524 research outputs found
POPPER AND ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY
No full textU ovom tekstu autor ima dva cilja: prvo, pokazati svu pogrješnost Popperovoga prikazivanja atenske demokracije u 5. st. pr. Kr., osobito njezinoga dugogodišnjega vođe, Perikla; i, drugo, obraniti Tukidida od Popperovih posve neutemeljenih tvrdnji o pristranosti. U skladu sa svojom vizijom vječne borbe protiv totalitarizma, Popper totalitarnim shvaćanjima, čije korijene vidi u Platonu, pokušava naći neku protutežu, izražavanje tadašnjih pozitivnih vrijednosti. Platonu suprotstavlja Perikla, a Platonovoj ideji države, nadahnutoj Spartom, atensku demokraciju. Popper prvo nalazi neprijatelja pa tek onda, naknadno, konstruira “otvoreno društvo”. Demokracija u Ateni, koju nam Popper prikazuje kao prototip otvorenoga društva, u stvarnosti je s takvom koncepcijom imala vrlo malo sličnosti. No, sve što se ne uklapa u njegovu koncepciju, Popper jednostavno zanemaruje, iskrivljuje, mijenja. U tekstu se detaljno ispituje Popperov prikaz atenske demokracije, a posebna se pozornost posvećuje Periklovu pogrebnom govoru. Prikazuje se kako je Popper stvorio termin “otvoreno društvo”, vadeći iz konteksta Periklove riječi. Pokazano je i kako je došao do mota “otvorenoga društva”, ne prezajući niti od (posve) krivoga prijevoda Tukidida.This article’s goals are twofold: the first is to demonstrate the fallacy of Popper’s depiction of the Athenian democracy in 5th ct. B.C., especially of its longtime leader Pericles; the second is to defend Thucydides from Popper’s completely unfounded allegations of bias. In line with his vision of an eternal struggle against totalitarianism, Popper attempts to counterbalance totalitarian attitudes whose roots he finds in Plato by expressing the then positive values. He offsets Pericles to Plato, and the Athenian democracy to Plato’s idea of the state inspired by Sparta. Popper first finds an enemy and only then constructs the “open society”. Democracy in Athens, which Popper advances as a prototype of the open society, in practice had very little in common with that concept. However, everything that cannot be incorporated into his concept, Popper simply ignores, distorts, changes. The author dissects Popper’s account of the Athenian democracy, and dwells on Pericles’ famous funeral oration. He describes how Popper devised the term “open society” by taking Pericles’ words out of context, not even shying from using an (altogether) faulty translation of Thucydides
In broad daylight.
No full textThis memoir is a reflection about the events following the Anschluss of Austria to Nazi-Germany, an attempt to understand what was not comprehensible to the little boy the author was by that time. It shows how deeply the author's fate informed his later life, e.g. the decision to put his daugther to a Yeshiva, to provide her with a Jewish identity he never felt for himself. This manuscript is a valuable addendum to the more fact based memoir written by Mr. Wolf A. Popper nine years earlier. He states that it took 50 years for his memories to come back to his mind. Unfortunately, the memoir is incomplete.Wolf A. Popper, 2006Wolf A. Popper was born as Wolfgang Alexander Leopold Albert Popper von Podhragy on 6/13/1928 in Vienna. He lived with his parents, Ernest and Ilse Popper von Podhragy, and his sister Evelyn in Hietzing, Vienna. His father was a baron, and the family was very wealthy--they lived in a house with 13 rooms, and had a cook, a chambermaid, a chauffeur, and a gardener. In December of 1938, Wolf Popper and his sister emigrated without their parents, but with the help of their former governess, to Czechoslovakia. When their parents arrived as well--the father had been interned at Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps--they fled to Holland, then to England where he attended high school. He came to the US in 1941 via Brazil where they stayed only for three months. In the USA, his father started as a helper in a lumber yard. He served in the Korean War from 1950 – 1952. He studied at NYU in 1954. Wolf Popper is president of a company that provides financial services. In the past, he has held various non-profit posts for organizations like the Jewish War Veterans or B’nai Brith.Austrian Heritage Collectio
Karl Popper and the social sciences
No full textThe book "Karl Popper and the social sciences" of William A. Gorton - Author offers the first systematic treatment of Karl Popper’s contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences
Karl Popper y Heráclito: antecedentes y problemas actuales de la Filosofía de la Ciencia
No full textThis essay discusses the meaning of Hereaclitus logo and
change ideas for Karl Popper's philosophy of science. The author
explains that Heraclitus has been misinterpreted and misunderstood,
especially since the critical rationalist conception, which Popper places
in the Ionian and Ephesian illustration. This has certainly involved,
according to the Austrian author, a lack of knowledge of the
contributions to scientific thinking of both philosophical, innovative
and original ideas in the pre-Socratic era. According to Popper,
Heraclito meant for the future of science and philosophy, a true link
with the innovative ideas that came over the centuries, issues that
influenced later developments of science. This work is a brief study of
the two works with which Popper studies Ephesio: Conjectures and
Refutations (1991) and The Open Society and Its Enemies (1984);
however, some connections are made with the rest of his work,
concluding that Popper bases his critical scientific rationalism on the
