 1 vol. cover in vellum, author & title written on spine, 2 pairs of new rawhide ties
Liber singularis ad Iustinianum Imperatorem de fiduciaria tutela
No full textObra perteneciente al Fondo Antiguo de la Biblioteca de la USA
Alcibiade au miroir de Socrate : sources épiques d’un portrait croisé (Platon, Banquet, 215a-222b)
No full textInternational audienceThe aim of this study is to explore the sources and references, both explicit and implicit, that animate one of the most famous sequences in Plato's Symposium, namely the eulogy of Socrates that Alcibiades is said to have delivered at the end of the banquet given in honour of Agathon's victory in the Lenean tragedy competition in 416 (215a-222b). Helen North has pointed out the twofold originality of this speech in the context of epidictic rhetoric: on the one hand, it is the first example of praise of a person contemporary with the author of the speech; on the other, Plato bends the codes of the genre to serve the purposes of philosophy by having Alcibiades praise Socrates' speech rather than his own person (NORTH, 1994, pp. 97-98). Although eulogy readily makes use of comparison to give scope to the portrait, the choice of basing praise of Socrates on the latter's resemblance to a silenus, an ungainly creature renowned for its excesses, may nevertheless seem counter-productive. Andrea Capra has recently countered scholarly opinion by suggesting that this depiction of Socrates as a silenus does indeed come from Aristophanes' The Clouds, and that Plato is attempting to turn it around to his master's advantage, a move that may have inspired the production of busts of Socrates within the academy itself (CAPRA, 2016, pp. 437-442). The mention of silenas and satires, associated with Bacchic possession, are also likely to awaken a multiplicity of poetic reminiscences in Plato, as witness the passage in the Ion devoted to the divine exaltation of poets (533c9-e5, see FERRONI and MACÉ, eds., 79-93). By turning to epic poetry, we propose to explain some of the poetic resources that enabled Plato to use a statue of Silenus as a vehicle for a philosophical use of praise. In particular, we will try to show that the mysterious statue, because it has an interior, allows Plato to play with exteriority and interiority in a way that is reminiscent of Hesiod's creation of human beings and Aesop's variation on it. We shall also see that Plato inserts these games into a system of variation that is in turn part of the possibilities offered by the art of portraiture that the rhetoric of the Homeric characters calls for. It would be the combined use of this dual resource drawn from epic poetry, Homeric and Hesiodic, that would help turn a comparison borrowed from comedy into a means of philosophical praise, not just of Socrates, but of what the Platonic Socrates pursues with all his desires, namely the intelligible forms that inhabit the innermost core of all reality.La présente étude entend contribuer à l'exploration des sources et des références, explicites et implicites, qui animent l'une des séquences les plus fameuses du Banquet de Platon, à savoir l'éloge de Socrate qu'aurait prononcé Alcibiade à la fin du banquet donné en l'honneur de la victoire d'Agathon au concours de tragédies des Lénéennes en 416 (215a-222b). Helen North a indiqué la double originalité de ce discours dans le contexte de la rhétorique épidictique : d'une part, il s'agirait du premier exemple d'éloge d'une personne contemporaine de l'auteur du discours ; d'autre part, Platon infléchit les codes du genre pour servir les finalités de la philosophie en faisant faire à Alcibiade l'éloge du discours de Socrate plutôt que celui de sa personne (NORTH, 1994, p. 97-98). Si l'éloge fait volontiers usage de la comparaison pour donner de l'ampleur au portrait, le choix de faire reposer un éloge de Socrate sur la ressemblance de ce dernier avec un silène, une créature disgracieuse et réputée pour ses excès, peut néanmoins sembler contre-productif. Andrea Capra a récemment pris à contre-pied l'opinion savante en suggérant que cette représentation de Socrate en silène proviendrait bien des Nuées d'Aristophane et que Platon entreprendrait ici de la retourner à l'avantage de son maître, un geste qui aurait pu inspirer la production de bustes de Socrate au sein même de l'académie (CAPRA, 2016, p. 437-442). La mention des silènes et des satires, associés à la possession bacchique, sont en outre susceptibles d'éveiller chez Platon une multiplicité de réminiscences poétiques, comme en témoigne le passage de l'Ion consacré à l'exaltation divine des poètes (533c9-e5, voir FERRONI et MACÉ, éd., 79-93). Aussi proposons-nous, en nous tournant vers la poésie épique, d'expliciter