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[Recensão a] MEDEROS MARTÍN, Alfredo; MAIER ALLENDE, Jorge; JIMÉNEZ ÁVILA, Javier, La necrópolis orientalizante de la Cruz del Negro (Carmona, Sevilla): los trabajos de Jorge Bonsor (1896-1911), Sevilla: Editorial Universidad de Sevilla
No full textReflexões sobre Cetóbriga e Tróia
Full text linkThis paper discusses the sites of Setúbal and Troia departing from their Roman remains in order to reflect on their character and relationship. The archaeological record of Setúbal shows an urban agglomerate with production activity more evident up to the 3rd century, vestiges of domus and architectural pieces proving its urban character and a continuous occupation up to the 6th century. The materials recovered in the city show a stronger economic dynamism in the 1st and 2nd centuries and a lower frequency of imports in Late Antiquity. The archaeological remains of Troia show a great number of fish-salting factories, with stronger activity in the High Empire, but maintaining a strong production capacity up to the 5th century. Not many houses are known, but there are baths, mosaics and painted stucco. The materials recovered show economic dynamism both in the High Empire and in Late Antiquity, and a great affluence and circulation of imported consumption goods. Even if Troia always maintained a strong industrial character, it seems it had a great economic autonomy and there is no indication that Caetobriga and Troia were the same city.Este artigo faz uma reflexão sobre Setúbal e Tróia na época romana, a sua caracterização e relação entre as duas. O registo arqueológico de Setúbal mostra um aglomerado urbano com actividade fabril mais evidente até ao século III, vestígios de domus e peças arquitectónicas que comprovam o seu carácter urbano e uma indiscutível ocupação até ao século VI. Os materiais recuperados mostram um maior dinamismo económico no século I-II e uma menor frequência de importações na Antiguidade Tardia. O registo arqueológico de Tróia mostra um grande número de fábricas de salga, com maior actividade no Alto Império, mas que mantêm uma forte capacidade de produção até ao século V. Conhecem-se poucas casas, mas há termas, mosaicos e estuques pintados. Os materiais recuperados mostram dinamismo económico tanto no Alto Império como na Antiguidade Tardia, com forte afluência e circulação de bens de consumo importados. Embora Tróia tenha mantido sempre um forte carácter industrial, parece ter tido autonomia económica, e nada indica que Caetobriga e Troia fossem a mesma cidade
Da eudaimonia individual ao florescimento social. Perspectivas sobre a felicidade na obra de Martha Nussbaum
Full text linkMartha Nussbaum is one of the main references for the contemporary debate on human happiness and well-being. Her main contributions are, on the one hand, her study and analysis of ancient philosophy as a therapy of the soul, and, on the other hand, the capabilities approach, which she developed with Amartya Sen, as an ideal for the organization of society, in order to provide human beings with full development and flourishing. Although closely related in their practical and transformative purpose, these two visions of human happiness and the means to achieve it diverge radically and can even be considered contradictory. If for the Hellenistic schools eudaimonia is an individual task, alien to and independent of any social or collective flourishing, for the capabilities approach, social or collective flourishing is the true condition of possibility for any individual flourishing. In this essay we will discuss both approaches and try to show how they are not only reconcilable but even closely related in Nussbaum's thought, constituting two different but complementary approaches to the problem of human flourishing and the philosophical pursuit of happiness.Martha Nussbaum é uma das principais referências para o debate contemporâneo sobre a felicidade e o bem-estar humanos. Neste contexto, a obra de Nussbaum distingue-se, por um lado, pela sua interpretação e análise da filosofia antiga como uma terapia da alma vocacionada para o alcance da eudaimonia, e, por outro lado, pelo seu desenvolvimento, com Amartya Sen, da abordagem das capacidades, que se apresenta como um ideal de organização da sociedade, por forma a providenciar aos seres humanos um pleno desenvolvimento e florescimento. Apesar de intimamente relacionadas no seu propósito prático e transformador, estas duas visões de felicidade humana e dos meios para a alcançar divergem radicalmente, podendo até mesmo considerar-se contraditórias. Se na perspectiva da felicidade proposta pelas escolas helenistas a eudaimonia é uma tarefa individual, alheia a e independente de qualquer florescimento social ou coletivo, para a abordagem das capacidades o florescimento social ou coletivo é a verdadeira condição de possibilidade de qualquer florescimento individual. Neste ensaio discutiremos ambas as abordagens e procuraremos mostrar como estas não só são conciliáveis como se encontram mesmo estreitamente relacionadas no pensamento de Nussbaum, constituindo duas abordagens diferentes, mas complementares ao problema do florescimento humano e da procura filosófica da felicidade
