91 research outputs found

    Late Middle Ages and Renaissance: the forgotten contribution of Max Dvořák

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    Max Dvořák, one of the pilasters of the Viennese school of art history, is nowadays widely known for the works of his final years as well as for writings on monument conservation. Through a reconstruction of the historical and academic context and a brief presentation of Dvořák’s studies on the transition period from the fourteenth to the fifteenth century, the author aims to show that the Bohemian scholar made an important contribution to the art historical debate of the time, for which he is hardly appreciated today. This article examines a selection of Dvořák’s early writings from the first decade of the twenthieth century. In particular, the habilitation thesis Das Rätsel der Kunst der Brüder van Eyck (The Enigma of the Art of the Van Eyck Brothers, 1903) is consulted. While many scholars claim that there is a wide gap between his older works and those from the last years of his life, as stated by his former students Karl M. Swoboda and Johannes Wilde in the preface to Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte (1924), it is argued here that Dvořák’s point of view already presents the basic elements of his more mature conclusions at the beginning of his academic career. Likewise, it is reflected on the fact that Dvořák made a remarkable contribution to a new consideration of the transitional period between the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, among other workd, with his Enigma, but that this is today attributed not to him but to the cultural historian Johan Huizinga and his work Autumn of the Middle Ages (1919)

    Defining a Discipline: «Kunstgeschichtliche Anzeigen» as a Critical Organ for the Vienna School

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    This article briefly presents the often mentioned, yet not deeper investigated journal 'Kunstgeschichtliche Anzeigen' (KA), founded by Franz Wickhoff in 1904. The primary driving force behind the project was his then assistant Max Dvořák, who continued the editorship after Wickhoff’s death in 1909 until 1913. On this occasion, the founding of the journal through the unpublished correspondence between the two, which gives insight into the journal’s objectives and purpose, is retraced. Particular attention is given to the involvement of scholars from other universities as well as to the KA’s aim to establish a definition of scientifically valid research in art history. In this context, an analysis of the Vienna School’s definition of Wissenschaftlichkeit (‘scientificity’) is a central part of the article. Finally, the author reflects on the journal’s legitimacy in the broader context of the institutionalisation of the discipline of art history

    EU cultural policy as a tool to combat crises - a discourse analysis on the use of cultural policy in deadlock

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    Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-10T19:51:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 BERDING-THESIS-2017.pdf: 1013522 bytes, checksum: 45df81c6d42c0ebdb8b294ad6966a0e4 (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4213 bytes, checksum: d70d189c55b7c99af6cad7cb0df577b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-04-17Embargo set by: Colleen Fallaw for item 102620 Lift date: 2019-08-10T21:25:30Z Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD systemLimited Restriction Lifted for Item 102620 on 2019-08-11T09:15:09Z.This Master’s thesis looks at the relationship between crises and European identity, an identity largely built by the EU’s cultural policy. I examine where this connection is made by analyzing communication from various EU institutions, as well as EU or national politicians, and newspapers. I hypothesize that the EU is referring to European identity and the common European cultural heritage in crisis situations. After conducting discourse analysis, a connection between crises and European identity or common culture is made at various places and by various people. This thesis contributes to the field of European Union Studies, by looking at how the concept of European identity through cultural policy is utilized. It also makes a contribution to the field of Cultural studies by indicating how culture can be instrumentalized and how culture can transform social relations.Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'Closed Access', the embargo will last until 2019-05-01The student, Raphaela Berding, accepted the attached license on 2017-04-13 at 17:11.The student, Raphaela Berding, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2017-04-13 at 17:11.This Thesis was approved for publication on 2017-04-17 at 09:39.DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #10751 on 2017-08-10 at 14:30:3