certaines des ressources poétiques qui ont permis à Platon de faire d'une statue de silène le truchement d'un usage philosophique de l'éloge. Nous tenterons plus particulièrement de montrer que la mystérieuse statue, parce qu'elle est dotée d'un intérieur, permet à Platon de se livrer à certains jeux, sur l'extériorité et l'intériorité, qui évoquent la fabrication des êtres humains chez Hésiode, et la déclinaison qu'en donne Ésope. Nous verrons encore que Platon insère ces jeux au sein d'un système de variation qui s'inscrit à son tour dans les possibilités offertes par l'art du portrait que sollicite la rhétorique des personnages homériques. Ce serait l'usage conjoint de cette double ressource tirée de la poésie épique, homérique et hésiodique, qui contribuerait à retourner une comparaison empruntée à la comédie en moyen d'éloge philosophique, non pas seulement de Socrate, mais de ce que le Socrate platonicien poursuit de tous ses désirs, à savoir les formes intelligibles qui habitent le coeur intime de toute réalité
Socrate o dello specchio. Strategie di scritture nell'Apologia e nell'Alcibiade
No full textThrough a mention to the Middle Platonists and a reference to a late antique text that presents a comparison between Plato and the Demiurge, I set out to show just one of those rhetorical strategies that have been used by the author Plato to give his writings the unity and consistency that make the corpus a kosmos, a living animal, like the universe. After having identified among the rhetorical strategies the one that uses examples and explained what such a strategy means, I analyse the Platonic use of the example of the mirror identified with Socrates in two writings, the Apology of Socrates and the Alcibiade
Aristophanes and Euripides: A Palimpsestuous Relationship
No full textAristophanes allows Euripides to interrupt constantly. In Athenian comedy of the fifth century they are on stage together, both literally and figuratively. Despite Aristophanes’ comedies having a meaning of their own, Euripides’ lines are so clearly visible underneath them that they can only be described as the verbal equivalent of a palimpsest. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a palimpsest as a manuscript or piece of writing on which later writing has superimposed or effaced earlier writing, or something reused or altered but still bearing visible traces of its earlier form. It is clear that a palimpsest is the product of layering that results in something as new, whilst still bearing traces of the original. Dillon describes the palimpsest as “...an involuted phenomenon where otherwise unrelated texts are involved and entangled, intricately interwoven, interrupting and inhabiting each other”. Aristophanes takes texts, particularly those of Euripides, which may otherwise have been unrelated, and weaves them together to form something new.
I will show that in a number of cases Aristophanes offers scenes that have already been performed in Euripides’ plays but lays his own plot over the tragedian’s, whilst at the same time drawing the audiences’ attention to the original. The nature of this borrowing overwrites Kristeva’s theory of ‘intertextuality’ and provides a new and more apposite name for the permutation of texts in which the geno-text corresponds to infinite possibilities of palimpsestuous textuality (and the pheno-text to a singular text, which contains echoes of what it could have been). The plurality of Euripides’ texts, whilst engendering those of Aristophanes, constantly interrupts them. Through the consideration of ancient and modern literary theory and by a close analysis of Aristophanes’ and Euripides’ plays, this thesis sets out to offer a new reading of the relationship between these two poets. It shows that they were engaged in a dialogue of reciprocal influence that came to a head at the end of the Peloponnesian War
Humanisme et anthropologie chez Cicéron
No full textCiceros Werk liegt dem Begriff des Humanismus zugrunde, wie ihn die Modernen seit der Renaissance kennen. Der Autor verbindet seine beiden Bedeutungen : Respekt des Menschen als Wert an sich ; Betonung der literarischen Studien nach den antiken Modellen. Dieser Humanismus stimmt mit einer Anthropologie platonischer Tradition überein (cf. Alcibiade 132 sqq.), wo Cicero den Menschen durch seine Seele definiert, wobei er die Rolle des Körpers anerkennt, der ihre Hülle ist (Tusc. I, 52). So löst sich durch die Einheit des Guten der Widerspruch, der in De finibus, IV-V aufgezeigt wird. Ein solcher Humanismus, der das Humane durch das Zusammenfallen mit dem Idealen definiert, beinhaltet keinen Dogmatismus : man versteht das Wort ‘Mensch’, selbst wenn man nicht an die menschliche Nature glaubt (De finibus V, 33). So werden die zukünftigen Theorien des Nominalismus oder des Übermenschlichen vorbereitet und vielleicht sogar überschritten.The works of Cicero are at the very origins of the concept of humanism, as the term has been understood since the Renaissance. The author tries to combine two of its principle aspects, namely, the elevation of the respect for man to the status of a value in itself, and the importance attached to the study of literature in accordance with ancient precepts. This form of humanism fits in with the Platonic tradition of anthropology (cf. Alcibiades 132) in which Cicero defines man in terms of his soul, whilst recognizing the body’s importance as a «vessel». (Tusculanae Disputationes I, 52). Thus the contradiction outlined in De Finibus IV-V is resolved through the one-ness of «Good». This perception of humanism, which defines man in terms of his conformity to an ideal and as a universal necessity, does not imply dogmatism : the word «man» is intelligible even if one docs not believe in «human nature» (De Finibus V, 33). Thus were the foundations of the subsequent theories of nominalism and the super-human laid, and perhaps already made obsolete.L’œuvre de Cicéron est à l’origine de la notion d’humanisme, telle que les modernes la connaissent depuis la Renaissance. L’auteur lie ses deux significations : respect de l’homme pris comme valeur ; attention aux études littéraires, pratiquées selon l’imitation des modèles antiques. Cet humanisme s’accorde avec une anthropologie de tradition platonicienne (cf. Alcibiade, 132 sqq.) où Cicéron définit l’homme par son âme, tout en reconnaissant le rôle du corps qui en est le «vase» (Tusc. I, 52). Ainsi se trouve résolue par l’unité du bien la contradiction esquissée dans le De finibus, IV-V. Un tel humanisme, qui définit l’humain par la convenance à l’idéal et comme une exigence universelle, n’implique pas un dogmatisme : on comprend le mot «homme» même si on ne croit pas à la nature humaine (De finibus V , 33). Ainsi se trouvent préparées (et peut-être dépassées à l’avance) les théories futures du nominalisme ou du surhumain.En la obra de Cicerón está el origen de la noción de humanismo, tal y como la conocen los modernos desde el Renacimiento. El artículo integra sus dos significados : respeto del hombre considerado como objeto de valor ; atención dada a los estudios literarios, practicados a imitación de los modelos antiguos. Dicho humanismo concuerda con una antropologia de tradición platónica (cf. Alcibiades, 132 sqq.) en la que Cicerón define al hombre por su alma, aunque reconociéndole al cuerpo su papel de 'recipiente' (Tusc. I, 52). Así, mediante la unidad del bien se resuelve la contradicción trazada en el De finibus, I V-V. Tal humanismo, que define a lo humano de acuerdo al ideal y como exigencia universal no implica ningún dogmatismo : se entiende la palabra 'hombre' aunque no se crea en la naturaleza humana (De finibus V, 33). De este modo se plantean (y quizás se hallan superadas de antemano) las teorías futuras del nominalismo o de lo sobrehumano.Michel Alain. Humanisme et anthropologie chez Cicéron. In: Cahiers de Fontenay, n°39-40, 1985. Anthropologie et humanisme. pp. 43-55
Il dono del filosofo. Sul gesto originario della filosofia
No full textDue temi e due scene compongono la trama di questo libro intrecciandosi fra loro. I due temi sono costituiti da due domande. La prima ripropone quella che Deleuze e Guattari chiamavano la "domanda di mezzanotte" per evocare il suo carattere ultimo e decisivo. E' l'interrogazione classica su che cos'e' la filosofia? La seconda si chiede, invece, in compagnia di una tradizione che va da Seneca a Mauss e oltre, che cos'e', in realta', un dono? Le due scene hanno per protagonisti Socrate, il primo filosofo, e Montesquieu, l'autore de "Lo spirito delle leggi" e il fautore della dottrina della divisione dei poteri. Entrambe le scene, del resto, raccontano di un dono. Nella prima Socrate, davanti ai suoi concittadini che devono giudicarlo, dichiara di essere il dono del dio alla citta'. Nella seconda, Montesquieu salva un mercante sconosciuto, caduto vittima dei pirati, pagandone il riscatto, ma rifiutando di farsi riconoscere come il benefattore. La prima scena, che appartiene alle pagine notissime del'"Apologia", ha uno sviluppo affascinante e assai meno conosciuto nel dialogo, ritenuto spurio, "Alcibiade Minore", la' dove Socrate discute di doni e di sacrifici, finendo per indossare lui stesso la corona del sacrificio. La seconda ci e' raccontata in "Montesquieu a' Marseille" dal drammaturgo illuminista Louis-Sebastien Mercier (e da altre tre commedie dell'epoca), ma pare rispecchiare un evento reale della biografia del filosofo.
