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Clausewitz's ideas of strategy and victory
No full textClausewitz's definition of strategy, as given in On War, is very unsatisfactory. Taking his own ideas about the relationship between political aims and military means further, one is led to define strategy in relation to the degree of success in the achievement of the war aims, which must include a lasting, stable peace, the conditions of which are bearable or even satisfactory for all sides. This requires a change in the enemy's mind about the situation, and not just a breaking of his will. The enemy must be convinced that he has a stake in the peace, not just be temporarily disabled. Only then is military victory the true end of war and the foundation of peace, not a prelude to the next war
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Clausewitz' ideas of strategy and victory
No full textClausewitz's definition of "strategy" does not greatly differ from the original definition of the term in the 6th century East Roman Empire. His ideas of "victory" are limited to the military arena. Nevertheless, there are elements in his writing which have led subsequent authors, especially Andre Beaufre, to take them further and make them very useful tools for the analysis of conflicts and war aims in subsequent centuries
Dialectical Philosophy after Auschwitz Remaining Silent, Speaking Out, Engaging with the Victims
Get PDFOpposizioni nella teoria politica della guerra di Clausewitz
No full textOpposizioni nella teoria politica della guerra di Clausewit
Militärgeschichte als Friedensforschung Einführung in die Dialektik der Wissenschaft von Krieg und Frieden
No full textClausewitz in His Time: Essays in the Cultural and Intellectual History of Thinking about War
Get PDFLijotar nasuprot Hegelu: nasilni kraj postmodernosti
No full textIn the final phase of the Cold War, Jean-François Lyotard popularized the end of modernity and the dawn of a new era, “postmodernity”. But postmodernism is already over again. In the resurgence of the great empires and civilizations that perished in European colonization and European-American hegemony, the rise of the “others”, a new epoch of history is emerging that will define the entire 21st century. Lyotard’s position is characterized by three different approaches that seem to flow into each other but need to be separated: A critique of Hegel with the core assertion that Auschwitz, as a symbol of infinite suffering, abrogated his philosophy of history, and the extension of this critique to the great narratives of modernity. This is followed by a meta-discourse on the great narratives of history on the basis of linguistic-philosophical considerations (in fact a meta-meta-narrative) and, finally, the construction of an alternative great narrative, that of the individual, particular, other, of postmodernity. This latter is only ostensibly not an alternative construction because it is intimately connected to the critique of grand narratives. In all three subfields, Lyotard has made groundbreaking considerations – but their immediate connection has reversed these advances. Lyotard exchanged a totalizing discourse of the absolute through a similar totalizing discourse of the particular. We not only need a radical reversal of the concepts of Western modernity, but also of those of post-modernity and re-invent a kind of different dialectics. It must be granted to Lyotard that an abridged interpretation of Hegel could support his critique. However, it is completely disputed whether Hegel’s approach is based on a closed or an open system. The thesis presented here is that Hegel’s approach is both open and closed at the same time. A simple and illustrative example is a sine curve on a slightly rising x-axis. This wave model is closed on the y-axis, but completely open and even infinite on the x-axis. Critics and proponents of Hegel’s philosophy of history misunderstood his approach as a closed system and derived from it an “end of history” (Marx as well as Fukuyama). With Hegel, however, it can be argued that we are at the violent end of postmodernity. I wanted my text not only to attempt a critique of Lyotard and a reconstruction of the Hegelian method, but also to lay out the consequent substantive perspectives, even if they are necessarily not yet fully elaborated. In addition, I see Lyotard as an outstanding representative of post-structuralism, with whom he shares comparable problems, so that I make cross-references to similarities in this position, even if I do not treat them separately here.U završnoj fazi Hladnog rata, Žan-Fransoa Lijotar popularizovao je kraj modernosti i zoru novog doba, „postmodernosti”. Međutim, postmodernizam je već završen. U ponovnom usponu velikih carstava i civilizacija koje su nestale usled evropske kolonizacije i evropsko-američke hegemonije, s usponom „drugih”, rađa se nova epoha istorije koja će obeležiti čitav 21. vek. Lijotarova pozicija karakteriše se kroz tri različita pristupa koja naizgled proističu jedan iz drugog, ali ih je potrebno razlikovati: Kritiku Hegela sa osnovnom tvrdnjom da je Aušvic, kao simbol beskonačnog stradanja, ukinuo njegovu filozofiju istorije i proširio ovu kritiku na velike narative modernosti. Sledeće je meta-diskurs o velikim narativima istorije zasnovan na lingvističko-filozofskim razmatranjima (zapravo meta-meta-narativ) i, na kraju, konstrukcija alternativnog velikog narativa, narativa o pojedincu, partikularnom, drugom, postmodernosti. Ovo poslednje samo prividno nije alternativna konstrukcija jer je usko povezano sa kritikom velikih narativa. U sva tri ova područja, Lijotar je izneo revolucionarna razmatranja – ali njihovo neposredno povezivanje je poništilo ove napretke. Lijotar je zamenio totalizujući diskurs apsoluta sličnim totalizujućim diskursom partikularnog. Potrebna nam je ne samo radikalna revizija pojmova zapadne modernosti, već i pojmova postmodernosti i pronalazak drugačije vrste dijalektike. Lijotaru treba priznati da skraćeno tumačenje Hegela može podržati njegovu kritiku. Međutim, potpuno je sporno da li se Hegelov pristup zasniva na zatvorenom ili otvorenom sistemu. Teza izneta ovde jeste da je Hegelov pristup istovremeno i otvoren i zatvoren. Jednostavan i ilustrativan primer je sinusna kriva na blago uzdignutoj x-osi. Ovaj talasni model je zatvoren na y-osi, ali potpuno otvoren i čak beskonačan na x-osi. Kritičari i zagovornici Hegelove filozofije istorije pogrešno su razumeli njegov pristup kao zatvoren sistem i iz toga izvukli „kraj istorije” (Marks kao i Fukujama). Međutim, s Hegelom se može tvrditi da smo na nasilnom kraju postmodernosti. Želeo sam da moj tekst ne samo pokuša kritiku Lijotara i rekonstrukciju Hegelove metode, već i da iznese suštinske perspektive koje iz toga proizlaze, čak i ako one nužno još nisu u potpunosti razrađene. Pored toga, Lijotara vidim kao istaknutog predstavnika poststrukturalizma, s kojim deli uporedive probleme, tako da pravim ukrštene reference na sličnosti u ovoj poziciji, čak i ako ih ovde ne razmatram zasebno
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