266 research outputs found
A review of “In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents” by Jacob K. Goeree, Riedl Arno & Aljaž Ule
No full textIn this paper we review the Journal Article “In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents” by Jacob K. Goeree, Riedl Arno & Aljaž Ule. Methodologies and innovative content of this article are described, analysed and criticised in light of recent developments in the empirical study of network formation processes
Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions
No full textThis paper reports laboratory data for a series of two-person games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment for which behavior conforms quite nicely to the predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case we change a key payoff parameter in a manner that does not alter the equilibrium predictions, but this theoretically neutral payoff change has a major (often dramatic) effect on observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple economic intuition and with a model of iterated noisy introspection for one-shot games.Nash equilibrium, noncooperative games, experiments, bounded rationality, introspection
An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination
No full textThis paper reports data for coordination game experiments with random matching. The experimental design is based on changes in an effort-cost parameter, which do not alter the set of Nash equilibria, nor do they alter the predictions of dynamic adjustment theories based on imitation or best responses to others' decisions. As would be expected, however, increases in effort cost result in reduced effort levels. Average behavior in the final periods is consistent with a one-parameter stochastic generalization of the Nash equilibrium that is calculated by maximizing a "stochastic potential function." The noise parameter estimated from the initial two-person, minimum-effort games is used to predict behavior in subsequent experiments with three-person games, using both minimum and medium-effort payoff structures.coordination games, laboratory experiments, stochastic potential, logit equilibrium, bounded rationality, minimum effort game, median effort game
On the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
No full textWe consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus. The short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to Gutmann et al. (Annals of Probability, 1991). We also show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed, or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations
Wise Crowds or Wise Minorities?
No full textThis paper reports results from social learning experiments where subjects choose between two options and each subject has a small chance of being perfectly informed about which option is correct. In treatment 'sequence', subjects observe the entire sequence of predecessors' choices while in treatment 'no-sequence' they only observe the number of times each option has been chosen. The theoretical predictions are that subjects follow their immediate predecessors in treatment sequence and follow the minority in treatment no-sequence (Callander and Hörner, 2009). The former prediction is borne out in the data, but subjects tend to follow the majority in treatment no-sequence. We observe substantial heterogeneity in levels of strategic thinking, as predicted by level-k and Cognitive Hierarchy. While these models reproduce some features of our data, their fit is poor because of the assumed best-response behavior. Allowing for some degree of 'trembling' improves the fit significantly, especially if subjects are aware that others tremble, as in logit-QRE. The 'noisy introspection' model proposed by Goeree and Holt (2004), which combines different levels of thinking with error-prone behavior, best describes the data
Wise crowds or wise minorities?
No full textThis paper reports results from social learning experiments where subjects choose between two options and each subject has a small chance of being perfectly informed about which option is correct. In treatment "sequence", subjects observe the entire sequence of predecessors' choices while in treatment "no-sequence" they only observe the number of times each option has been chosen. The theoretical predictions are that subjects follow their immediate predecessors in treatment sequence and follow the minority in treatment no-sequence (Callander and Hörner, 2009). The former prediction is borne out in the data, but subjects tend to follow the majority in treatment no-sequence. We observe substantial heterogeneity in levels of strategic thinking, as predicted by level-k and Cognitive Hierarchy. While these models reproduce some features of our data, their fit is poor because of the assumed best-response behavior. Allowing for some degree of "trembling" improves the fit significantly, especially if subjects are aware that others tremble, as in logit-QRE. The "noisy introspection" model proposed by Goeree and Holt (2004), which combines different levels of thinking with error-prone behavior, best describes the data.Social learning, experiments, quantal response equilibrium, level-k models, noisy introspection
Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment to Equilibrium Under Noisy Directional Learning
No full textThis paper presents a dynamic model in which agents adjust their decisions in the direction of higher payoffs, subject to random error. This process produces a probability distribution of players' decisions whose evolution over time is determined by the Fokker-Planck equation. The dynamic process is stable for all potential games, a class of payoff structures that includes several widely studied games. In equilibrium, the distributions that determine expected payoffs correspond to the distributions that arise from the logit function applied to those expected payoffs. This "logit equilibrium" forms a stochastic generalization of the Nash equilibrium and provides a possible explanation of anomalous laboratory data.bounded rationality, noisy directional learning, Fokker- Planck equation, potential games, logit equilibrium, stochastic potential.
Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition
No full textThis paper considers a duopoly price-choice game in which the unique Nash equilibrium is the Bertrand outcome. Price competition, however, is imperfect in the sense that the market share of the high-price firm is not zero. Economic intuition suggests that price levels should be positively related to the market share of the high-price firm. Although this relationship is not predicted by standard game theory, it is implied by a generalization of the Nash equilibrium that results when players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. This logit equilibrium model was used to design a laboratory experiment with treatments that correspond to changing the market share of the high-price firm. The model predicts the final-period price averages for both treatments with remarkable accuracy. Moreover computer simulations of a naive learning model were used, ex ante, to predict the observed differences in the time paths of average prices.laboratory experiments, simulation, decision error, learning, logit equilibrium.
Tractaet in wat manieren men op root koper snijden ofte etzen zal : door de middel der stercke-wateren, ende harde- en zachte- vernissen, ofte gronde : als mede de manieren der zelve plaeten te drucken, de pars te maecken, ende andere dinghen, behelzende de zelve konsten /
No full textColophon: t'Amsterdam, ter drukkerye van Steven van Lier ... 1662.Added engraved title-page; with engraved plates illustrating techniques for engraving and etching.Signatures: A-I⁸ K⁴.Mode of access: Internet.Library's c.2 bound in old vellum; ink title on spine; book label of John Landwehr on front pastedown; extensive bibliographical notes in pencil on front pastedown and front free endpaper.Library's c.1 bound with: Inleydingh tot de practijck der al-gemeene schilder-konst ... / door W. Goeree. Tot Middelburgh : By Wilhekmus Goeree ..., anno 1670
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