118 research outputs found
Bayesian game theorists and non-Bayesian players
No full textInternational audienceBayesian game theorists claim to represent players as Bayes rational agents, maximising their expected utility given their beliefs about the choices of other players. I argue that this narrative is inconsistent with the formal structure of Bayesian game theory. This is because (i) the assumption of common belief in rationality is equivalent to equilibrium play, as in classical game theory, and (ii) the players' prior beliefs are a mere mathematical artefact and not actual beliefs held by the players. Bayesian game theory is thus a Bayesian representation of the choice of players who are committed to play equilibrium strategy profiles
From Homo Economicus to Homo Psychologicus: the Paretian Foundations of Behavioural Paternalism
No full textInternational audienceBehavioural paternalism aims at designing public policies helping boundedly rational individuals to satisfy their own preferences. It is assumed that (i) individuals have true preferences which would determine their choices if they were rational, (ii) the satisfaction of those preferences constitutes the normative criterion, and (iii) it is possible to elicit those preferences from the social planner standpoint. I argue that behavioural paternalism implicitly endorses Pareto’s model of the Homo economicus, and highlight the methodological difficulties of those three hypotheses. My main argument is that behavioural paternalists cannot define unambiguously what would be the preferences of an ideally rational agent
Strategie enunciative nella «Canso de la crozada» di Guilhem de Tudela
No full textLa prima parte della Chanson de la croisade contre les albigeois, composta da Guilhem de Tudela, è un osservatorio privilegiato per studiare i meccanismi dell’enunciazione in un testo medievale scritto in vista della recitazione. Viene dapprima studiato il gioco tra prima e terza persona singolare, che denotano il narratore implicito e l’autore, con alcune zone di ambiguità tra le due istanze. Sono poi presi in considerazione i contesti in cui appaiono i termini metaletterari canso, libre, estoria, gesta, gloza. I risultati dell’analisi sono esaminati alla luce della teatralità intrinseca alla letteratura medievale.The first part of the Chanson de la croisade contre les albigeois, written by Guilhem de Tudela, is a good starting point to study énonciation strategies in a medieval text, which was written to be orally performed. The author takes into consideration the interplay between the first and the third persons of the singular that are used to refer to the narrator and the author; sometimes the narrative I overlaps with the author. The use of technical words such as canso, libre, estoria, gesta, gloza by Guilhem de Tudela is then examined in the frame set in the first part of the article. The facts established in the first two parts are then examined in the light of the theatrical features of medieval literature itself.</p
La question de la coordination en Sciences Economiques
No full textSéminaire organisé par Pascal Bridel (Université de Lausanne, Centre Walras-Pareto, Suisse) et Muriel Dal Pont Legrand (Université de Nice sophia Antipolis GREDEG CNRS, France) du 29 mai au 3 juin 2017 Participants Richard Arena, Michaël Assous, Pascal Bridel, Katia Caldari, Jean Cartelier, Camille Cornand, Muriel Dal-Pont Legrand, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, Jean-Luc Gaffard, Roger Guesnerie, Harald Hagemann, Cyril Hédoin, Guilhem Lecouteux, Jean-Sébastien Lenfant, Andreas Pyka, Alain Rayb..
Choosing one's preferences
No full textA central assumption in economics is that individuals are rational in the sense that they seek to satisfy their preferences, by choosing the action that maximizes a utility function that represents those preferences. However, it appears that in strategic interaction with other rational agents, the individuals can bene t from strategic commitments. We determine the set of games for which strategic commitments can be bene cial to the players, by building an analytical framework in which players can choose their own preferences before playing a game. We show that players make strategic commitments as soon as there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium that is not a Nash equilibrium, but also that there always exists at least one set of preference relations at the equilibrium such that a Nash equilibrium is implemented. We then show that the possibility of making strategic commitments generates cooperative behaviours in the case of supermodular games
A Reformulation of Libertarian Paternalism
No full textConventional normative economics is built on the assumption that people act as if seeking to satisfy coherent and a priori preferences. This model has however been challenged by many empirical works highlighting the existence of systematic deviations from the behaviour predicted by the neoclassical theory. The development of behavioural economics therefore questions the validity of the results developed by normative economists. Reconciling behavioural and normative economics needs in particular a clarification of the normative content of economic prescriptions, since it appears that the assumption of rational preferences enabled economists to overstep this question, the different interpretations of the current normative criterion of preference-satisfaction leading in fine to the same prescriptions. In this paper, we want to highlight that libertarian paternalism is probably the most natural solution to the reconciliation problem for neoclassical economists, since its current formulation relies on the existence of a rational homo oeconomicus trapped within each individual. We can however find within the current formulation of libertarian paternalism the same difficulties than the ones of Pareto's theory of the homo oeconomicus. We therefore suggest a reformulation of libertarian paternalism based on a normative criterion of individual autonomy rather than preference-satisfaction, and defend its relevance in the specific context of common-pool resources, by showing that the normative prescriptions generated by our principle of individual autonomy present strong similarities with the institutional design principles of Ostrom (1990) enabling a sustainable management of common-pool resources
What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours
No full textInternational audienc
De l’Homo economicus à l’Homo psychologicus : les fondements parétiens du paternalisme comportemental
No full text- …
