1,722,731 research outputs found
Reason-based choice correspondences
No full textA reason-based choice correspondence rationalizes choice behaviour in terms of a two-stage choice procedure. Given a feasible set S, the individual eliminates from it all of the dominated alternatives according to her fixed (not necessarily complete) strict preference relation, in the first step. In the second step, first she constructs for each maximal alternative identified in the first step its lower contour set (i.e. the set of alternatives which are dominated by it in S), and then she eliminates from the maximal set all of those alternatives so that the following justification holds: there exists another maximal alternative whose lower contour set strictly contains that of another maximal alternative. This procedural model captures the basic idea behind the experimental finding known as “attraction effect”. We study the rationalizability of reason-based choice correspondences axiomatically. We relate our choice-consistency conditions to standard consistency proprieties. Our characterization result offers testable restrictions on this ‘choice anomaly’ for large (but finite) set of alternatives
Implementation in partial equilibrium
No full textConsider a society with a finite number of sectors (social issues or commodities). In a partial equilibrium (PE) mechanism a sector authority (SA) aims to elicit agents’ preference rankings for outcomes at hand, presuming separability of preferences, while such presumption is false in general and such isolated rankings might be artifacts. This paper studies what can be Nash implemented if we take such misspecification of PE analysis as a given institutional constraint. The objective is to uncover the kinds of complementarity across sectors that this institutional constraint is able to accommodate. Thus, in our implementation model there are several SAs, agents are constrained to submit their rankings to each SA separately and, moreover, SAs cannot communicate with each other. When a social choice rule (SCR) can be Nash implemented by a product set of PE mechanisms, we say that it can be Nash implemented in PE. We identify necessary conditions for SCRs to be Nash implemented in PE and show that they are also sufficient under a domain condition which identifies the kinds of admissible complementarities. Thus, the Nash implementation in PE of SCRs is examined in auction and matching environments. © 2017 The Author(s
Minimal covering set solutions
No full textWe study necessary and sufficient conditions for a multi-valued solution S to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a complete asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the solution set of S coincides with the minimal covering set of T restricted to that feasible set. Our characterization result relies only on properties relating S across feasible choice sets
Uncovered set choice rules
No full textI study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a total asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the choice set coincides with the uncovered set of T restricted to that feasible set. This notion of ‘maximization’ offers testable restrictions on observable choice behavior
What kind of preference maximization does the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority characterize?
Full text linkA choice correspondence is weak justified if a non-chosen alternative is dominated by any other obtainable alternative, and for each discarded alternative there is some chosen alternative which dominates it. This definition allows us to build a connection between the behavioral property expressed by the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority and a weak form of maximality. It is weaker than the form of maximality characterized by the weak axiom of revealed preference
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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