165 research outputs found
Does the Brain ‘Initiate’ Freely Willed Processes? A Philosophy of Science Critique of Libet-Type Experiments and Their Interpretation
No full textIn the extensive, recent debates on free will, the pioneering experiments by Benjamin Libet continue to play a significant role. It is often claimed that these experiments demonstrate the illusory nature of freely willed actions. In this article, we provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of Libet—s experiments from a philosophy of science perspective. Our analysis focuses on Libet—s central notion of the “initiation” of freely willed processes by the brain. We examine four interpretations of the notion of initiation: in terms of a cause, a necessary condition, a correlation, and a regular succession. We argue that none of these four interpretations can be supported by the design and results of Libet—s experiments. In addition, we analyze two recent Libet-type experiments. Our general conclusion is that neither Libet—s original experiments nor later Libet-type experiments can justify the claim that allegedly freely willed processes are in fact initiated by the brain. © 2012, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved
Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World
No full textSaigle, Dubljevic, and Racine (2018) claim that Libet-style experiments are insufficient to challenge that agents have free will. They support this with evidence from experimen- tal psychology that the folk concept of freedom is consis- tent with monism, that our minds are identical to our brains. However, recent literature suggests that evidence from experimental psychology is less than determinate in this regard, and that folk intuitions are too unrefined as to provide guidance on metaphysical issues like monism. In light of this, it is worthwhile to examine the authors’ insuf- ficiency claim under the assumption that monism is false and dualism true (our minds are not identical to our brains). We conclude that, were dualism true, then Libet- style experiments would tell us no more about freedom and moral responsibility than what the authors initially claimed, thus further bolstering their point that Libet-style experiments are ill-suited to speak to the free will of agents. In what follows we first discuss some of the reasons to be skeptical of using folk intuitions to make claims about the nature of freedom and moral responsibility. We then draw from the work of E. J. Lowe to demonstrate that Libet-style experiments would likely give the same results regardless of the truth of monism or dualism
Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World
No full textSaigle, Dubljevic, and Racine (2018) claim that Libet-style experiments are insufficient to challenge that agents have free will. They support this with evidence from experimen- tal psychology that the folk concept of freedom is consis- tent with monism, that our minds are identical to our brains. However, recent literature suggests that evidence from experimental psychology is less than determinate in this regard, and that folk intuitions are too unrefined as to provide guidance on metaphysical issues like monism. In light of this, it is worthwhile to examine the authors’ insuf- ficiency claim under the assumption that monism is false and dualism true (our minds are not identical to our brains). We conclude that, were dualism true, then Libet- style experiments would tell us no more about freedom and moral responsibility than what the authors initially claimed, thus further bolstering their point that Libet-style experiments are ill-suited to speak to the free will of agents. In what follows we first discuss some of the reasons to be skeptical of using folk intuitions to make claims about the nature of freedom and moral responsibility. We then draw from the work of E. J. Lowe to demonstrate that Libet-style experiments would likely give the same results regardless of the truth of monism or dualism
The analysis of quality system of vibropress working in Libet S.A. Factory
No full textW opracowaniu przedstawiono analizę systemu jakości wibroprasy pracującej w Zakładach Libet S.A. w Libiążu. Analizowana wibroprasa stanowi podstawowe ogniwo linii technologicznej służącej do produkcji elementów betonowych. Zaproponowane kryteria ocenowe umożliwiają ocenę jakości urządzenia, produkowanych wyrobów, jak również wprowadzanych zmian modernizacyjnych.In the paper is presented the analysis of quality system of vibropress working in Libet S.A. Factory in Libiąż. The vibropress is the main part of technological line for beton elements production. The method proposed here let uprising the quality of object and products
Una bibliografia completa sul lavoro di Benjamin Libet con annotazioni sul libero arbitrio e gli atti volontari / A comprehensive bibliography on Benjamin Libet’s work with annotated entries on free will and voluntary acts
