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Bailouts in a common market: a strategic approach
Get PDFGovernments in the EU grant Rescue and Restructure Subsidies to bail out ailing firms. In an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly we study effects of such subsidies on market structure and welfare. We adopt a common market setting, where consumers from the two countries form one market. We show that the subsidy is positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a strategic effect, which forces the more efficient firm to make additional cost-reducing effort. When the exit is prevented, allocative and productive efficiencies are lower and the only gaining player is the rescued firm.subsidies; asymmetric oligopoly; exit; European Union
Effectiveness of bailouts in the EU
Get PDFGovernments in the EU frequently bail out firms in distress by granting state aid. I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine two issues: the effectiveness of bailouts in preventing bankruptcy and the determinants of bailout policy. The results are threefold. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate increases during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. The number of failing bailouts could be reduced if European control was tougher. Second, governments’ bailout decisions favored state-owned firms, even though state-owned firms did not outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an endogenous variable in the analysis of the hazard rate. Treating it as exogenous underestimates its impact on the bankruptcy probability. Several policy implications of the results are discussed in the paper
Effectiveness of bailouts in the EU
Get PDFGovernments in the EU frequently bail out firms in distress by granting state aid. I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine two issues: the effectiveness of bailouts in preventing bankruptcy and the determinants of bailout policy. The results are threefold. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate increases during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. The number of failing bailouts could be reduced if European control was tougher. Second, governments’ bailout decisions favored state-owned firms, even though state-owned firms did not outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an endogenous variable in the analysis of the hazard rate. Treating it as exogenous underestimates its impact on the bankruptcy probability. Several policy implications of the results are discussed in the paper.State aid; European Union; Discrete-time hazard; Bivariate probit
Bailouts in a common market: a strategic approach
Get PDF"Die Regierungen der EU gewähren staatliche Beihilfe zur Rettung und
Umstrukturierung von Unternehmen in Schwierigkeiten. In einem
internationalen asymmetrischen Cournot-Duopol werden die Wohlfahrtseffekte
und die Konsequenzen solcher Beihilfe für die Marktstruktur analysiert.
Grundannahme ist ein gemeinsamer Markt, auf dem Verbraucher aus zwei
Ländern zusammenkommen. Es wird gezeigt, dass die optimale Beihilfe positiv ist, auch wenn der
Marktaustritt einer Firma nicht verhindert werden kann. Der Grund hierfür ist
ein strategischer Effekt, der die effizientere Firma zu einer zusätzlichen
kostenreduzierenden Maßnahme veranlasst. Wird der Marktaustritt verhindert,
sind Allokations- und Produktionseffizienzen geringer, und der einzige
aufholende Teilnehmer ist die gerettete Firma." (Autorenreferat)"Governments in the EU grant Rescue and Restructure Subsidies to bail out
ailing firms. In an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly we study effects of
such subsidies on market structure and welfare. We adopt a common market
setting, where consumers from the two countries form one market. We show
that the subsidy is positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a
strategic effect, which forces the more efficient firm to make additional costreducing
effort. When the exit is prevented, allocative and productive
efficiencies are lower and the only gaining player is the rescued firm." (author's abstract
A note on reserve price commitments in the Vickrey auction
Get PDFThis note provides a simple explanation why sellers rarely set optimal reserve prices in one-shot auctions. In a standard sealed-bid second-price auction, bidders with private values do not bid truthfully if the seller cannot commit to her announced reserve price. Consequently, expected revenue may be lower than without the announcement of a reserve price
A note on reserve price commitments in the Vickrey auction
Get PDFThis note provides a simple explanation why sellers rarely set optimal reserve prices in one-shot auctions. In a standard sealed-bid second-price auction, bidders with private values do not bid truthfully if the seller cannot commit to her announced reserve price. Consequently, expected revenue may be lower than without the announcement of a reserve price.Vickrey auction; reserve price; commitment
Bailouts in a common market: a strategic approach
Get PDFGovernments in the EU grant Rescue and Restructure Subsidies to bail out ailing firms. In an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly we study effects of such subsidies on market structure and welfare. We adopt a common market setting, where consumers from the two countries form one market. We show that the subsidy is positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a strategic effect, which forces the more efficient firm to make additional cost-reducing effort. When the exit is prevented, allocative and productive efficiencies are lower and the only gaining player is the rescued firm
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
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