critical rationalism of the first Greek illustration.Se analiza el significado que tienen para la filosofía de la ciencia de Karl
Popper las ideas de logos y cambio de Heráclito de Éfeso. Este autor expone que
Heráclito ha sido mal interpretado e incomprendido, especialmente desde la
concepción racionalista crítica, que Popper sitúa en la ilustración
jónica y efesina. Ello ha implicado, según afirma, un desconocimiento
de los aportes para el pensamiento científico de ambas ideas
filosóficas, innovadoras y originales en la época presocrática. Según
Popper, Heráclito significó desde entonces, un verdadero enlace con
las ideas innovadoras que sobrevendrían al paso de los siglos,
influyendo en desarrollos posteriores de la ciencia. Este trabajo es un
breve estudio de las dos obras con las cuales Popper estudia al Efesino:
Conjeturas y refutaciones (1991) y La sociedad abierta y sus enemigos
(1984); sin embargo, se hacen algunas conexiones con el resto de su
obra, para concluir que Popper basa su racionalismo científico crítico
en el racionalismo crítico de la primera ilustración griega
La controversia stove-popper: racionalismo o irracionalismo
No full textIn this text, I will try to show some relevant aspects about the controversy Stove-Popper in wich the tension between Logia Positivism and Critic Rationalism is carried out. I start from Stove's position to attack Popper's anti-inductivism, and to achieve it, the author centers herself basically in two fundamental aspects: the first one shows the conception of Rationality as if it were possible to analyzed just from deductives points of view. The second one related to the affirmation about that science has only had progress from de pure Deductivism. The conception of Popper's rationality implies a strong Deductivism, and could not establish the affirmation of progress during the last centuries. In order to attack these aspects, the author tries to show that Popper's concept about rationality is richer and more complex than Stove's proposal, and on the other hand, shows that there is not a postulation of inferences of unobservable, from observable or from future facts starting from past facts.En este escrito trataré de mostrar algunos puntos relevantes de la controversia Stove-Popper en los que se hace clara la tensión entre el positivismo lógico y el racionalismo crítico. Se parte de la posición de Stove para atacar el antiinductivismo de Popper, para lo cual, el autor se centra básicamente en dos puntos claves: El primero muestra la concepción de racionalidad como si ésta sólo fuera posible de ser analizada desde puntos de vista deductivistas. El segundo con relación a la afirmación acerca de que la ciencia sólo ha tenido progresos desde el deductivismo puro. La concepción de racionalidad de Popper implica deductivismo fuerte y no podría hacer la afirmación de progreso durante los últimos siglos. Para atacar estos aspectos se intenta mostrar que el concepto de racionalidad de Popper es más complejo y rico de lo que Stove propone y, segundo, mostrar que no hay la postulación de inferencias de inobservables a partir de observables o de hechos futuros a partir de hechos pasados
A Solution To A Problem Of Popper
No full textPopper's logical systems were an attempt to "reform the teaching of elementary logic", but were regarded by their own author as "bad and ill-fated". However, the problem raised by Popper was, and still is, a real one. In fact we show that the popular approaches in terms of natural deduction and analytic tableaux are unsatisfactory. Then we present a system of classical logic which combines the virtues of both and can be generalized to a wide range of non-classical logics
La controversia stove-popper: racionalismo o irracionalismo
No full textIn this text, I will try to show some relevant aspects about the controversy Stove-Popper in wich the tension between Logia Positivism and Critic Rationalism is carried out. I start from Stove's position to attack Popper's anti-inductivism, and to achieve it, the author centers herself basically in two fundamental aspects: the first one shows the conception of Rationality as if it were possible to analyzed just from deductives points of view. The second one related to the affirmation about that science has only had progress from de pure Deductivism. The conception of Popper's rationality implies a strong Deductivism, and could not establish the affirmation of progress during the last centuries. In order to attack these aspects, the author tries to show that Popper's concept about rationality is richer and more complex than Stove's proposal, and on the other hand, shows that there is not a postulation of inferences of unobservable, from observable or from future facts starting from past facts.En este escrito trataré de mostrar algunos puntos relevantes de la controversia Stove-Popper en los que se hace clara la tensión entre el positivismo lógico y el racionalismo crítico. Se parte de la posición de Stove para atacar el antiinductivismo de Popper, para lo cual, el autor se centra básicamente en dos puntos claves: El primero muestra la concepción de racionalidad como si ésta sólo fuera posible de ser analizada desde puntos de vista deductivistas. El segundo con relación a la afirmación acerca de que la ciencia sólo ha tenido progresos desde el deductivismo puro. La concepción de racionalidad de Popper implica deductivismo fuerte y no podría hacer la afirmación de progreso durante los últimos siglos. Para atacar estos aspectos se intenta mostrar que el concepto de racionalidad de Popper es más complejo y rico de lo que Stove propone y, segundo, mostrar que no hay la postulación de inferencias de inobservables a partir de observables o de hechos futuros a partir de hechos pasados
