1,721,117 research outputs found
Replication Data for: Busemeyer, Marius;Iversen, Torben, 2018, "Replication Data for: Busemeyer, Marius/Iversen, Torben, 2018: The Welfare State with Private Alternatives.
No full textThis is the replication dataset for this paper: Busemeyer, Marius/Iversen, Torben, 2018: The Welfare State with Private Alternatives, Journal of Politics. It contains: (1) a modified ISSP dataset (modified in the sense that we add macro-level variables) (2) the Stata Do file to reconstruct the tables and figures in the paper (3) an additional dataset that describes which macro-level variables were added to the original ISSP 2006 RoG dataset (2018-11-23
Replication Data for: Busemeyer, Marius;Iversen, Torben, 2018, "Replication Data for: Busemeyer, Marius/Iversen, Torben, 2018: The Welfare State with Private Alternatives.
No full textThis is the replication dataset for this paper: Busemeyer, Marius/Iversen, Torben, 2018: The Welfare State with Private Alternatives, Journal of Politics. It contains: (1) a modified ISSP dataset (modified in the sense that we add macro-level variables) (2) the Stata Do file to reconstruct the tables and figures in the paper (3) an additional dataset that describes which macro-level variables were added to the original ISSP 2006 RoG dataset (2018-11-23
Replication Data for: Information and financialization: Credit markets as a new source of inequality
No full textThese are the replication files for: Iversen, Torben, and Philipp Rehm. “Information and Financialization: Credit Markets as a New Source of Inequality.” Comparative Political Studies
Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems
Full text linkDie gängige Begründung – basierend auf der bahnbrechenden Arbeit Rokkans – dafür, dass ein spezifisches Wahlsystem bevorzugt wird, ist, dass die Verhältniswahl („proportional respresentation“ oder „PR“) von einer zersplitterten Rechte eingeführt wurde, um ihre Klasseninteressen gegenüber denen einer wachsenden Linken zu verteidigen. Neue Erkenntnisse zeigen jedoch, dass PR tatsächlich die Linke und das Konzept der Umverteilung stärkt. Wir behaupten daher, dass die allgemein akzeptierte Sichtweise historisch, analytisch und empirisch falsch ist. Unsere Erklärung für die Einführung der PR ist eine grundlegend andere: Durch die Integration zweier gegensätzlicher Interpretationen von PR – das Konzept der minimal erfolgreichen Koalitionen [minimum winning coalition] gegenüber dem Konzept des Konsens – gehen wir davon aus, dass die Rechte PR übernommen hat, als ihre Unterstützung für konsensuelle rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen (besonders im Arbeitsmarkt und in der Ausbildung neuer Arbeitskräfte, wo spezifische Investitionen wichtig waren) wichtiger wurde als ihre Abneigung gegen die Umverteilungsauswirkungen; dies passierte in den Ländern, die vorher eine eng organisierte kommunale Wirtschaft hatten. In Ländern mit relativ schlechten Arbeitgeber- Arbeitnehmer-Beziehungen und einer schwach ausgeprägten Koordination zwischen Wirtschaft und Gewerkschaften hatte die Beibehaltung von Mehrheitssystemen die Funktion, die Linke in Schach zu halten. Diese Tatsache erklärt die enge Beziehung zwischen den bestehenden Varianten von Kapitalismus und Wahlsystemen und warum diese weiterhin fortbestehen. -- The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan’s seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR – minimum winning coalitions versus consensus – we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.Economic Models of Political Processes,Government,War,Law,and Regulation (Comparative),Political Economy of Capitalism
Risks at work: the demand and supply sides of government redistribution
Full text linkTo understand how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important to explain both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional incentives of governments to respond to these preferences. This paper attempts to do both, using a general theoretical framework and detailed data at both the individual and national levels. In a first step, we focus on how risk exposure and income are related to preferences for redistribution. To test our hypotheses, we extract detailed risk exposure measures from labor force surveys and marry them to cross-national survey data. In a second step, we turn our attention to the supply side of government redistribution. Institutions, we argue, mediate governments’ reactions to redistributional demands following economic shocks. Using time-series cross-country data, we demonstrate how national training systems, electoral institutions as well as government partisanship shape government responses. -- Um zu verstehen, wie Wohlfahrtsstaaten auf ökonomische Schocks reagieren, ist es wichtig, sowohl die Nachfrage- als auch die Angebotsseite von Umverteilung zu analysieren. Wie entstehen Umverteilungs-Präferenzen in der Bevölkerung? Welche institutionellen Anreize haben Regierungen, darauf zu reagieren? Das vorliegende Papier wendet einen generellen theoretischen Rahmen und umfangreiche Individual- und Aggregat-Daten an, um diesen Fragen nachzugehen. Dazu wird zuerst analysiert, wie Risiken im Arbeitsmarkt und das Einkommen Umverteilungs-Präferenzen von Individuen beeinflussen. Die abgeleiteten Hypothesen werden an neuen Datensätzen getestet. Diese kombinieren Informationen von Arbeitsmarkterhebungen und Umfrage-Daten für mehrere Länder und Jahre. In Sachen Angebotsseite wird argumentiert, dass unterschiedliche Regierungen auf ökonomische Schocks unterschiedlich reagieren, abhängig von Institutionen. Das Papier testet diese und andere Hypothesen auf der Aggregatsebene anhand von vergleichenden Zeitreihen. Es zeigt sich, dass die Art und Weise, wie Regierungen auf ökonomische Schocks reagieren, von Ausbildungs- und Wahlsystemen sowie der parteipolitischen Färbung der Regierung mitbestimmt werden.Public Opinion,Preferences,Redistribution,Varieties of Capitalism,Partisanship,Unemployment,Occupations
The causes of welfare state expansion: deindustrialization or globalization?
