243 research outputs found
Boys of England and Edwin J. Brett, 1866-99
No full textBoys of England was a Victorian boys' periodical. It was published weekly by Edwin J. Brett from 1866 to 1899, initially from the Fleet Street offices of the Newsagents'
Publishing Company, and later from Brett's own `Boys of England Office'. It was the first periodical of its kind, and achieved a large sale amongst eager youngsters.
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a general history of BOE and Brett, neither of which has yet been attempted. More specifically, the thesis is intended to address
misconceptions regarding Brett and his work. Historians of boys' periodical literature have tended to portray Brett's papers as largely supportive of middle class hegemony. They
argue that they failed to connect with the lives of their upper working and lower middle class readers. However, this thesis contends that in actual fact BOE engaged closely with
the lives of its readership, comprised mainly of boys from the `respectable' working classes. Therefore, BOE should rightly be considered an important, indigenous component
of working class society and culture in mid to late Victorian Britain.
To provide as comprehensive an analysis as possible, the thesis is divided into three sections: `Paper and Proprietor'; `Content'; `Response'. These sections are divided into further chapters, each exploring a salient facet of BOE and Brett. Some of these engage with, and challenge, the existing historiography of boys' periodical literature. Others introduce historiographies previously remote from the study of boys' papers, widening the
remit of this relatively self-contained field. Some examine entirely unstudied, or largely understudied, subject matter.
Ultimately, this thesis is intended to make a valuable contribution not only to the historiography of boys' papers specifically, and children's literature in general, but also to the wider historiographies of Victorian social and cultural history and the Victorian working class
Thinking About Other Minds
No full textEvery day, we engage in countless interactions with others. Navigating these interactions requires us to think about others’ minds. We use our observations to make inferences about the beliefs, desires, and goals of the people with whom we are interacting, and shape our own behavior accordingly. Psychologists call this “theory of mind.”
While scientific understanding of theory of mind is broadening, a number of ways in which people think about other minds still lie outside its scope. What inferences do people draw about others’ minds when the others are not specific, observable individuals? Or are not people at all? What inferences do people make about others’ capacities? What cognitive processes are deployed in making these inferences?
This dissertation explores these questions in three different contexts. Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation focus on two relevant legal settings. Law affords a particularly interesting avenue for investigating these questions, as law routinely asks people to reason about unseen causes of events.
Chapter 1 examines how people think about the abstract mind of the "reasonable person" when applying tort law’s reasonable person standard. Chapter 2 investigates how people conceptualize the "minds" of non-human technologies, such as self-driving cars, and how those conceptualizations affect legal decisions and policy opinions. Finally, Chapter 3 explores people’s puzzling inclination to spontaneously adopt the visual perspective of pictorial representations of agents, even when there is no communicative value in doing so
Defending a Social Learning Explanation: A Comment on the Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice
No full text\u3cem\u3eKatz\u3c/em\u3e\u27s Imperfect Circle: An Empirical Study of Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
No full textUnder Katz v. United States, the Fourth Amendment restricts government actions that infringe upon expectations of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. This foundational test has long been criticized as circular, both because courts can shape the very expectations they seek to identify through their decisions and because governments can manipulate those expectations to expand the reach of their own power. But how do members of society decide what expectations are reasonable, and how do judges ascertain those expectations? And are expectations of privacy malleable even without deliberate manipulation?
This Article shows that the circularity critique is both understated and overstated. We identify six different potential elements of Katzian circularity, some of which have never been examined—particularly those relating to the stickiness of precedent concerning changing technology. To test the import of these circularity elements, we conducted two empirical studies, one survey and one experiment. We found that individuals’ beliefs about whether expectations of privacy are reasonable are highly influenced by data about what others think. Telling a person that a majority (versus a minority) of people believe a privacy right exists significantly increases their belief in that right to privacy. We also found evidence that people tend to view the investigative uses of new technologies as particularly violative of privacy expectations. Yet, we found little evidence beliefs are influenced by legal precedent or government action—with one important exception. It seems court decisions do not commonly shape society’s expectations, nor do they reflect society’s expectations.
The larger problem is that judges are likely to conflate society’s expectations with their own expectations. We show how turning the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry into one hinging on scientifically-based research, rather than on judges’ unsound intuitions, would better fulfill Katz’s mandate and reflect societal consensus on these most fundamental constitutional principles. Altogether, this Article comprehensively charts the theoretical possibilities of Katzian circularity, empirically shows why and how the problem is likely to arise, and supplies a solution
\u3ci\u3eKatz\u3c/i\u3e\u27s Imperfect Circle: An Empirical Study of Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
No full textUnder Katz v. United States, the Fourth Amendment restricts government actions that infringe upon expectations of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. This foundational test has long been criticized as circular, both because courts can shape the very expectations they seek to identify through their decisions and because governments can manipulate those expectations to expand the reach of their own power. But how do members of society decide what expectations are reasonable, and how do judges ascertain those expectations? And are expectations of privacy malleable even without deliberate manipulation?
