1,720,971 research outputs found

    The Loyal Defense Lawyer

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    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed

    Variations on the Author

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    “Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship

    Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis

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    We provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis

    Replaying the Past: Roles for Emotion in Judicial Invocations of Legislative History, and Precedent

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    Legal reasoning in the common law tradition requires judges to draw on concepts, and examples that are meant to resonate with a particular emotional import and operate in judicial reasoning as though they do. Judicial applications of constitutional rights are regularly interpreted by reference to past violations (either through precedent, contextual framings, and/or legislative history), which in turn elicit a series of emotions which work to deepen and intensify judicial understandings of a right guarantee (freedom of association, freedom of expression, equality, security of the person, etc.). This paper examines the way in which invocations of past political histories, and rights abuses (however ill or well-defined), work to conjure up a set of service emotions (emotions which work to establish a particular frame of mind), which guide judicial applications of doctrine in cases concerning an alleged violation of a constitutional right

    Emotions and Precedent

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    The philosophy of emotion raises complications for theories of precedent. This chapter argues that it is productive to think of the effect of some precedents as facets of legal reasoning that are related to the use and understanding of legal concepts as thick concepts. In legal reasoning, precedents are routinely invoked to explicate, and/or clarify the content of legal concepts that are at issue in a case. This chapter develops an argument by Bernard Williams, i.e., that one must avoid the risk of over-generalizing the relationship of emotions to thick concepts, by placing it in the context of legal reasoning. It argues that the several distinctive ways that emotions might interact with thick legal concepts pose challenges for any general theoretical account of precedent in legal reasoning. A focus on these different roles that emotions can play in judicial uses of precedent illuminates some of the more subtle ways in which these uses reveal held values, ways of seeing, and political commitments. The chapter finds that in at least some cases where a precedent is invoked to thicken the understanding of a legal concept at issue in a case, variations in the emotional architecture associated with that invocation will come in direct tension with the legal concept under examination, or with other legal values and principles that pertain to equality, and equal treatment under law

    An International Law of the Emotions

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    Talk of the emotional or affective turn in international law is relatively recent though it tracks and echoes several other critical methods movements, including the turn to history, in the study of international law and, so too, a two-decade long wave of law and emotions research in several domestic legal systems. The affective turn in international law in several instances aims to critique a post-Cold War optimism that held out the promise that a rules and reason-based international order would work to abate war, and secure peace, prosperity and efficient capital flows. As outlined by the editors of this volume of the Cambridge History of International Law, ‘the period beyond or after the Cold War held out enormous hope precisely because it offered the possibility of change and great change at that’. With others similarly casting it as ‘a moment widely thought to be full of new ‘global’, if not cosmopolitan, possibilities’, involving ‘a high-minded desire and universalist objective to build a stable global legal order [that] was projected back to 1945, and then described as having been sacrificed by, and during, the Cold War’. Against this backdrop promise, the focus on emotions and affect in the study of international law stands to offer, via different manners and modes of analysis, critical appraisals of the convincing-or-not performances of this cosmopolitan liberal, legal formalism that rooted (and continues to root) the teaching and practice of international law as a ‘disembodied, disarticulated discipline’ in this so declared post-Cold War era. The turn to the study of emotions in the history of international law stands to put pressure on the promise of this hopeful mode sketched above, often by illustrating the ways that legal theory offers formal rationalisations of hideously unequal status quo distributions of political and economic power. Indeed, one can map a burgeoning set of projects in the study of international law that foreground, examine, or use emotions (or affect) to better understand the history and politics of international law vis-à-vis this post-Cold War promise of good order. This chapter takes up the broad challenge of thinking about emotions in the history of international law in the post-Cold War era by addressing the subject, sideways, through an essay by Bernard Williams. Drawing from Williams’s discussion of a tragedy by Sophocles, The Women of Trachis, this chapter speaks to the ways that philosophical conceptions of time set the backdrop for certain emotions appearing apt within a particular political era, and so too, how moralised philosophies of mind and action come to pervade historical thinking, including, as this chapter will argue, historical thinking about international law. Emotions can reveal deep political commitments, and they often serve to reinforce at the cultural level a material base or set of structured power relations. This leads to some emotions presenting as obscure, hard-to-place, or somehow out of bounds, where certain dominant frames and ways of seeing work to exclude them (consider here, for example, how some public acts of mourning have wrought political backlash, vilification, and persistent misconstrual). Attention paid to the work of emotions settled in the bedrocks of certain dominant theories about international law in the post-Cold War period, elucidate the ways in which they support an indomitable, impervious, and challenge-resistant form of liberal hopefulness (one apt to exclude history and horror), that is characteristic of the post-Cold War optimistic mode outlined above, and which later, when confronted with overwhelming political violence, transmutes for some actors into an incredible nostalgia for a past now construed as sufficiently orderly for that same liberal hopefulness to flourish

    Images of Reach, Range, and Recognition: Thinking about emotions in the study of international law

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    There is much critical potential in bringing together the philosophy of emotion and the study of international law. Narratives about legitimate political and legal authority have tended to either assume that it is possible to extricate emotions from political judgement, or to rest upon uncomplicated (and wholly demystified) assumptions about the legibility of emotions over time and place. Philosophers interested in emotion have regularly grappled with questions concerning an emotion’s reach and range (insofar that the emotion in question bears an intersubjective component), and recognition (comprehensibility) of emotions beyond one’s own social and political communities (or even beyond one’s self). Emotions contain evaluative judgments, and, as such, they strike as subjectively involved and image-laden “engagements with the world” (to quote Robert Solomon’s memorable phrase). Where evaluative judgements are embedded within the structure of an emotion, we can expect it to be scripted, at least to an extent, by time and place, which raises, in turn, questions of all sorts pertaining to reach, range, and recognition
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