Il dono di se' e il dono anonimo: tra queste due dimensioni della donazione il libro sviluppa il tentativo di rispondere alla domanda di mezzanotte sull'essenza della filosofia. Al di la' delle capacita' mimetiche della filosofia di mascherarsi, oggi e nel corso del tempo, all'interno del sistema utilitaristico-disciplinare dei saperi e dei poteri, vi si sostiene la tesi che il tratto distintivo della filosofia va controvento, in direzione ostinata e contraria, rispetto alla marcia del pianeta dietro il vessillo dell'utile e del profitto e alla sua immane accelerazione nel "fondamentalismo economico" che ha retto il processo di globalizzazione degli ultimi decenni. Se l'utile, come ammoniva Schiller, "e' il grande idolo del tempo, a cui tutte le forze debbono servire e a cui tutti i talenti debbono rendere omaggio", quello filosofico e' l'atto anti-idolatrico e iconoclasta per eccellenza. La filosofia, infatti, non soltanto fa tesoro, per cosi' dire, della sua antica inutilita' rivendicata dai classici (tutte le scienze e le tecniche saranno piu' utili di essa, ma nessuna le sara' superiore diceva Aristotele), ma si protende in un gesto che rovescia quel voler avere di piu' che sembra essere, ormai, il movente principale, se non l'unico movente, che agita il mondo intero. Di fronte al globo trasformato in un immane ammasso di merci umane e non umane, tutte accomunate dal fatto di avere un prezzo, essa si offre senza prezzo, gratuitamente, semplicemente in dono. Si cercava l'essenza della filosofia, si trovera', forse, la forma sovrana di un gesto. Un gesto, quello della donazione, che interrompe il circuito dell'utile e dell'interesse, ma anche, in qualche maniera, del sapere stesso, rappresentando il modo, ogni volta diverso per stile e strumentazione concettuale, con cui la filosofia ottiene il suo scopo originario: la sospensione dell'assolutismo della realta', ovvero la divisione dei poteri che ne costituiscono la presa.
Il dono del dio, il dono del filosofo, e', quindi, la funzione critica della verita'. Nel corso della vita, ogni uomo ingaggia una dura lotta con la verita'. Ne ha bisogno, ma la teme. Talvolta la cerca disperatamente e, tuttavia, molto spesso si da' da fare per metterla a tacere e poi nasconderla. Eppure, assai raramente, in questo aspro confronto, egli si chiede cosa significhi la verita' in se'. Per l'uomo, in generale, sara' piu' importante ascoltare una parola, acquisire un sapere, possedere un oggetto, conoscere i precisi dettagli di un fatto - tutte cose alle quali, di volta in volta, si da' il nome di verita' -, piuttosto che interrogarsi sulla verita' medesima. Gli uomini che dicono di volere la verita', in fondo, sono solo alla ricerca di spiegazioni, di cause e di colpe, di un sistema di esoneri e di consolazioni in grado di rendere piu' sopportabile il peso della vita all'interno di un programma di verita' che e', per essi, trasparente e inavvertito come la boccia di vetro in cui nuotano i pesci rossi. Ecco allora che di fronte alla generalita' del comportamento degli uomini, il filosofo e' quell'uomo che non si accontenta della rassegna delle spiegazioni particolari, ma chiede e pretende di piu', che aspira ad un gesto tanto inutile, nella prospettiva del sistema di esoneri e spiegazioni di cui si diceva, quanto sovrano.
