1,721,049 research outputs found

    From identity-conflict to civil society: restoring human dignity and pluralism in deeply divided societies

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    In societies like Bosnia or Rwanda, deep divisions along ethnic and religious lines and the legacy of years of atrocities and violence pose serious challenges to liberal forms of consensus. People do not recognise themselves as members of a political community, and identity politics is pursued at the expense of liberal democratic projects and reconciliation programmes. This book explores the nature and role of civil society in deeply divided societies. Civil society is presented here as the sphere where a shared ‘culture of civility’ emerges. The ‘Culture of civility’ enables individuals to become part of a community of citizens and accept to reciprocate on the basis of some basic universal values, such as the protection of human dignity. The last chapter on Bosnia shows that relevance of civil society crucially depends on its capacity to represent the sphere where individuals are able to recognize and deal with transitional issues by appealing to the Bosnian “culture of civility” and developing a sense of justice based on a shared understanding of the idea of human dignity

    Democratic justice: the priority of politics and the ideal of citizenship

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    In his Democratic justice and the social contract, Weale presents a distinctive contingent practice-dependent model of ‘democratic justice’ that relies heavily on a condition of just social and political relations among equals. Several issues arise from this account. Under which conditions might such just social and political relations be realised? What ideal of equality is required for ‘democratic justice’? What are its implications for the political ideal of citizenship? This paper focuses on these questions as a way to critically reconsider Weale’s model. After presenting Weale’s procedural constructivism, I distinguish his model from an institutional practice-dependent model, one salient example of which is Rawls’s political constructivism. This distinction allows for a formulation of the social and political equality required for justice in each case. The contingent model assumes that an equality of ‘status’ will generate just social practices, yet it fails to recognise that an equality of ‘role’ is also important to ensure citizens’ compliance. The paper ultimately seeks to show that the contingent model is insufficient to ensure that just social practices will become stable

    From identity-conflict to civil society: civil society role in building peace, through the protection of human dignity and pluralism.

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    From identity conflict to civil society. Understanding ethno-religious conflicts. From conflict to civil society: a normative perspective. Bosnia case study.From identity conflict to civil society. Understanding ethno-religious conflicts. From conflict to civil society: a normative perspective. Bosnia case study.LUISS PhD Thesi

    'Epistemic Injustice' and the 'Right Not to Be Poor': Bringing Recognition into the Debate on Global Justice

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    Poverty and inequality are not the sole sources of (global) injustices. And the latter are not only a matter of fair distribution. Identity and cultural asymmetries, often articulated along political and economic lines, relocate and reshape the struggle against subordination to include new areas of contestation, such as gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, culture, religion and nationality

    From a Culture of Civility to Deliberative Reconciliation in Deeply Divided Societies

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    In deeply divided societies (DDS) – those having experienced episodes of ethnic or religious mass violence – thousands of survivors must confront the challenge of reconstructing their public identity, split between their tragic human experience as victims and their political obligations as citizens. They are required to cooperate precisely with those who are, in their eyes, responsible for the crimes perpetrated against them. Is liberal democratic theory able to respond to such deep divisions? Is democracy, even, compatible with the reconciliation that in these societies is a priority? Building on the idea that certain cultural conditions are important for securing the stability of liberal democracy, this paper presents an account of deliberative reconciliation appropriate to the context of DDS and which provides guidance in such circumstances of unmitigated pluralism. Deliberative reconciliation works with those elements of background culture that disclose some forms of civility within society. This is the culture of civility: a deliberative consensus, which enables former enemies to become part of a community of equals and to reciprocate on the basis of some shared political values, thus displaying support for liberal democratic institutions

    Rawls’s Inclusivism and the Case of “Religious Militants for Peace”: A Reply to Weithman’s Restrictive Inclusivism

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    Across almost a decade, Desmond Tutu, Anglican cleric and chairman of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supported a model of civil resistance against the apartheid regime based solely on religious argument. Tutu is one of what Appleby (2000) calls the “religious militants for peace”: people of faith who use religious arguments to buttress resistance against unjust regimes and to support vital political change with regard to rights and justice. Yet the employment of religious arguments to justify political action seems to contradict the liberal democratic requirements of public reason, particularly the duty of liberal citizens to provide reasons that others could reasonably endorse. If “religious militants” violate their duty of civility by appealing to their comprehensive doctrines, should liberal democracy exclude this form of religiously founded dissent as being unreasonable? Or, rather, should liberal democracy embrace and support the efforts of “religious militants” to enhance and/or restore political justice

