1,721,406 research outputs found
Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games
No full textGame theory has been a huge success in economics. Many important questions have been answered, and game theoretic methods are now central to much economic investigation. We suggest areas where further advances are important, and argue that models of learning are a promising route for improving and widening game theory's predictive power while preserving the successes of game theory where it already works well. We emphasize in particular the need for better understanding of the speed with which learning takes place
An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk
Full text linkWe derive a simplified version of the model of Fudenberg and Levine [2006, 2011] and show how this approximate model is useful in explaining choice under risk. We show that in the simple case of three outcomes, the model can generate indifference curves that “fan out” in the Marshack-Machina triangle, and thus can explain the well-known Allais and common ratio paradoxes that models such as prospect theory and regret theory are designed to capture. At the same time, our model is consistent with modern macroeconomic theory and evidence and generates predictions across a much wider set of domains than these models
On the robustness of anchoring effects in WTP and WTA experiments
Full text linkWe reexamine the effects of the anchoring manipulation of Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) on the evaluation of common market goods and find very weak anchoring effects. We perform the same manipulation on the evaluation of binary lotteries, and find no anchoring effects at all. This suggests limits on the robustness of anchoring effects
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
No full textMany models of learning in games implicitly or explicitly assume there are many agents in the role of each player. In principle this allows different agents in the same player role to have different beliefs and play differently, and this is known to occur in laboratory experiments. To explore the impact of this heterogeneity, along with the idea that subjects use their information about other players' payoffs, we define rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE). We provide several examples to highlight the impact of heterogeneous beliefs, and show how mixed strategies can correspond to heterogeneous play in a large population. We also show that every heterogeneous-belief RPCE can be approximated by a RPCE in a model where every agent in a large pool is a separate player. Keywords: Rationalizability; Extensive-form games; Self-confirming equilibrium; Heterogeneous beliefs; Purification; Random matchingNational Science Foundation (Grant SES-0646816)National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0951462)National Science Foundation (Grant SES-1258665
Bayesian posteriors for arbitrarily rare events
No full textWe study how much data a Bayesian observer needs to correctly infer the relative likelihoods of two events when both events are arbitrarily rare. Each period, either a blue die or a red die is tossed. The two dice land on side 1 with unknown probabilities p[subscript 1] and q[subscript 1], which can be arbitrarily low. Given a data-generating process where p[subscript 1] ≥cq[subscript 1], we are interested in how much data are required to guarantee that with high probability the observer's Bayesian posterior mean for p[subscript 1] exceeds (1-δ)c times that for q[subscript 1]. If the prior densities for the two dice are positive on the interior of the parameter space and behave like power functions at the boundary, then for every ϵ > 0; there exists a finite N so that the observer obtains such an inference after n periods with probability at least 1-ϵ whenever np 1 ≥N. The condition on n and p[subscript 1] is the best possible. The result can fail if one of the prior densities converges to zero exponentially fast at the boundary
Active learning with a misspecified prior
No full textWe study learning and information acquisition by a Bayesian agent whose prior belief is misspecified in the sense that it assigns probability 0 to the true state of the world. At each instant, the agent takes an action and observes the corresponding payoff, which is the sum of a fixed but unknown function of the action and an additive error term. We provide a complete characterization of asymptotic actions and beliefs when the agent's subjective state space is a doubleton. A simple example with three actions shows that in a misspecified environment a myopic agent's beliefs converge while a sufficiently patient agent's beliefs do not. This illustrates a novel interaction between misspecification and the agent's subjective discount rate.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant 1643517
Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
Full text linkThis paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors
Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation
Full text linkWe define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when, following Neyman (1985), players are assumed to behave as finite automata. We define two types of equilibria, namely the Repeated Nash Network (RNN), in which the same network forms at each period, and the Repeated Nash Equilibrium (RNE), in which different networks may form. We state a sufficient condition under which a given network may be implemented as a RNN. Then, we provide structural properties of RNE. For instance, players may form totally different networks at each period, or the networks within a given RNE may exhibit a total order relationship. Finally we investigate the question of efficiency for both Bentham and Pareto criteria.Repeated Network Formation Game, Two-sided Link Formation Costs, Bounded Rationality, Automata
In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers
Full text linkIn this paper, we study in?nitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an effcient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments.
Interim correlated rationalizability
Full text linkThis paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space.Rationalizability, incomplete information, common certainty, common knowledge, universal type space
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