348 research outputs found
Evaluation of psychological outcomes following the intervention 'teaching group': study on predialysis patients.
No full textGOALS:
Aims of the study were to evaluate the effects of the intervention 'Group education' (NIC 5604) on patients' coping, fear control, anxiety and the association between demographic and clinical variables with the outcomes.
MATERIALS AND METHODS:
We studied all predialysis patients treated, at Lleida University Hospital, from 1 January 2007 till 31 March 2008, who received the total intervention for six months.
RESULTS:
There were 41 patients, 33 male and 8 female. They had a mean age of 60.56 years (SD 13.96); 66% declared family support. Forty-one percent had a low educational level. The Charlson Comorbidity test showed a mean of 5.07 (SD 1.77). All patients were independent, using the Karnofsky scale and Barthel index. Patients reported a significant improvement in all the outcomes evaluated (anxiety, coping and fear response). Logistic regression showed that the reduction in anxiety and the improved nursing outcomes were not related to demographic and clinical variables.
CONCLUSION:
The group educational programme was effective on the defined psychological outcomes in predialysis patients. Hence, it should be available for all clients
Jim Anderson with Ed Craver, Kevin Spencer, and Rich Boles
No full textA photograph of head coach Jim Anderson with three Springfield College lacrosse players kneeling in front of him on the field. The players kneeling in front, from L to R, Rich Boles (wearing number 20), Kevin Spencer (wearing number 11), and Ed Craver (wearing number 31).The team finished the 1975 season with a record of 4 wins and 11 losses. Anderson coached the team for 8 seasons from 1971 until 1978. He finished his coaching career with an overall record of 50 wins and 57 losses, a winning percentage of .467
Marriage record of Pritchard, Thomas Newton and Williams, Adele L.
No full textMarriage license for Thomas Newton Pritchard and Adele L. Williams. C.M. Craver was the Notary Public
Marriage record of Campbell, Corrie L. and Skeen, Bertie A.
No full textMarriage license for Corrie L. Campbell and Bertie A. Skeen. J.C. Craver was the Notary Public
Does ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage really increase impulsiveness? Delay and probability discounting in patients with focal lesions
No full textIf the tendency to discount rewards reflects individuals' general level of impulsiveness, then the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards should be negatively correlated: The less a person is able to wait for delayed rewards, the more they should take chances on receiving probabilistic rewards. It has been suggested that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) increases individuals' impulsiveness, but both intertemporal choice and risky choice have only recently been assayed in the same patients with vMPFC damage. Here, we assess both delay and probability discounting in individuals with vMPFC damage (n = 8) or with medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage (n = 10), and in age- and education-matched controls (n = 30). On average, MTL-lesioned individuals discounted delayed rewards at normal rates but discounted probabilistic rewards more shallowly than controls. In contrast, vMPFC-lesioned individuals discounted delayed rewards more steeply but probabilistic rewards more shallowly than controls. These results suggest that vMPFC lesions affect the weighting of reward amount relative to delay and certainty in opposite ways. Moreover, whereas MTL-lesioned individuals and controls showed typical, nonsignificant correlations between the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards, vMPFC-lesioned individuals showed a significant negative correlation, as would be expected if vMPFC damage increases impulsiveness more in some patients than in others. Although these results are consistent with the hypothesis that vMPFC plays a role in impulsiveness, it is unclear how they could be explained by a single mechanism governing valuation of both delayed and probabilistic rewards
Thinking About Evolutionary Mechanisms: Natural Selection
No full textThis paper explores whether natural selection, a putative evolutionary mechanism, and a main one at that, can be characterized on either of the two dominant conceptions of mechanism, due to Glennan and the team of Machamer, Darden, and Craver, that constitute the “new mechanistic philosophy.” The results of the analysis are that neither of the dominant conceptions of mechanism adequately captures natural selection. Nevertheless, the new mechanistic philosophy possesses the resources for an understanding of natural selection under the rubric
The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation
No full textAccording to one large family of views, scientific explanations explain a phenomenon (such as an event or a regularity) by subsuming it under a general representation, model, prototype, or schema (see Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441; Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge: MIT Press; Darden (2006); Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation. In C. G. Hempel (Ed.), Aspects of scientific explanation (pp. 331–496). New York: Free Press; Kitcher (1989); Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67(1), 1–25). My concern is with the minimal suggestion that an adequate philosophical theory of scientific explanation can limit its attention to the format or structure with which theories are represented. The representational subsumption view is a plausible hypothesis about the psychology of understanding. It is also a plausible claim about how scientists present their knowledge to the world. However, one cannot address the central questions for a philosophical theory of scientific explanation without turning one’s attention from the structure of representations to the basic commitments about the worldly structures that plausibly count as explanatory. A philosophical theory of scientific explanation should achieve two goals. The first is explanatory demarcation. It should show how explanation relates with other scientific achievements, such as control, description, measurement, prediction, and taxonomy. The second is explanatory normativity. It should say when putative explanations succeed and fail. One cannot achieve these goals without undertaking commitments about the kinds of ontic structures that plausibly count as explanatory. Representations convey explanatory information about a phenomenon when and only when they describe the ontic explanations for those phenomena
Causation at different levels : Tracking the commitments of mechanistic explanations
No full textThis paper tracks the commitments of mechanistic explanations focusing on the relation between activities at different levels. It is pointed out that the mechanistic approach is inherently committed to identifying causal connections at higher levels with causal connections at lower levels. For the mechanistic approach to succeed a mechanism as a whole must do the very same thing what its parts organised in a particular way do. The mechanistic approach must also utilise bridge principles connecting different causal terms of different theoretical vocabularies in order to make the identities of causal connections transparent.
These general commitments get confronted with two claims made by certain proponents of the mechanistic approach: William Bechtel often argues that within the mechanistic framework it is possible to balance between reducing higher levels and maintaining their autonomy at the same time, whereas, in a recent paper, Craver and Bechtel argue that the mechanistic approach is able to make downward causation intelligible.
The paper concludes that the mechanistic approach imbued with identity statements is no better candidate for anchoring higher levels to lower ones while maintaining their autonomy at the same time than standard reductive accounts are, and that what mechanistic explanations are able to do at best is showing that downward causation does not exist
Mechanisms and Laws: Clarifying the Debate
No full textCraver CF, Kaiser MI. Mechanisms and Laws: Clarifying the Debate. In: Chao H-K, Chen S-T, Millstein RL, eds. Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences. Vol 3. Dordrecht: Springer ; 2013: 125-145
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Retort, 1950-12
No full textThis publication of the Dallas-Fort Worth Section of the American Chemical Society includes information about research, prominent scientist, organizational business, and various other stories of interest to the community. Published monthly during long academic semesters
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