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    Foreword by Josh Lerner

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    Review of Everyone Counts: Could Participatory Budgeting Change Democracy by Josh Lerner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014) and Making Democracy Fun: How Game Design Can Empower Citizens and Transform Politics by Josh Lerner (Cambridge, MA: MIT

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    Review of Everyone Counts: Could Participatory Budgeting Change Democracy by Josh Lerner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014) and Making Democracy Fun: How Game Design Can Empower Citizens and Transform Politics by Josh Lerner (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014)

    Book review: making democracy fun: how game design canempower citizens and transform politics by Josh Lerner

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    Making Democracy Fun by Josh Lerner posits that public participation in decision-making can be enhanced by using games in public meetings, with the author drawing on multiple case studies of where this approach has been implemented. Ron Johnston finds a fascinating book that is as open about the dangers of game-playing as it is about the potential benefits, but suggests a more rigorous assessment of the evidence presented is necessary in order to make a final judgement on the value of games in democracy

    The Patent System and Competition

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    What is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts?: Evidence from Lotus v. Borland

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    Economists have debated the extent to which strengthening patent protection spurs or detracts from technological innovation. In this paper, we examine the reduction of software copyright protection in the Lotus v. Borland decision. If patent and copyright protections are substitutes, then weakening of one form of protection should be associated with an increasing reliance on the other. We find that the firms affected by the diminution of copyright protection disproportionately accelerated their patenting in subsequent years. But little evidence can be found for harmful effects: in fact, the increased reliance on patents is correlated with some positive outcomes for firms.

    Josh Lerner [Elektronisk resurs] : recipient of the 2010 Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research

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    This article describes the academic contributions of the 2010 recipient of the Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research, Professor Josh Lerner of the Harvard Business School. Lerner’s empirical research on the inter-relationship between venture capital, innovation and entrepreneurship has greatly extended and improved our understanding of one of the major drivers of growth in modern economies. The first part of this article explains Lerner’s contributions as regards the structure and organization of the venture capital industry. Later, his most important publications on entrepreneurship, innovation and intellectual property rights are surveyed. Several aspects of Lerner’s policy-oriented work are then outlined, before the article closes with a brief conclusion.</p

    What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?

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    We examine the determinants of venture capital fundraising in the U.S. over the past twenty-five years. We study industry aggregate, state-level, and firm-specific fundraising to determine if macroeconomic, regulatory, or performance factors affect venture capital activity. We find that shifts in demand for venture capital appear to have a positive and important impact on commitments to new venture capital funds. Commitments by taxable and tax-exempt investors seem equally sensitive to changes in capital gains tax rates that decreases in capital gains tax rates increase the demand for venture capital as more workers are incented to become entrepreneurs. Aggregate and state level venture fundraising are positively affected by easing of pension investment restrictions as well as industrial and academic R&D expenditures. Fund performance and reputation also lead to greater fundraising by venture organizations.

    Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices? The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle

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    The returns that institutional investors realize from private equity investments differ dramatically across institutions. Using detailed and hitherto unexplored records of fund investors and performance, we document large heterogeneity in the performance of different classes of limited partners. In particular, endowments' annual returns are nearly 14% greater than average. Funds selected by investment advisors and banks lag sharply. These results are robust to controlling for the type and year of the investment, as well as to the use of different specifications. Analyses of reinvestment decisions and young funds suggest that the results are not primarily due to endowments' greater access to established funds. Finally, we examine the differences in the choice of intermediaries across various institutional investors and their relationship to success. We find that LPs that have higher average IRRs also tend to invest in older funds and have a smaller fraction of GPs in their geographic area, and that the performance of university endowments is correlated with measures of the quality and loyalty of the student body.

    Josh Lerner: Recipient of the 2010 Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research

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    This article describes the academic contributions of the 2010 recipient of the Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research, Professor Josh Lerner of the Harvard Business School. Lerner’s empirical research on the inter-relationship between venture capital, innovation and entrepreneurship has greatly extended and improved our understanding of one of the major drivers of growth in modern economies. The first part of this article explains Lerner’s contributions as regards the structure and organization of the venture capital industry. Later, his most important publications on entrepreneurship, innovation and intellectual property rights are surveyed. Several aspects of Lerner’s policy-oriented work are then outlined, before the article closes with a brief conclusion.Global Award; Venture capital; Patent; Entrepreneurship; Innovation

    Transaction Structures in the Developing World

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    While variations in public securities markets across nations have attracted increasing scrutiny, private financings have received little attention. But in developing nations, the bulk of financings are private ones. This paper analyzes 210 private equity transactions in developing countries. We find that unlike in the U.S., where convertible preferred securities are ubiquitous, in developing nations a much broader array of securities are employed and private equity investors often have fewer contractual protections. The choice of security appears to be driven by the legal and economic circumstances of the nation and the private equity group. Investments in common law nations are structured similar to those in the U.S., being less likely to employ common stock or straight debt, and more likely to use preferred stock with a variety of covenants. By way of contrast, in nations where the rule of law is less established, private equity groups are likely to use common stock and own the majority of the firm's equity if the investment encounters difficulties. Private equity groups based in the U.S. and U.K. rely more on preferred securities but also adapt transactions to local conditions. These contractual differences appear to have real consequences: larger transactions with higher valuations are seen in common law countries. These findings suggest that the structure of a country's legal system affects private contracts and cannot easily be undone by (bi-lateral) private solutions.
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