Review of Hladký, Vojtěch. Rejoicing Sphairos, Wandering Daimon, and Other Living Beings. Studies on Empedocles’ Philosophy of Life (and Death). Baden-Baden: Karl-Alber Verlag, 2025, 245pp., ISBN 9783495992920
No full textA progressão argumentativa das três definições de figura no Mênon
Full text linkThe article examines the three definitions of figure in Plato’s Meno, relating them to the analytical method of geometry. The first defines in perceptual terms (colors of surfaces), useful for initial identification but insufficient for rational explanations. The second abstracts figure as the limit of solids, offering clarity but violating the simplicity criterion by explaining something simple through something complex. The third, implicit definition, describes by the lines that delimit it, surpassing the previous ones by using a simple element with explanatory power. The ordering of the definitions reflects the analytical method of geometry and the Socratic method of generalizations.The article examines the three definitions of figure in Plato’s Meno, relating them to the analytical method of geometry. The first defines in perceptual terms (colors of surfaces), useful for initial identification but insufficient for rational explanations. The second abstracts figure as the limit of solids, offering clarity but violating the simplicity criterion by explaining something simple through something complex. The third, implicit definition, describes by the lines that delimit it, surpassing the previous ones by using a simple element with explanatory power. The ordering of the definitions reflects the analytical method of geometry and the Socratic method of generalizations.The article examines the three definitions of figure in Plato’s Meno, relating them to the analytical method of geometry. The first defines in perceptual terms (colors of surfaces), useful for initial identification but insufficient for rational explanations. The second abstracts figure as the limit of solids, offering clarity but violating the simplicity criterion by explaining something simple through something complex. The third, implicit definition, describes by the lines that delimit it, surpassing the previous ones by using a simple element with explanatory power. The ordering of the definitions reflects the analytical method of geometry and the Socratic method of generalizations.The article examines the three definitions of figure in Plato’s Meno, relating them to the analytical method of geometry. The first defines in perceptual terms (colors of surfaces), useful for initial identification but insufficient for rational explanations. The second abstracts figure as the limit of solids, offering clarity but violating the simplicity criterion by explaining something simple through something complex. The third, implicit definition, describes by the lines that delimit it, surpassing the previous ones by using a simple element with explanatory power. The ordering of the definitions reflects the analytical method of geometry and the Socratic method of generalizations.O artigo examina as três definições de figura no Mênon de Platão, vinculadas ao método analítico da geometria. A primeira define em termos perceptuais (cores das superfícies), útil para identificação inicial, mas insuficiente para explicações racionais. A segunda abstrai a figura como limite de sólidos, oferecendo clareza, mas viola o critério de simplicidade ao explicar algo simples por algo complexo. A terceira, implícita, define pelas linhas que a delimitam, superando as anteriores ao usar um elemento simples com poder explanatório. A ordenação das definições reflete o método analítico da geometria e o método socrático de generalizações
[Recensão a] CONTE, Bruno Loureiro. A doxa no poema de Parmênides. Uma investigação a partir dos testemunhos antigos. São Paulo: Loyola, 2023. 274 p. ISBN: 978-655-504-259-7
No full textRestauração e desintegração: a herança da tradição médica no Filebo de Platão