Full text linkAn influential line of argument holds that trade exposure causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory and risk-sharing welfare state spending. The argument has gained renewed prominence through the recent work of Garrett (1998) and Rodrik (1997; 1998). This paper argues that the relationship between trade openness and welfare state expansion is spurious, and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization. Based on cross-sectional time-series data for 15 OECD countries we show that there is no relationship between trade exposure and the level of labor market risks (in terms of employment and wages), whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for compensating welfare state policies. Yet, while differential rates of deindustrialization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state, its particular character -- in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments -- is shaped by government partisanship. The argument has implications for the study, and the future, of the welfare state that are very different from those suggestedin the trade openness literature. -- In vielen einflußreichen Diskussionsbeiträgen wird die Meinung vertreten, daß die Liberalisierung des Handels ökonomische Verunsicherung zur Folge habe und damit zu Forderungen nach ausgleichenden wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Ausgaben führe. Die Arbeiten von Garrett (1998) und Rodrik (1997;1998) verliehen diesem Argument zusätzliche Relevanz. Gegenstand dieser Untersuchung ist die Beziehung zwischen Ausmaß an Offenheit einer Volkswirtschaft und der Ausdehnung des Wohlfahrtsstaates, dessen großzügige Entwicklung seit den 1960er Jahren durch zunehmende Deindustrialisierung ermöglicht wurde. Auf der Grundlage von Analysen länderübergreifender Zeitreihen und von 15 OECD-Ländern wird gezeigt, daß kein Zusammenhang zwischen einer Handelsliberalisierung und dem Grad der Arbeitsmarktrisiken (bezogen auf Löhne und Beschäftigung) besteht. Angesichts der durch die Deindustrialisierung verursachten Unsicherheit kommt es jedoch von seiten der Wähler zu Forderungen nach einer ausgleichenden Sozialpolitik. Während das Ausmaß der Deindustrialisierung die Größe und Ausstattung des Wohlfahrsstaates determiniert, wird sein spezifischer Charakter - hinsichtlich der direkten Regierungsdienstleistungen und der ausgleichenden Transferzahlungen - von den Regierungsparteien geprägt. Diese Argumentation ist von großer Tragweite für die Analyse und Zukunft des Wohlfahrtsstaates; sie weicht gravierend von der Literatur über offene Volkswirtschaften ab.
A Political-Institutional Model of Real Exchange Rates, Competitiveness, and Division of Labor
Full text linkThe University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.Torben Iversen is Harold Hitchings Burbank Professor of Political Economy in the Department of Government at Harvard University.
Iversen's research and teaching interests include comparative political economy, electoral politics, and applied formal theory. He is the author of Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare (Cambridge University Press, 2005), Contested Economic Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1999), and co-editor of Unions, Employers and Central Bankers (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Iversen's current work focuses on the political economy of distribution, representation, and economic performance. He is the author or co-author of more than two dozen articles in leading journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Annual Review of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Public Choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics, World Politics, and numerous edited volumes.
Iversen's work has won five American Political Science Association prizes including Best Book on European Politics and Society, the Luebbert Best Article Award, and the Gabriel Almond Best Dissertation Award.
He is currently working on two book-length projects: one on the political representation of economic interests (with David Soskice), and another on the political economy of gender inequality (with Frances Rosenbluth).Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security StudiesEvent webpag
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Recommended from our members
Essays on Political Socialization and Polarization
No full textThis dissertation studies the long-term consequences of political socialization. In the first paper, I study socialization under different regime types and its implications for democratic consolidation. Using public opinion data from transitioning democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa I show that democracy may not be self-enforcing: Individuals socialized under democracy voice less support for democratic rule than individuals socialized under autocracy. In the second paper, my co-author and I analyze habituation effects through socialization among newly enfranchised 16-year-old voters in Austria. We suggest that lowering the voting age has benefits for long-term rates of political participation, but may also reinforce polarization. The third paper conceptualizes political polarization as one form of socialization and demonstrates widespread misperceptions of out-group ideologies in the US electorate. It utilizes and experimental design to test whether an information intervention can mitigate some of the negative consequences of partisan polarization. I find that individuals update their posterior beliefs about out-group ideologies. Such updating lowers negative affect and threat perceptions, but does not impact issue-based polarization.Governmen
- …