This Article shows that the circularity critique is both understated and overstated. We identify six different potential elements of Katzian circularity, some of which have never been examined—particularly those relating to the stickiness of precedent concerning changing technology. To test the import of these circularity elements, we conducted two empirical studies, one survey and one experiment. We found that individuals’ beliefs about whether expectations of privacy are reasonable are highly influenced by data about what others think. Telling a person that a majority (versus a minority) of people believe a privacy right exists significantly increases their belief in that right to privacy. We also found evidence that people tend to view the investigative uses of new technologies as particularly violative of privacy expectations. Yet, we found little evidence beliefs are influenced by legal precedent or government action—with one important exception. It seems court decisions do not commonly shape society’s expectations, nor do they reflect society’s expectations.
The larger problem is that judges are likely to conflate society’s expectations with their own expectations. We show how turning the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry into one hinging on scientifically-based research, rather than on judges’ unsound intuitions, would better fulfill Katz’s mandate and reflect societal consensus on these most fundamental constitutional principles. Altogether, this Article comprehensively charts the theoretical possibilities of Katzian circularity, empirically shows why and how the problem is likely to arise, and supplies a solution
Current directions in videoconferencing tele-mental health research
No full textThe provision of mental health services via videoconferencing tele-mental health has become an increasingly routine component of mental health service delivery throughout the world. Emphasizing the research literature since 2003, we examine (a) the extent to which the field of tele-mental health has advanced the research agenda previously suggested and (b) implications for tele-mental healthcare delivery for special clinical populations. Previous findings have demonstrated that tele-mental health services are satisfactory to patients, improve outcomes, and are probably cost effective. In the very small number of randomized controlled studies that have been conducted to date, tele-mental health has demonstrated equivalent efficacy compared to face-to-face care in a variety of clinical settings and with specific patient populations. However, methodologically flawed or limited research studies are the norm, and thus the research agenda for tele-mental health has not been fully maximized. Implications for future research and practice are discussed
A Performance Guide and Recordings for Four New Works Featuring Improvisation for Soprano Saxophone and Various Instruments
No full textabstract: This project’s goal is to expand the repertoire for soprano saxophone featuring improvisation. Each work detailed in this document features improvisation as an integral component. The first piece, Impetus, was written by Grant Jahn for soprano saxophone and piano. The second piece, Sonata, was written for the same instrumentation by Brett Wery. Ethan Cypress wrote the third work for solo soprano saxophone, Noir et Bleu. The final composition on the project, Counterpunch by Gregory Wanamaker, was written for saxophone sextet. This paper also includes composer biographies, program notes, performance guides, and composer questionnaires. The central component of this project is a recording of all these works which features the author.Dissertation/ThesisCounterpunch for Saxophone Sextet, by Gregory WanamakerSonata for Soprano Saxophone and Piano, II. Adagio sognando – “Bluesy” andantino by Brett WerySonata for Soprano Saxophone and Piano, III. Danza ritmica, by Brett WeryNoir et Bleu for Solo Soprano Saxophone, by Ethan CypressImpetus for Soprano Saxophone and Piano, by Grant JahnSonata for Soprano Saxophone and Piano, I. Allegro ma non troppo, by Brett WeryDoctoral Dissertation Music 201
Law and Order
No full textWhen we hear about a transgression, we may consider whether the perpetrator’s individual circumstances make their transgression more understandable or excusable. Mitigating circumstances may reduce the severity of what punishment is deemed appropriate, both intuitively and legally. But importantly, in courts of public opinion and of law, mitigating information is typically presented only after information about a perpetrator’s transgression. We explore whether this sequence influences the force of mitigating evidence. Specifically, in two studies, we examined whether presenting evidence about a perpetrator’s background before or after evidence of their violation influenced how severely U.S. participants punished perpetrators. In Study 1 (N=132), evidence about the perpetrator’s mitigating circumstances reduced punishment only when it was presented before evidence about the perpetrator’s violation. Study 2 (N=316) revealed this moderating effect of presentation order across a variety of premeditated and impulsive violations. These findings are consistent with person-centered theories of punishment and with the Story Model of adjudication
Law and Order
No full textWhen we hear about a transgression, we may consider whether the perpetrator’s individual circumstances make their transgression more understandable or excusable. Mitigating circumstances may reduce the severity of what punishment is deemed appropriate, both intuitively and legally. But importantly, in courts of public opinion and of law, mitigating information is typically presented only after information about a perpetrator’s transgression. We explore whether this sequence influences the force of mitigating evidence. Specifically, in two studies, we examined whether presenting evidence about a perpetrator’s background before or after evidence of their violation influenced how severely U.S. participants punished perpetrators. In Study 1 (N=132), evidence about the perpetrator’s mitigating circumstances reduced punishment only when it was presented before evidence about the perpetrator’s violation. Study 2 (N=316) revealed this moderating effect of presentation order across a variety of premeditated and impulsive violations. These findings are consistent with person-centered theories of punishment and with the Story Model of adjudication
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