837 research outputs found
Scaling up qualitative data: with Professor Ken Benoit
No full textProfessor Benoit is the Principal Investigator in an ERC funded project QUANTESS developing innovative methods for the quantitative analysis of textual data in the social sciences. He is the co-author with Paul Nulty of the R software package for text analysis “quanteda”, and working on a book Quantitative Text Analysis Using R covering methods for managing, processing, and analysing textual data using the R programming language. He has taught quantitative text analysis extensively and has published research in this area targeting both methodology and political science applications
Inquiry, Questions, and Actions
No full textThis article aims to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of inquiry. I start with some common desiderata for any theory of inquiry. I then categorize inquiry as a structured process. By focusing on its essential components, I advance a new characterization of inquiry as a combination of questioning attitudes guiding actions. Finally, I turn to the recent objection that questioning attitudes are not necessary for inquiry. I argue that inquiry is a structured process essentially constituted by questioning attitudes having two precise functional roles, initiating and guiding the deployment of cognitive capacities towards an epistemic goal
Doubt and suspension: Two attitudes or one?
Full text linkAre doubt and suspension of judgment similar attitudes? In the burgeoning literature on suspension of judgment, the notion of doubt is curiously absent. This paper aims to argue for the plausibility of an identity claim, which I term the “No-Difference View.” This view suggests that there is no substantial difference between being in doubt and suspending judgment. The argument will draw on historical and systematic considerations that support the No-Difference View as a plausible view within the logical space of positions
Inquiry, Questions, and Actions
Full text linkThis article aims to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of inquiry. I start with some common desiderata for any theory of inquiry. I then categorize inquiry as a structured process. By focusing on its essential components, I advance a new characterization of inquiry as a combination of questioning attitudes guiding actions. Finally, I turn to the recent objection that questioning attitudes are not necessary for inquiry. I argue that inquiry is a structured process essentially constituted by questioning attitudes having two precise functional roles, initiating and guiding the deployment of cognitive capacities towards an epistemic goal
Suspended Judgement Rebooted
Full text linkSuspension of judgment is often viewed as a member of the doxastic club, alongside belief and disbelief. In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that suspension is a commitment-involving stance on a par with belief and disbelief. Friedman's counterexamples to the traditional view that suspended judgement merely requires considering a proposition and being in a state of non-belief are criticized. I introduce a refined conception, emphasizing that suspension involves a proximal causal link between examining a proposition and the resulting non-belief state. This episode manifests as an incapacity at making a judgement, occurring under specific circumstances. The refined view clarifies the nature of suspended judgement
The nature of Sextan suspension: metacognition or affection of the mind?
No full textWhat kind of mental state is suspension, according to Sextus Empiricus? Recently, this question has been addressed by attributing to Sextus a metacognitive account of suspension (Dunphy 2023). Roughly, this means that, for Sextus, suspension constitutively involves a particular attitude – namely, a higher-order belief about one’s own epistemic standing. This reading clashes with the standard view, on which Sextan suspension is not a distinctive doxastic attitude. In this paper I challenge that revisionary interpretation and use it as a springboard to argue that Sextan suspension should instead be understood as a kind of affective state
Enquête, questions et actions
Full text linkCet article vise à élucider la nature de l'enquête. Je présente tout d'abord les desiderata communs à toute théorie de l'enquête. Je catégorise ensuite l'enquête comme un processus structuré en me concentrant sur ses composantes essentielles : des attitudes de questionnement guidant des actions. Enfin, je me penche sur l'objection récente selon laquelle les attitudes de questionnement ne sont pas nécessaires à l'enquête. Je défends la thèse selon laquelle l'enquête est un processus structuré essentiellement constitué d'attitudes de questionnement ayant deux rôles fonctionnels précis, soit d'initier et de guider le déploiement de capacités cognitives en vue d'un but épistémique
The nature of Sextan suspension: metacognition or affection of the mind?
Full text linkWhat kind of mental state is suspension, according to Sextus Empiricus? Recently, this question has been addressed by attributing to Sextus a metacognitive account of suspension (Dunphy 2023). Roughly, this means that, for Sextus, suspension constitutively involves a particular attitude – namely, a higher-order belief about one’s own epistemic standing. This reading clashes with the standard view, on which Sextan suspension is not a distinctive doxastic attitude. In this paper I challenge that revisionary interpretation and use it as a springboard to argue that Sextan suspension should instead be understood as a kind of affective state
Thesium philosophicarum fasciculus
No full textquem ... praeside ... Io. Friderico Benoit ... publicè tutabitur Ioh. Rodolphus Kochius, HBernas, phil. stud. author & respondens, ad diem 5. Martii ...Diss. Hohe Schule Bern, 171
Doubt and suspension: two attitudes or one?
Full text linkAre doubt and suspension of judgment similar attitudes? In the burgeoning literature on suspension of judgment, the notion of doubt is curiously absent. This paper aims to argue for the plau- sibility of an identity claim, which I term the “No-Difference View.” This view suggests that there is no substantial difference between being in doubt and suspending judgment. The argument will draw on his- torical and systematic considerations that support the No-Difference View as a plausible view within the logical space of positions
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