Full text linkThis study aims to examine the position of medicine within the context of Plato's dialogue Philebus, focusing, on one hand, on the critique the philosopher makes of medicine as a practice and craft governed by specific norms and procedures, and, on the other, on the skillful way in which he draws upon certain medical theories, adapting them to serve his own purposes. The first part of the analysis seeks to understand the reasons behind Plato’s critique of medicine in the Philebus, especially in passage 56b1, where he includes it among the activities that involve “much imprecision and little certainty.” This critique, as will be demonstrated, is closely related to the method of medicine. In this sense, it is important to highlight that, in criticizing medicine, Plato does not seek to establish a rivalry between philosophy and the medical practice, but rather to question medicine’s claim to sometimes present itself as the best and only modus vivendi. The second part of the study focuses on analyzing the influence of medicine on Plato’s theory of pleasure, particularly regarding the concept of pleasure as a process of fulfillment. To this end, Hippocratic texts such as On Diseases IV, On the Nature of Man, and On Ancient Medicine are consulted. Finally, through a comparison of recurring key terms, similarities and differences between the medical conception and Plato’s conception of pleasure are highlighted.Este estudo tem como objetivo central examinar a posição da medicina no contexto do diálogo Filebo de Platão, focando, por um lado, na crítica que o filósofo faz à medicina, enquanto prática e ofício regulado por normas e procedimentos específicos, e, por outro, na maneira habilidosa com que ele recorre a algumas teorias médicas, adaptando-as para seus próprios propósitos. A primeira parte da análise busca compreender as razões pelas quais Platão critica a medicina no Filebo, especialmente na passagem 56b1, em que a inclui entre as atividades que envolvem “muita imprecisão e pouca certeza”. Essa crítica, como se demonstrará, está profundamente relacionada ao método da medicina. Nesse sentido, será importante destacar que, ao criticar a medicina, Platão não busca estabelecer uma rivalidade entre a filosofia e a prática médica, mas sim questionar a pretensão da medicina de se apresentar, algumas vezes, como o melhor e único modus vivendi. A segunda parte do estudo, por sua vez, se concentra em analisar as influências da medicina sobre a teoria platônica do prazer, especialmente no que diz respeito ao conceito de prazer como um processo de preenchimento. Para isso, recorre-se a textos hipocráticos, como Sobre as Doenças IV, Sobre a Natureza do Homem e Sobre a Medicina Antiga. Por fim, através da comparação de termos-chave recorrentes, destacam-se as semelhanças e as diferenças entre a concepção médica e a concepção de Platão sobre o prazer
[Recensão a] CACCIATORE, P. Volpe, A Life Devoted to Plutarch: Philology, Philosophy, and Reception . Selected Essays by Paola Volpe Cacciatore. Edited by Serena Citro and Fabio Tanga. (Brill’s Plutarch Studies 8), Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2021. p. xiv + 222
No full textRelativism and Theaetetus 171a-b: Post-truth and Populist Demagogy
Full text linkThis paper offers a reading of Theaetetus 171a-b in the context of Plato’s critique of Protagorean relativism. It analyses the structure and philosophical significance of the so-called “self-refutation” (peritropê) argument, following the interpretations of Burnyeat and Erginel. It aims to show that Plato’s argument is not a mere logical paradox but a dialectical refutation revealing the impossibility for the relativist to defend their own position rationally: by acknowledging the truth of the belief that relativism is false, the relativist undermines the validity of their own doctrine. This dialectical impossibility exposes a constitutive weakness of relativism, which cannot be formulated, communicated, or sustained without presupposing a shared space of discourse and common criteria of truth. The final section draws a parallel between this Platonic analysis and contemporary phenomena of post-truth and populist demagogy, both grounded in the dissolution of the common world and the replacement of facts by convictions. Plato thus appears not as the defender of archaic dogmatism but as the thinker of the very conditions of rational disagreement and a shared world.This paper offers a reading of Theaetetus 171a-b in the context of Plato’s critique of Protagorean relativism. It analyses the structure and philosophical significance of the so-called “self-refutation” (peritropê) argument, following the interpretations of Burnyeat and Erginel. It aims to show that Plato’s argument is not a mere logical paradox but a dialectical refutation revealing the impossibility for the relativist to defend their own position rationally: by acknowledging the truth of the belief that relativism is false, the relativist undermines the validity of their own doctrine. This dialectical impossibility exposes a constitutive weakness of relativism, which cannot be formulated, communicated, or sustained without presupposing a shared space of discourse and common criteria of truth. The final section draws a parallel between this Platonic analysis and contemporary phenomena of post-truth and populist demagogy, both grounded in the dissolution of the common world and the replacement of facts by convictions. Plato thus appears not as the defender of archaic dogmatism but as the thinker of the very conditions of rational disagreement and a shared world.Cet article propose une relecture du passage 171a-b du Théétète de Platon à la