    Modus vivendi liberalism, practice-dependence and political legitimacy

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    Contemporary political theory is characterised by a realistic critique of liberalism. Realist theorising is seen as avoiding foundational disagreements about justice mutating into second-order disputes concerning the justifiability of legitimate political institutions. In this sense, the realist critique challenges a key aspect of Rawls’ liberal project – that is, its justificatory constituency. McCabe’s Modus Vivendi Liberalism presents an interesting case of such a critique. Given the condition of deep pluralism that characterizes contemporary democracies, the liberal Justificatory Requirement (JR) should be recast so to include those, illiberal or sceptical, who are excluded by Rawls’ justificatory constituency. This paper confronts McCabe’s modus vivendi justificatory project with Rawls view. It suggests that both views seem to endorse a practice-dependent account of political justice in which “politics is prior to morality”; yet the ways in which reasons are endorsed to justify the shared conception of political authority are significantly different in these two schemes. The paper shows that the most problematic aspect of McCabe contingent model is that it disconnects the idea of legitimacy from a conception of liberal political morality. On this account, political legitimacy that reflects the uncoercive character of extant institutions seems to be sufficient to meet the MVL JR. Yet, from a normative point of view, this might be not enough to ensure morally acceptable outcomes. In conclusion, the paper considers McCabe’s model as a version of ‘practice-independent’ moral theorizing committed to a transcendent view of ‘threshold morality’. This move, however, comes at the cost of sacrificing the theory’s premises of anti-perfectionism and realism

    Intellectuals’ Engagement in Italy: Sebastiano Maffettone and the Public Intellectual

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    The public intellectual is the subject of a lively scholarly debate. It is often said that intellectuals have increasingly lost interest in speaking to a broad public and engaging with important real-world issues – something that it is said has been primarily inspired by Rawls’s normative political theory. This paper suggests that Rawls’s theory had a unique impact on Italian philosophy. Here, the ‘public intellectual’ refers to an approach, which was developed in Italy, especially by Sebastiano Maffettone, as a theoretical alternative to a more traditional ‘engaged’ model

    De Politiek van ‘Interreligieuze dialoog’ Religieuze rechtvaardigingen en ‘rechtvaardige’ verzoening

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    Religions and religious actors are increasingly associated with extremism and violence. A mainstream view that sees religions as prone to violence has been affirmed within the West. Yet, to affirm that religions promote anti-democratic projects and are inclined to violence can only partially capture the impact of religious voices in contemporary societies. In fact, religions have often played an important role in promoting democratic transition and religiously inspired doctrines have importantly supported peace and reconciliation processes in divided societies. This paper argues that the mainstream view reproduces and extends a traditional liberal wariness toward the alleged incendiary role of religions in politics, the so-called doctrine of religious restraint. This view, I argue, is based on a misinterpretation of contemporary liberal theory and, especially, of Rawls’s Political Liberalism. The paper shows that Rawls’s framework instead provides an extensive accommodation of religions in political life. Starting from this premise, this paper responds to the mainstream view by focussing on the role of religious actors and sensitivities in reconciling divided societies

    Clean Trade, Anti-Paternalism and Resources’ Entitlement

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    In this paper, I examine whether Wenar's Bloody Oil ( 2016) succeeds in providing a theory able to accommodate the statist commitment to peoples’ sovereignty without dismissing the cosmopolitan concern regarding a just global market. Contextualising Blood Oil within the broader debate on global justice and resource ownership, I focus on some specific aspects of Wenar’s Clean Trade scheme and explain why it comes to quite radical conclusions. Yet, if these conclusions are taken seriously, Clean Trade seems too demanding from the point of view of a statist account of justice. For cosmopolitans, too, the lack of normative justification for any alleged national resource sovereignty might weaken this position, especially for those who might oppose arguments to justify different forms of resource ownership. I will therefore discuss two problems with Wenar’s theory. First, I will show that, in spite of its statist premises, Wenar’s radical conclusions hardly pass the test of anti-paternalism. Is the Clean Trade scheme able to accommodate the demand of pluralism emerging in the Society of Peoples? Second, I focus on an issue that is neglected in Wenar’s book and which refers directly to the normative basis of resources ownership. I argue that this is a crucial issue, especially in contexts where the traditional idea of national sovereignty is contested, which often occurs in resource-cursed societies
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