1,721,004 research outputs found
Does Independence Affect Regulatory Performance? The case of national competition authorities in the European Union
Full text linkDespite having always been assumed to be true, a relationship between the independence of regulatory agencies and their performance has never been formally tested. This paper aims at verifying whether formal regulatory independence affects the performance of national competition authorities in the EU member states. The author presents and discusses a statistical analysis which shows that greater formal independence leads competition authorities to investigate more cases and to issue more decisions
Competition policy enforcement in EU member states : what is independence for?
No full textThis book investigates the crucial EU policy of competition, which is enforced by the Commission and by national agencies that enjoy various degrees of autonomy from their governments. More and more policy-making activities are nowadays delegated to agencies that cannot be held accountable to parliaments, and ultimately to voters. The author explains why this is the case in the field of EU competition policy and discusses whether independence is linked to improved enforcement – as theories of delegation and common wisdom would suggest. These questions are explored with an in-depth analysis covering 27 EU countries for 17 years (1993–2009). While the results show that independence is given when countries lack credibility and good reputation, they also point out that autonomy from governments can hardly be associated with improved regulatory output. So, is independence of competition authorities useful to society in the end? This book will appeal to upper-level students and scholars interested in competition policy, regulatory agencies, and European public policy.1 Introduction -- 2 EU Competition Policy in Context -- 3 Independence: Reasons, Costs and Benefits -- 4 Explaining National Competition Authorities’ Independence -- 5 What Is Independence For? Measuring the Impact of Independence on Competition Policy Enforcement -- 6 ConclusionsPublished version of EUI PhD thesis, 201
Delegation and varieties of capitalism : explaining the independence of national competition agencies in the European Union
Full text linkPublished online: 15 April 2013This article aims to explain why, despite the fact that all national competition authorities (NCAs) in EU member states enforce the same law, relevant differences exist in the degree of independence that these agencies enjoy. The author advances an original theoretical framework according to which the decision on the independence of NCAs depends on the structure of the economic system of a country. In particular, it is hypothesized that the means by which firms operate in the national market affects the tendency of national legislators to delegate more or less independence to the NCA. The statistical analysis carried out shows that both countries with low and high levels of employer density tend to have less independent competition authorities than those of other countries. On the one hand, the findings support the argument, advanced by varieties-ofcapitalism scholars, that liberal market economies and coordinated market economies achieve greater efficiency than mixed market economies. On the other, the expectation that all institutional choices should be coherent with the firms’ coordination method is not confirmed
The Democratic Party of Matteo Renzi
Full text linkThe rise of Matteo Renzi is one of the most significant political events of the year. This chapter analyzes Renzi's leadership of the Partito Democratico (PD), looking at both the internal politics of the party and the party's position within the Italian party system. Within the PD itself, Renzi has brought take-it-or-leave-it proposals to the party executive, which has upset a vocal minority. More broadly, Renzi has moved the party to the center on the left-right scale, while adopting a more expansionary fiscal stance, effectively marginalizing other parties. The chapter concludes that the most serious opposition to Renzi today may come from within his own party
The impact of independence on regulatory outcomes : the case of EU competition policy
Full text linkArticle first published online: 15 JUL 2015Independent regulatory agencies are created in order to enhance the stability and credibility of economic regulation, and to improve policy implementation. So far, most research in political science has focused on explaining the reasons for independence, while less attention has been paid to analysing the consequences of independence. Aiming to start filling this gap, this article seeks to test if (and to what extent) independence makes a difference in competition policy enforcement. Original data on formal independence of national competition agencies in EU Member States from 1993 to 2009 are employed to test if different degrees of independence (and changes in independence over time) affect foreign direct investment and consumer prices. The results indicate that the formal independence of a competition agency does not have any significant impact on either indicator, thus questioning the assumption that independence yields better regulatory performance
The Eurozone crisis, decentralized bargaining and the theory of EU institutions
Full text linkAccording to neoliberal institutionalism, sovereign states create centralized international organizations to limit information asymmetries, monitor compliance, and ensure the credibility of commitments to agreed-upon policies – in short, to minimize transaction costs in a world where the Coase theorem does not apply. Neoliberal institutionalism can thus help explain the delegation of powers to supranational bodies like the European Commission (‘Commission’) or the European Central Bank (‘ECB’). Yet, what we observe in the Eurozone in 2010-2013 is the emergence of a number of influential institutions of decentralized bargaining, such as the “Merkozy duumvirate” and the “Frankfurt Group”, whose creation reversed the logic of supranational delegation. To understand the causes and the consequences of these apparently anomalous institutions we develop a model of incomplete contracts. We demonstrate that, inasmuch as they receive monopolistic powers, centralized international organizations create potential problems of discrimination. Decentralized institutions are explained by their role in mitigating these problems
Social democratic parties and antitrust policy : evidence from Western Europe (2002–13)
Full text linkPublished online 25 may 2015This paper investigates the position of social democratic parties (SDPs) towards antitrust (competition) policy. Given their traditional state-interventionist attitude and their ties with organized labour, SDPs have long been considered as not supportive of antitrust policy. However, antitrust policy’s goal of granting consumers lower prices is beneficial to salary earners. Hence, it is not surprising that SDPs’ support for antitrust policy varies considerably. To account for such variation, this paper hypothesizes that SDPs’ support for antitrust policy depends on: (a) the influence of trade unions; (b) the electoral system; and (c) the degree of coordination of the economy. Analysing in depth 16 party manifestos of West European SDPs from 2002 to 2013, we check the plausibility of our hypotheses with seven paired comparisons. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that the influence of trade unions affects SDPs’ support for antitrust policy, while the impact of electoral system and economic coordination appears less evident
The PD and social-democratic parties in Europe
No full textThis article analyses the main challenges currently facing the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD), drawing a comparison with other social-democratic parties in Europe. After illustrating how the party campaigned before the election and the decisions it took after the electoral defeat, we highlight the main causes of the party’s decline. First, the party was identified by voters as the main actor responsible for unpopular economic policies; we note that the PD, more than any other party in Italy, maintained the objective of securing Italy’s participation in the euro (with all its implications). Second, the PD’s strategy on migration was unpopular, and it increased the electoral support for challenger parties. Third, like other social-democratic parties, the PD suffers from the ‘meritocratic cleavage’ that is emerging, by which parties of the Left are supported by educated middle-class voters, but increasingly fail to attract voters from the working class
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