Rorty vs. Popper, ou “Conversação” vs. “Argumentação”
No full textIn this paper, Rorty’s and Popper’s philosophies are compared from the perspective of their social, cultural, and political implications. The author focuses on two nuclear concepts: conversation (Rorty) and argumentation (Popper). He argues that the historical and philosophical context of these philosophies is basically the same: the problematics of the consequences of holism, as concerns the theory of meaning, for the status of philosophy itself – a problematic as the one which Quine, Kuhn, and Popper, have established since the 1960s. However, when the two concepts (conversation, argumentation) are more closely compared, they seem to lead to contrasting conceptions of society, of culture, and of politics, which are carefully discussed.Neste artigo, as filosofias de Rorty e de Popper são comparadas na perspetiva das suas implicações sociais, culturais e políticas. O autor foca‑se em dois conceitos nucleares: conversação (Rorty) e argumentação (Popper). Ele argumenta que o contexto histórico e filosófico dessas filosofias é basicamente o mesmo: a problemática das consequências do holismo, no que diz respeito à teoria da significação, para o estatuto da própria filosofia – uma problemática como aquela que Quine, Kuhn, e Popper estabeleceram desde os anos sessenta do século passado. Contudo, quando os dois conceitos (conversação e argumentação) são mais estreitamente comparados, eles parecem conduzir a conceções contrastantes da sociedade, da cultura e da política, que são cuidadosamente discutidas
The problem of demarcation of human sciences in philosophy of Karl Popper
No full textDarbā analizēta Karla Popera zinātnes filozofija, pievēršoties viņa demarkācijas kritērijam un problēmām tā attiecināšanā uz sociālajām un humanitārajām zinātnēm. Autors izklāsta indukcijas problēmu, Popera noraidošo viedokli induktīvu slēdzienu izmantošanā zinātnē un viņa piedāvāto risinājumu kritiskā racionālisma veidā. Īpaša uzmanība tiek pievērsta Popera definētajai demarkācijas problēmai un piedāvātajam demarkācijas kritērijam – zinātniskās sistēmas falsificējamībai. Šī kritērija izklāsts ietver Popera redzējumu par empīrisku zinātni, kas ir potenciāli atspēkojama ar empīrisku pieredzi. Autors secina, ka Popers attiecina demarkācijas kritēriju uz sociālajām un humanitārajām zinātnēm, bet pastāv vairāki argumenti, kas izslēdz šādu iespēju. Savus iebildumus autors pamato no Entonija Gidensa un Jirgena Krica filozofijas perspektīvas.The diploma paper is dedicated to the analysis of the philosophy of Karl Popper and focuses to his criterion of demarcation of sciences and the problems related with adaptation of this criterion to the human sciences. The author explains the problem of induction, negative position of Popper regarding usage of induction in the science and solution offered by Popper in the manner of critical rationalism. Special attention is paid to the problem of demarcation defined by Popper and his offered solution for criterion of demarcation – falsifiability of the scientific system. Layout of this criterion contains vision of Popper regarding empirical science which can be potentially falsified with the empirical data. The author comes with a conclusion that Popper applies his criterion of demarcation also to the human sciences, however, there are number of arguments prohibiting that. Objections of the author are motivated from the perspective of the philosophy of Anthony Giddens and Juergen Kriz
Epistemología, ética y política según Karl Popper
No full textThis paper looks to examine Popper�s view of the critical discussion which, ultimately, is re-
sponsible for the creation of daring speculations both in epistemology and in the political and
social fields. The author introduces the fallibilist presupposition of our assertions regarding
truth. This Popperian concern, according to the testability of our hypotheses, moved him to
suggest a method which includes the natural and social sciences. For Popper, the fundamental
principle of unity in science was that the testing of hypotheses in social sciences had to be
applied using the same method than in natural science. It is out of these Popperian assertions
supporting a methodological unity, the principle of fallibility, a sensible discussion and the
search for truth�considered by Popper both epistemological and ethical principles�that we
suggest an analysis of these principles, thus linking epistemology and ethics in Popper�s
thought.El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar la visión popperiana de la discusión crítica que,
en última instancia, es responsable por la creación de conjeturas osadas, tanto en el campo
epistemológico, como en el campo político y social. Presentaremos el presupuesto falibilista de
nuestras alegaciones en torno de la verdad. Esa preocupación de Popper, sobre la contrastación
de nuestras hipótesis, lo llevó a proponer un método capaz de abarcar tanto las ciencias natura-
les como las sociales. Para Popper, el principio fundamental de la unidad de la ciencia era que el
test de las hipótesis en las ciencias sociales debía ser conducido de la misma forma que para el
científico natural. Es a partir de las formulaciones popperianas acerca de la unidad metodológi-
ca, del principio de falibilidad, de la discusión sensata y de la búsqueda de la verdad, considera-
dos por Popper tanto principios epistemológicos como principios éticos, que proponemos un
examen de éstos, aproximando epistemología y ética en el pensamiento del reconocido episte-
mólogo austríaco
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