No full textIl neurofisiologo e neuroscienziato Benjamin Libet (1916-2007), che progettò un setting empirico per rilevare i tempi del libero arbitrio in azioni volontarie, è stato autore di oltre 200 articoli scientifici e monografie. Questa è la prima bibliografia mai compilata di questi scritti. Comprende un elenco completo delle pubblicazioni di Libet, in cui sono annotate le voci relative al libero arbitrio e agli atti volontari. Mostra come la prima fase delle ricerche di Libet, dalla neurofisiologia alla “psicofisica delle intenzioni”, ha condizionato la sua successiva ricerca sul libero arbitrio. ---------- The neurophysician and neuroscientist Benjamin Libet (1916-2007), who planned an empirical setting to detect the timing of free will in voluntary action, was the author of more than 200 scientific articles and monographs. This is the first bibliography ever compiled of these writings. It comprises a comprehensive list of Libet’s publications, in which the entries relevant to free will and voluntary acts have been annotated. It shows how Libet’s earlier research ranging from neurophysiology to “psychophysics of intention”, conditioned his later research on free will.</jats:p
Validating the Diathesis–Stress Model Based Case Conceptualization Procedure in Cognitive Behavioral Therapies: The LIBET (Life Themes and Semi-Adaptive Plans—Implications of Biased Beliefs, Elicitation and Treatment) Procedure
No full textCognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) approaches use case formulation procedures based on the diathesis–stress conceptualization model, arranged in two dimensions: emotional vulnerability (present in a patient’s consciousness in terms of core beliefs) and coping strategies. Nevertheless, despite its pivotal role, there are a limited number of validation studies for this model. Life themes and semi-adaptive plans: Implications of biased beliefs, elicitation and treatment (LIBET) is a CBT case formulation method grounded on the CBT diathesis–stress model that aims to help validate the CBT case formulation model, and, in particular, its bidimensional arrangement. In LIBET, the two classic CBT dimensions are called “life themes,” which are mental states of focused attention to emotional sensitivities represented as core beliefs in consciousness, and “semi-adaptive plans,” which are the rigid management strategies of “life themes” implemented by adopting coping strategies such as anxious safety behaviors, compulsive controls and aggressive or rewarding strategies. The study uses quantitative textual analysis to validate the LIBET procedure in a clinical sample. The investigation discusses the extent to which the results can be considered a validation of the arrangement of the general CBT diathesis–stress model in the two dimensions of core beliefs and coping strategies
The Cognitive View in Cognitive Science
No full textI believe that there are only a select few topics, which arouse a similar level of interest and curiosity among academics and laymen alike, as does the study of mind and brain. Although mind and brain have been capturing the attention of philosophers for centuries, it is the "scientific investigation" of age old philosophical queries by socalled cognitive scientists, which is distinctive of the developments of the last few decades and which, in times to come, may well be considered the hallmark of the study of mind in the 20th and early 21st centuries. In the past, advances in the natural sciences underlay or boosted a plethora of developments in the technological, economic and political spheres that not only improved the standard of living and prolonged the average life span for a vast number of people, but also fuelled hopes that a new and improved understanding of the nature of man was also within reach. Despite all the benefits mankind derived from scientific and technological progress past and present, the success of the natural sciences also helped spread and foster a virulent and nowadays quasi-ubiquitous and unquestioned believe in the omnipotence of science and technology. In the context of the study of mind, in particular, it fostered the widespread (mis-)conception that in order for an investigation leading to insight and understanding a "scientific" approach is a sine qua non.
This thesis highlights the danger of such an approach. By investigating the framework of explanation adopted by cognitive scientists, the cognitive view, and by examining its inherent conceptions of mind and thought, it will be shown that the scientific, or rather scientistic, approach inherent in the views depicted above is highly questionable, and in the case of the study of mind and brain, does not further insight and understanding, but rather prevents it. In the 20th century, Ludwig Wittgenstein has been one of the few philosophers who recognized the fallaciousness of these ideas and who opposed the inherent scientism. His later philosophy, which provides the philosophical mise en scène for the following investigations, provides a much-needed antidote against the misconceptions common among cognitive scientists today. Although, many of the shortcomings of the ideas and views of cognitive scientists have, with a certain regularity, been discussed by philosophers working in the tradition of the later Wittgenstein (e.g. Kenny, Hanfling, Hacker, Hyman and Glock) their criticisms, more often than not, fell on deaf ears.
