1,720,992 research outputs found
The Expanding Boundaries of MiFID’s Duty to Act in the Client’s Best Interest: The Italian Case
No full textMiFID requires investment firms to act in accordance with the best interests of their clients. This overarching principle shapes firms’ professional conduct in at least two ways. First, it sets a general standard firms have to comply with when dealing with their clients and its breach may lead to civil remedies for clients or administrative sanctions for investment firms. Second, the duty is the backbone of the detailed conduct of business rules within the body of MiFID II and its implementing measures, playing a role in their interpretation. In this paper, we analyse the duty to act in the clients’ best interest within the MiFID II framework, and illustrate its practical relevance by looking at its role in Italian financial markets law. More specifically, after recalling how the duty came to be an essential part of the ISD/MiFID framework, we map how the duty is spelt out, at various junctures, in the Directive and highlight its functions. Next, we look into how the duty operates with reference to the individual investment services and activities covered by MiFID II, claiming that the duty is quite difficult to reconcile with services characterized by at-arms’-length relationships between the investment firm and the client. Then, we focus on the use of the duty in the law in action of one member state, Italy, where retail investors have suffered from egregious cases of misselling of bonds issued by the banks acting as their investment services providers. We conclude that the MiFID II regime falls short of clarifying with sufficient precision the implications of the best interest duty and, at least in the civil law jurisdiction we focus on (Italy), significantly expands the scope for judicial review of purely arms-length firms-clients relationships
Regolamentazione dei mercati finanziari, rating e regolamentazione del rating
No full textA livello globale, europeo e di singoli paesi, numerose regole dei mercati finanziari si affidano ai giudizi delle agenzie di rating per disciplinare le banche e gli altri intermediari finanziari, anche su aspetti fondamentali quali i requisiti patrimoniali. In questo modo, si è creata una domanda artificiale del servizio di rating, si sono amplificati gli effetti delle imperfezioni che lo caratterizzano, si sono poste le premesse, con la (in parte conseguente) regolamentazione delle agenzie di rating, per l'innalzamento di barriere all'entrata su questo mercato e si è accresciuto lo scarto tra l'utilità effettiva dei rating e l'utilità percepita dagli investitori.
Questo lavoro si concentra su alcuni aspetti legati al problema della «domanda di rating» indotta dai regolatori. In primo luogo, sono passati in rassegna, senza pretesa di esaustività, alcuni tra i più significativi esempi di «abdicazione regolamentare» in favore delle agenzie di rating. In secondo luogo, sono descritti alcuni problemi, emersi durante la recente crisi finanziaria, che caratterizzano il mercato dei servizi prestati dalle agenzie, con particolare riguardo alla finanza strutturata. In terzo luogo, sono brevemente descritte le principali reazioni di legislatori e regolatori alle carenze delle società di rating che la crisi ha evidenziato. Dopo aver sottolineato come queste reazioni, per quanto opportune, non paiono di per sé idonee a risolvere le vere questioni alla base di tali carenze, si svolgono alcune considerazioni conclusive sulla possibilità di ripensare più in profondità il rapporto tra rating e regolamentazione finanziaria
The overarching duty to act in the best interest of the client in MiFID II
No full textThe chapter examines MiFID II’s core obligation for investment firms to act in the best interest of clients, analyzing its scope, legal basis, and impact on investor protection within EU financial regulation
La s.p.a. nel quadro europeo
No full textLa riforma delle società di capitali ha segnato una profonda svolta nell'assetto normativo delle s.p.a.: a dieci anni di distanza dalla sua entrata in vigore, alla luce dell'amplissimo dibattito dottrinale che l'ha preceduta e seguita e dei numerosi interventi giurisprudenziali, è possibile ripercorrerne la genesi e ricostruirne la portata. Il sistema societario è stato oggetto, in epoca successiva, di continui interventi da parte del legislatore, ispirati alle più varie esigenze, che hanno ancora modificato in modo significativo importanti tasselli della disciplina. Collocata la s.p.a. nel quadro dei fenomeni associativi, appare indispensabile, al fine della comprensione del nostro ordinamento, tener conto del diritto europeo e delle esperienze straniere a noi più vicine. Il volume, oltre ad offrire un panorama storico e comparatistico, ricostruisce i profili della costituzione delle s.p.a., analizzando il procedimento, il controllo notarile, il capitale, i conferimenti, i patti parasociali, nonché quelli concernenti la personalità giuridica e l'unico azionista
La Consob: natura, organizzazione e funzioni
No full textA oltre vent'anni dalla entrata in vigore del T.u.f. e dopo innumerevoli modifiche, per lo più di origine comunitaria, che ne hanno sfumato l'originaria organicità, è necessaria una complessiva ricognizione delle norme e delle questioni interpretative e applicative, alla ricerca delle soluzioni più idonee ad assicurare efficienza, garanzie e coerenza nel mutato e sempre più frammentato quadro regolamentare. Piuttosto che seguire la strada del semplice commentario, peraltro sconsigliata dall'alto tasso di volatilità delle disposizioni, si è preferito percorrere quella, più impegnativa ma anche più solida, di una trattazione che, pur tendenzialmente ordinata secondo la scansione dell'articolato, affrontasse la materia per argomenti e questioni con un metodo volto a combinare l'approccio operativo con l'inquadramento sistematico delle varie e complesse tematiche
Form and function in doing business rankings: is investor protection in Italy still so bad?