lumière de la critique platonicienne du relativisme protagoréen. Il examine la structure et la portée de l’argument dit de l’« auto-réfutation » (peritrope), en suivant les analyses de Burnyeat et de Erginel. L’étude montre que cet argument ne consiste pas en une contradiction logique, mais en une réfutation dialectique qui met en évidence l’impossibilité pour le relativiste de défendre rationnellement sa propre position : en admettant la vérité de l’opinion selon laquelle le relativisme est faux, il détruit la validité de sa doctrine. Cette impossibilité dialectique révèle une fragilité constitutive du relativisme : celui-ci ne peut être formulé, transmis ni soutenu sans présupposer un espace commun de discours et des critères partagés de vérité. Dans la dernière partie, une mise en parallèle sera suggérée entre l’analyse platonicienne et les phénomènes contemporains de la post-vérité et du populisme démagogique, qui reposent sur la dissolution de cet espace commun et sur la substitution des faits par des croyances. Platon apparaît ainsi non comme le défenseur d’un dogmatisme archaïque, mais comme le penseur des conditions de possibilité du désaccord rationnel et du monde commun.This paper offers a reading of Theaetetus 171a-b in the context of Plato’s critique of Protagorean relativism. It analyses the structure and philosophical significance of the so-called “self-refutation” (peritropê) argument, following the interpretations of Burnyeat and Erginel. It aims to show that Plato’s argument is not a mere logical paradox but a dialectical refutation revealing the impossibility for the relativist to defend their own position rationally: by acknowledging the truth of the belief that relativism is false, the relativist undermines the validity of their own doctrine. This dialectical impossibility exposes a constitutive weakness of relativism, which cannot be formulated, communicated, or sustained without presupposing a shared space of discourse and common criteria of truth. The final section draws a parallel between this Platonic analysis and contemporary phenomena of post-truth and populist demagogy, both grounded in the dissolution of the common world and the replacement of facts by convictions. Plato thus appears not as the defender of archaic dogmatism but as the thinker of the very conditions of rational disagreement and a shared world.This paper offers a reading of Theaetetus 171a-b in the context of Plato’s critique of Protagorean relativism. It analyses the structure and philosophical significance of the so-called “self-refutation” (peritropê) argument, following the interpretations of Burnyeat and Erginel. It aims to show that Plato’s argument is not a mere logical paradox but a dialectical refutation revealing the impossibility for the relativist to defend their own position rationally: by acknowledging the truth of the belief that relativism is false, the relativist undermines the validity of their own doctrine. This dialectical impossibility exposes a constitutive weakness of relativism, which cannot be formulated, communicated, or sustained without presupposing a shared space of discourse and common criteria of truth. The final section draws a parallel between this Platonic analysis and contemporary phenomena of post-truth and populist demagogy, both grounded in the dissolution of the common world and the replacement of facts by convictions. Plato thus appears not as the defender of archaic dogmatism but as the thinker of the very conditions of rational disagreement and a shared world
A filosofia primeira nos livros E e Λ da Metafísica de Aristóteles
Full text linkIn this paper, I analyze three conditionals present in Books E and Λ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. The conditionals in Book E correspond to passages 1026a10-13 and 1026a29-32, while the conditional in Λ corresponds to passage 1069a36-b2. I consider that the way we interpret the implications of these conditionals may generate a tension regarding the nature of first philosophy and its subject. To dissipate this possible tension, I suggest that, for Aristotle, the scope of first philosophy would not be restricted to separate and immovable things, and I propose, from this perspective, two ways in which sensible substances can be considered.Neste artigo, analiso três condicionais que estão presentes nos livros E e Λ da Metafísica de Aristóteles. Os condicionais do livro E correspondem aos trechos 1026a10-13 e 1026a29-32, ao passo que o condicional do livro Λ corresponde ao trecho 1069a36-b2. Eu considero que o modo como interpretamos as implicações desses condicionais pode gerar uma tensão no que diz respeito à natureza da filosofia primeira e seu objeto de estudo. A fim de dissipar essa possível tensão, sugiro que, para Aristóteles, o escopo da filosofia primeira não estaria restrito às coisas separadas e imóveis, e proponho, nessa perspectiva, dois modos pelos quais as substâncias sensíveis podem ser consideradas