I believe that one of the main reasons underlying the imperviousness of the community of cognitive scientists to the criticism of the kind of analytic philosophy inspired by the later Wittgenstein, is that it mainly focused on select misconceptions inherent in the cognitive view, but regularly failed to point out their place in the overall framework of thought for cognitive scientists. As a result, it was easy to dismiss these criticisms with excuses of the sort "but that does not bear any direct relevance to the work I do ...".
For this reason, this thesis aimed to portray and examine the cognitive view in its entirety, i.e. to depict the intricate interconnections existing between the premises that provide the foundation of the cognitive view, and to point out their disastrous consequences for our understanding not only of a select view aspects of mental phenomena, but to our understanding of the mind (and consequently of human nature) in its entirety. In order to provide such a "big picture", and to describe the numerous often very subtle interconnections between the various ideas making up the cognitive view in all their breadth and depth, a lot of well-trodden ground had to be revisited and reviewed. Thus, Anthony Kenny's and Peter Hackers' discussions of the mereological fallacy (Chapter 3, Chapter 4 first half) will provide the "base camp" from which we will visit less familiar aspects of the cognitive view via novel routes on our way to the peak of this "philosophical mountain". Where required, my indebtedness to the works of these philosophers will be highlighted throughout the text
Gray Areas: Levels Within Philosophy
No full textThe First Chapter of an Anthology of short stories inspired by philosophical topics surrounding vagueness. In this chapter, the author explores the issue of conscious action through an emotion filled drama based on the famous experiment conducted by Benjamin Libet in 1983
Una explicación de la conciencia inexplicada
No full textIn this brief note the author appeals to the human experience, from the perspective of Phenomenology of consciousness. A necessary point, in his opinion, against
the scientistic and materialistic reductionism. Other considerations, in the field of scien-
tific research, in relation to the known Libet experiment, which extend the questioning of
its results and, above all, of some of its more radical interpretations are also discussed.En esta breve nota el autor apela a la experiencia humana, desde la perspectiva de la fenomenología de la conciencia. Un punto necesario, en su opinión, contra el reduccionismo materialista y cientificista. Se discuten también otras consideraciones, en el ámbito de la investigación científica, en lo relativo al conocido experimento de Libet, que amplían el cuestionamiento de sus resultados y, sobre todo, de algunas de sus interpretaciones más radicales
Building the border: The treatment of immigrants in France, 1884-1914
No full text"Between 1884 and 1914, several hundred thousand male foreigners, chiefly Italian, entered unskilled occupations in France's ""dual labor market."" In French Lorraine, Italians formed an industrial labor underclass in mining and construction. This work analyzes the French response to this proletarian immigration: the construction of a citizen-foreigner border. The border was a social structure which functioned both to exclude alien workers from political and social rights and to subordinate foreigners in the labor market and the occupational hierarchy. It was formalized and reinforced by several French ""immigrant policies."" The Ministry of the Interior established special police controls over alien workers (1893) and used deportation as a tool to discourage Italian activism and upward social mobility. The Ministry of Commerce established quotas on the employment of foreign workers in the public sector (1899).""The citizen-foreigner border has three major causes. First, French workers demanded primacy over aliens in the labor market and in the workplace. French workers clashed violently with Italians whenever the aliens transgressed social or spatial boundaries. French claims were supported by ""labor protectionist"" politicians with ties to Boulangist and other nationalist groups. Second, the French bourgeoisie demanded protection from the crime, disease and social unrest which they attributed to a foreign ""dangerous class."" Third, the French state provided security and primacy to citizens in order to expand its power and strengthen its legitimacy. France's ""immigrant policies"" were active and interventionist (if not always effective). They suggest that the Third Republic was not a ""liberal state"" which ignored immigration, but rather a ""security state"" which regulated the citizen-foreigner relationship. Its efforts prefigure more recent ""immigration policy."""The one exception to the exclusion of foreigners lies in the area of welfare. By treaty, Italian workers were included in French social insurance programs such as workmen's compensation (1898) and retirement pensions (1910). This suggests that humanitarian, international action may effectively challenge (or at least mitigate) the marginalization and subordination of foreigners.Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T12:39:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2
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