Il dire la verita' e', cioe', qualcosa di diverso e ulteriore rispetto alla verita' come fatto o come teoria di cui danno prova le scienze. Il dire la verita' implica una questione piu' ampia e di vasta portata, intrinsecamente connessa con la verita' ma distinta, ovvero la questione del senso. Il senso viene esperito ed esplorato dal filosofo a partire da quel gesto di rottura e di allontanamento dall'equilibrio consuetudinario degli usi del linguaggio che il profilo affilato e tagliente della negazione rappresenta al suo massimo grado. L'essenza della filosofia, allora, e' sempre un'attivita' per cui, in linea di principio, non esistono proposizioni filosofiche, ma soltanto atti ed eventi filosofici. Questa attivita' puo' essere descritta come un atto di liberazione. Allora, come notava Wittgenstein in uno dei passi piu' belli della sua opera, il compito della filosofia non e' fare o insegnare a costruire trappole, ma mostrare alla mosca come venirne fuori.
Due parole sulla forma stilistica del libro. Se la filosofia e' quell'attivita' e quella ricerca del senso che presuppongono il gioco dell'immaginazione, allora il testo che la esprime non puo' essere costretto alla disciplina della pura argomentazione, al monologo impersonale del concetto, ma deve avvicinarsi, almeno per la scelta dello stile espressivo, alla drammatizzazione narrativa, accostando immagini e figure, procedendo per scene e personificazioni, come in una sorta di teatro filosofico.Two themes and two scenes cross each other and make up the framework of this book. The two themes are constituted by two questions. The former poses again what Deleuze and Guattari called "the midnight question", in order to recall its ultimate and definitive character. It is the classical question: what is philosophy? On the contrary, the latter asks (with a tradition that goes from Seneca to Mauss and further) what actually is a gift? Socrates, the first philosopher, and Montesquieu, the author of "The Spirit of the Laws" and of the doctrine of the separation of powers, are the protagonists of these two scenes. As a matter of fact, both the scenes tell the story of a gift. In the first scene Socrates stands in front of the citizens of Athens, that are there to judge him, and says that he is a gift of the god to the city. In the second Montesquieu pays a ransom to save an unknown merchant who is victim of the pirates, but refuses to let him know he is his benefactor. The first scene belongs to the "Apology of Socrates" and has a fascinating and less known development in the probably spurious dialogue "Second Alcibiades", in which Socrates talks about gifts and sacrifices and ends up putting the crown of sacrifice on. The second scene has been told in "Montesquieu a Marseille", written by the follower of Enlightenment and dramatist Louis-Sebastien Mercier, and in other plays of that time and probably resembles real events of the biography of Montesquieu.
The gift of oneself and the anonymous gift: between this two dimension of donation the book makes its attempt to answer the midnight question about the essence of philosophy. The gift of the god, the gift of philosophy is the critic function of truth. In front of the generality of the behavior of men, the philosopher is someone that is not pleased with contingent explanations. He asks and expects more. He aspires to a gesture which is sovereign but at the same time useless, if one looks at it in the perspective of the general system of exemptions and explanations of powers and knowledge.
Telling the truth is something different and something more than truth as a fact or truth as a theory that science can demonstrate. The problem of telling the truth is more wide. It is a problem certainly connected to truth but also different, that is to say the problem of meaning. Meaning is experienced and explored by the philosopher in the gesture of rupture and departure from the common use of language that consists in the sharp and harsh act of negation. The essence of philosophy is an activity which, by principle, is not constituted by philosophical propositions, but only by philosophical acts and events. This activity can be described as an act of liberation. So, as Wittgenstein noticed in one of the most beautiful passages of his work, the task of philosophy is not to teach how to build traps, but to teach the fly how to come out of them.
Only two words concerning the style of the book. If philosophy is an activity of research of the meaning which presuppose the play of imagination, the text that expresses this philosophy can't be constrained into the discipline of pure argumentation, into the impersonal monologue of concept. On the contrary, it has to approach, at least in its style, to narrative dramatization. It has to use images and figures, scenes and personifications, as it was a sort of philosophical theatre