No full textThe World Bank’s Doing Business Report (DBR) ranks every year numerous jurisdictions across the globe according to their ability to facilitate business activities. Among the indexes contributing to the definition of the global competitiveness of the legislations, the “Protecting investors index” (PII) measures the protection of minority shareholders in listed companies. In this paper, we analyse the DBR’s assessment of the Italian regulatory framework on investor protection. We find that the PII falls short of properly evaluating the applicable rules. First, it underrates Italy because the DBR evaluation falls short of properly evaluating the role performed by independent directors under Italian rules on related party transactions. In particular, the DBR fails to properly account for independent directors’ power to veto unfair transactions before they are submitted to the board, a safeguard that ensures minority investors’ protection at least as well as mandatory abstention by conflicted directors. Second, past DBR overrated the PII, so that subsequent reforms that substantially improved investor protection have not been grasped by more recent assessments, giving the misleading impression that no relevant changes have occurred. Far from representing one of the multiple coding errors reported in the literature, these flaws aptly show that the DBR methodology, while correctly attempting to preserve consistency in the evaluation of different jurisdictions, adopts an excessively formalistic approach and disregards the function of the rules it scrutinizes. In light of the influence that the DBR exerts on national policymakers, this approach is detrimental because it might induce window-dressing reforms. Moreover, it may rule out experimentation, which is key to ensuring that the applicable rules keep pace with the variety of techniques adopted to expropriate minority shareholders
Form and Function in Doing Business Rankings: is Investor Protection in Italy Still so Bad?
No full textThe World Bank’s Doing Business Report (DBR) ranks every year numerous jurisdictions across the globe according to their ability to facilitate business activities. Among the indexes contributing to the definition of the global competitiveness of the legislations, the “Protecting investors index” (PII) measures the protection of minority shareholders in listed companies. In this paper, we analyse the DBR’s assessment of the Italian regulatory framework on investor protection. We find that the PII falls short of properly evaluating the applicable rules. First, it underrates Italy because the DBR evaluation falls short of properly evaluating the role performed by independent directors under Italian rules on related party transactions. In particular, the DBR fails to properly account for independent directors’ power to veto unfair transactions before they are submitted to the board, a safeguard that ensures minority investors’ protection at least as well as mandatory abstention by conflicted directors. Second, past DBR overrated the PII, so that subsequent reforms that substantially improved investor protection have not been grasped by more recent assessments, giving the misleading impression that no relevant changes have occurred. Far from representing one of the multiple coding errors reported in the literature, these flaws aptly show that the DBR methodology, while correctly attempting to preserve consistency in the evaluation of different jurisdictions, adopts an excessively formalistic approach and disregards the function of the rules it scrutinizes. In light of the influence that the DBR exerts on national policymakers, this approach is detrimental because it might induce window-dressing reforms. Moreover, it may rule out experimentation, which is key to ensuring that the applicable rules keep pace with the variety of techniques adopted to expropriate minority shareholders
Mandatory and Contract-Based Shareholding Disclosure
No full textThis paper advocates a takeover-neutral legal framework for shareholding disclosure. After showing how the laws on securities custody may affect shareholding disclosure, it summarises the state of the art of shareholder identification and ownership disclosure in some major jurisdictions. Next, it considers the features that should qualify an effective regulatory system of shareholding disclosure and sketches how the applicable rules could be designed with a view to ensure that regulation is takeover-neutral: in particular, the extent to which issuers should be left free to devise their own tailored regime is investigated. Then, the issue of how (supra-national) harmonisation can play a role in this area is discussed. The paper argues for a harmonised policy solution which, while guaranteeing a sufficient degree of standardisation (and, consequently, limited adaptation and compliance costs), also allows for a flexible implementation through a system of centralised default rules and opting in/out choices both at the Member States’ and at the issuers’ level
Models of Solidarity in the EMU. The Impact of COVID-19 After Weiss
Full text linkRight in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic, the German federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht – FCC) issued a ruling that sent massive shockwaves through the continent. Not only did the Court question the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond buying program PSPP (Public Sector Purchase Program), but it also rejected the earlier decision by the CJEU in which this latter had found that program to respect EU law. The ruling is as such not directly concerned with Covid-19 measures, but it may have nonetheless important consequences thereon. In this contribution we will explore what those consequences may be. Apart from the direct effects on the ECB’s pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP), we zoom in on the ruling’s indirect consequences on the broader question of how to arrange solidarity in EMU. With regard to the latter, we contend that Weiss and the Covid-19 crises combined will test the basic models of solidarity the EMU relies upon: the models of individual fiscal responsibility, ECB based solidarity and the model of fiscal union. These models are assessed from economic, constitutional and democratic perspectives
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