9,458 research outputs found
Who gets the blame? How policymakers in the EU shift responsibility when things go wrong
No full textEU membership provides ample opportunities for politicians at the national level to shift blame for unpopular decisions to the EU's institutions, while EU-level actors also have an incentive to blame national politicians when things go wrong. Drawing on a new study, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild explains how these blame-avoidance processes function in practice
Brexit and the tragedy of the Commons: how wedge issues generate detrimental outcomes
No full textThe difficulty Theresa May and Boris Johnson had in winning the backing of MPs for their Brexit strategies illustrates the impact that ‘wedge issues’ can have on party politics, write Tim Heinkelmann-Wild and Lisa Kriegmair (Ludwig-Maximilians-University). As issues like Brexit cut across traditional party lines, they are highly likely to create intra-party divisions and make compromises difficult to secure
How European integration affects blame games in national politics
No full textWhen things go wrong, governments frequently attempt to deflect the blame by shifting it onto other actors, such as previous administrations. However, as Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Lisa Kriegmair and Berthold Rittberger write, European integration has provided governments with additional opportunities for blame avoidance, such as criticising the EU’s institutions or other EU member states. Drawing on a new study, they explain how the integration process has affected national blame games
When do governments benefit from non-compliance with unpopular EU policies?
No full textWhen the implementation of EU policies is likely to be unpopular, do governments benefit from non-compliance? Drawing on a new study, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger and Bernhard Zangl write that while non-compliance can be a successful political strategy, it can also backfire and increase the blame attributed to governments
sj-docx-1-bpi-10.1177_13691481231202642 – Supplemental material for Governance abhors a vacuum: The afterlives of major international organisations
No full textSupplemental material, sj-docx-1-bpi-10.1177_13691481231202642 for Governance abhors a vacuum: The afterlives of major international organisations by Hylke Dijkstra, Maria J. Debre and Tim Heinkelmann-Wild in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations</p
Supplementary material for the Article "Dolce far niente? Non-compliance and blame avoidance in the EU" (Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger, Bernhard Zangl, Tim Heinkelmann-Wild)
No full textHASH(0x7ff14452b608
Do dolphins benefit from nonlinear mathematics when processing their sonar returns?
No full textAn interview with author Tim Leighton about the paper
Opportunities for linking young surveyors across professional surveying member organisations and FIG
No full textTim Di Muzio on 'Sabotage'
No full textIn a series of essays published in 2013 and 2014 on capitaspower.com, political economist Tim Di Muzio explored the concept of ‘sabotage’ as it applies to capitalist power. I recently rediscovered these essays and was so impressed by them that I have reposted them here as a single piece.
About the author: Tim Di Muzio is a researcher at the University of Wollongong. He is the author of numerous books, including Debt as power, Carbon capitalism, and The 1% and the Rest of us
Disarmed principals : institutional resilience and the non-enforcement of delegation
No full textFirst published online: 6 May 2020Governments across the world increasingly rely on non-state agents for managing even the most sensitive tasks that range from running critical infrastructures to protecting citizens. While private agents frequently underperform, governments as principals tend nonetheless not to enforce delegation contracts. Why? We suggest the mechanism of institutional resilience. A preexisting set of rules shapes non-enforcement through the combination of (i) its structural misfit with the delegation contract and (ii) asymmetric interdependence that favors the agent over time. To demonstrate the plausibility of our argument, we trace the political process behind Europe’s largest military transport aircraft, the A400M. Governments delegated the development and production of this complex program to a private firm, Airbus. They layered a ‘commercial approach’ onto traditionally state-run defense industries. Yet, resilience caused these new formal rules to fail and eventually disarmed principals. Our mechanism constitutes an innovative approach by theorizing an alternative path toward dynamic continuity
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