    Understanding togetherness : joint action capacities in great apes

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    Doctorat, Université de Neuchâtel, Institut de biologieLes animaux sociaux coopèrent de multiples façons dans le but d’atteindre un objectif commun, par exemple en remplissant des rôles complémentaires et réciproques, en agissant de façon pro-sociale, et en adaptant leurs propres comportements à ceux de leurs partenaires. Malgré cela, une théorie influente suggère que les interactions coopératives des animaux non-humains, notamment les grands singes, sont de nature égoïste dans la mesure où les participants ne possèdent pas les capacités cognitives nécessaires pour partager leurs intentions et s’investir conjointement dans un objectif commun. En d’autres mots, les animaux ne sembleraient pas capables de s’engager dans une action commune par le biais d’un sentiment d’intentionnalité partagée. Cependant, cette théorie pose plusieurs problèmes. D’une part, elle présuppose la possession d’un certain nombre de capacités cognitives très sophistiquées (mais pas forcément nécessaires à la réalisation d’une entreprise commune). D’autre part, cette théorie s’appuie sur les résultats d’études comparatives menées en laboratoire avec des chimpanzés captifs et des enfants humains. Ces études manquent ainsi de pertinence écologique et d’équité inter-espèce au niveau des protocoles expérimentaux. De plus, elles ont été réalisées principalement avec des chimpanzés, connus pour être l’espèce de grands singes la plus compétitive. Des études récentes ont cependant apporté de nouvelles connaissances sur la coordination d’actions jointes chez les grands singes qui, associées aux raisons mentionnées ci-dessus, nous poussent à remettent en question cette théorie prédominante. Ma thèse avait deux objectifs principaux – le premier de nature théorique et le second de nature empirique. L’objectif théorique était de re-conceptualiser la théorie sur l’intentionnalité partagée. Dans ce but, j’ai développé un nouveau cadre théorique pour l’étude de la coordination d’actions jointes, inspiré par la recherche sur les interactions humaines, et qui permet d’étudier, chez toutes les espèces animales, comment deux participants co-créent, co-maintiennent et corompent un état d’investissement commun au cours des différentes phases d’une action jointe (entrée, principale et sortie). Lors du déroulement d’actions jointes, les participants sont constamment concernés par la nécessité de préserver la « face » – une forme de manifestation publique d’estime de soi. J’ai suggéré que les comportements et les signaux de communication déployés par les participants pour coordonner les actions jointes représentaient de bons indicateurs pour déterminer la présence d’une certaine responsabilité envers un investissement commun d’une part, et d’une certaine sensibilité envers la nécessité de préserver « face » de chacun, d’autre part. Mon second objectif était d’appliquer de manière empirique ce cadre théorique aux interactions sociales des grands singes (chimpanzés et bonobos), plus précisément aux interactions de toilettage et de jeu social. Les résultats de ma thèse indiquent que les bonobos et les chimpanzés présentent plusieurs des comportements révélateurs d’une responsabilité envers un investissement commun, mais aussi d’une certaine forme de gestion de la « face». Ces résultats suggèrent ainsi que ces deux espèces de grands singes sont capables d’atteindre un état d’intentionnalité partagée au travers du processus de coordination d’actions jointes. Par exemple, elles présentent des phases d’entrée et de sortie identifiables (i.e., les partenaires produisent des efforts de communication pour débuter, ou conclure, une interaction) lorsqu’ils se toilettent ou jouent, et s’efforcent de réinstaurer l’activité à la suite d’une interruption. De plus, mes résultats montrent que le type de communication employé par les bonobos et les chimpanzés pour coordonner les différentes phases d’une action jointe varie en fonction des liens sociaux qu’ils entretiennent avec leur partenaire, c’est-à-dire leur liens d’affinité et leur différence hiérarchique. Ceci fait écho aux modèles théoriques de gestion de la « face» chez les humains. Pris ensemble, les résultats de ma thèse posent la question du rôle de la compréhension d’un investissement commun et de la gestion de la face dans l’évolution des primates. J’espère que mes conclusions renforceront l’idée que les caractères uniques à l’Homme ont probablement été façonnés à partir de racines ancestrales dans l’échelle phylogénétique des primates, et qu’elles relanceront le débat sur l’exclusivité humaine dans la capacité à créer un sentiment d’intentionnalité partagée. Abstract Social animals cooperate in manifold ways towards a common outcome, for example by performing complementary and reciprocal roles, acting pro-socially, and adjusting their own actions in concert with those of their partners. Despite this, researchers have claimed that the cooperative interactions of non-human animal species –notably apes- remain egoistic in nature, insofar that the participants lack the cognitive capacity to share intentions for the establishment of a joint commitment toward a shared goal. Animals supposedly fail to engage in joint action via shared intentionality. This theory incurs several problems, however. It assumes a suite of high-level cognitive capacities, which may not be necessary for joint action coordination. Moreover, the evidence on which it is predominantly built relies on comparative laboratory experiments between captive apes and human children, which lack ecological relevance and comparability of cross-species designs, and mostly involve mostly chimpanzees, known to be the most competitive of all apes. Recent evidence furthermore provides new insights into joint action coordination in apes, warranting the need for revisiting the theory. In that regard, my thesis comprised two major goals– the first is of theoretical and the second of empirical nature. My first goal was to address the aforementioned shortcomings by reconceptualizing the theory of shared intentionality theoretically. I did so by implementing an alternative framework, inspired by human joint action research, allowing for the study of how two participants co-create, co-maintain, and co-dissolve a state of joint commitment in so-called joint action phases of entry, main body and exit. In addition, when humans engage in joint action, the participants are constantly concerned with face management – i.e., using politeness to mitigate face threatening acts, with face being defined as a form of publicly manifest self-esteem. The behaviors and communicative signals used by participants in the joint action phases serve as yardsticks for their sensitivity to joint commitment and face management. The proposed framework thus allows for studying those behavioral prerequisites minimally required to achieve a higher-level state of shared intentionality through the process of joint action coordination. My second goal was to empirically apply the framework to the study of great apes’ (here chimpanzees and bonobos) natural interactions, more specifically social and social grooming and play. My findings revealed that both chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit recognizable entry and exit phases in grooming and play interactions, and display recognizable reengagement attempts after interruptions of social activities. Additionally, the communication used by bonobos during joint action phases depended on partner-specific social attributes such as social bond and rank differences. These findings suggest that apes indeed exhibit several of the behavioral evidence for joint commitment understanding and face management, thus indicating that apes are capable of collaboratively constructing a state of shared intentionality through the process of joint action coordination. My findings raise questions about the role of joint commitment and face management in primate evolution, and stress the idea that human uniqueness has been shaped by ancestral primate roots. I hope my thesis will revive the debate on whether shared intentionality constitutes a uniquely human trait
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