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Mathesis Universalis from Leibniz to Husserl
Full text linkThe idea of a mathesis universalis plays a prominent role in Edmund Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic (FTL). It is clear that at this mature stage of his philosophy the idea he refers to with “mathesis universalis” is in large part due to Husserl’s own development and cannot be straightforwardly derived from one single author or source anymore. In a historical respect, of course, the idea is most strongly associated with Leibniz, and indeed we see that Husserl does re- fer repeatedly to him in FTL when discussing the mathesis universalis (e.g. § 23b). However, Leibniz is not the only author that is relevant for the specific way in which Husserl fills out the notion of mathesis universalis, since he also repeatedly refers to more recent 19th century authors such as Bolzano and Lotze, as well as early modern authors such as Vieta and Descartes. Here, as elsewhere, we see Husserl’s eclecticism at work
Mathesis Universalis from Leibniz to Husserl
No full textThe idea of a mathesis universalis plays a prominent role in Edmund Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic (FTL). It is clear that at this mature stage of his philosophy the idea he refers to with “mathesis universalis” is in large part due to Husserl’s own development and cannot be straightforwardly derived from one single author or source anymore. In a historical respect, of course, the idea is most strongly associated with Leibniz, and indeed we see that Husserl does re- fer repeatedly to him in FTL when discussing the mathesis universalis (e.g. § 23b). However, Leibniz is not the only author that is relevant for the specific way in which Husserl fills out the notion of mathesis universalis, since he also repeatedly refers to more recent 19th century authors such as Bolzano and Lotze, as well as early modern authors such as Vieta and Descartes. Here, as elsewhere, we see Husserl’s eclecticism at work
Philosophie und Frage I. Über Metaphilosophie
No full textDas grundsätzliche Fragen liegt immer und ständig dem Wissen zugrunde. Ein grundsätzliches Fragen ist notwendig, wenn man die Komplexität unserer Zeit und unserer Welt verstehen will. Was uns aber heutzutage fehlt, ist die Verbindung zwischen der elementaren Situation jedes grundsätzlichen Fragens und der inflationären Vervielfachung von Wissensformen und partiellen Theorien. Damit einhergehend verliert die Philosophie den Sinn der Form eines ersten Wissens (prôtê epistêmê) als vorrangige Form eines Denkens, das den Wissensformen Einheit geben und den Sinn des Wissens für den Menschen erschließen könnte.
Das Buch zielt darauf ab, im Dialog mit der phänomenologischen sowie mit der analytischen Tradition eine neue Schau zu entwickeln, welche die elementare Situation der Frage nach dem Sinn und die Komplexität des Realen wieder miteinander in Verbindung bringt. Ausgehend von der Frage nach dem Sinn kommen Grundfragen in den Blick, welche, jede auf ihre Art und Weise, einen Horizont öffnen, in dem das Denken eine Erweiterung seines Verstehens erreicht: der Horizont der Metaegologie, der Metatheorie, der Metaontologie und zuletzt der Metametaphysik. Durch die Entwicklung der Korrespondenz zwischen Grundfragen und Horizonten des Denkens öffnet sich nicht nur die Perspektive einer Archäologie, sondern die Perspektive der Zukunft des Wissens
La fenomenologia e i molteplici sensi della crisi. Dalla crisi dei fondamenti alla crisi dell’umanità europea
Full text linkIn his work and during his life, from the Philosophy of Arithmetic to the Krisis of European Sciences and even beyond, Husserl fight constantly against a certain « crisis » and settle Phenomenology as answer to the forms of crisis that step by step he focuses as critical moments of our civilization. But the meaning of “crisis” is manifold, can be viewed from different perspectives and assessed by different forms, in continuity or incremental to each other. The evolution of the idea of « crisis » let us finally sketch the dynamic and speculative evolution of Phenomenology itself and its standing critical self-interpretation. In our paper, we will explain and focus the different meanings of “crisis” in Phenomenology in order to understand its evolution and the intrinsic continuity between the project of the Logical Investigations (where Phenomenology is presented as a new form of Mathesis universalis) and the late period, in which Phenomenology itself is presented as an Hyper-Rationalism with a well defined role in the History of Europe and of the Mankind. 
Philosophie und Frage I. Über Metaphilosophie
No full textDas grundsätzliche Fragen liegt immer und ständig dem Wissen zugrunde. Ein grundsätzliches Fragen ist notwendig, wenn man die Komplexität unserer Zeit und unserer Welt verstehen will. Was uns aber heutzutage fehlt, ist die Verbindung zwischen der elementaren Situation jedes grundsätzlichen Fragens und der inflationären Vervielfachung von Wissensformen und partiellen Theorien. Damit einhergehend verliert die Philosophie den Sinn der Form eines ersten Wissens (prôtê epistêmê) als vorrangige Form eines Denkens, das den Wissensformen Einheit geben und den Sinn des Wissens für den Menschen erschließen könnte.
Das Buch zielt darauf ab, im Dialog mit der phänomenologischen sowie mit der analytischen Tradition eine neue Schau zu entwickeln, welche die elementare Situation der Frage nach dem Sinn und die Komplexität des Realen wieder miteinander in Verbindung bringt. Ausgehend von der Frage nach dem Sinn kommen Grundfragen in den Blick, welche, jede auf ihre Art und Weise, einen Horizont öffnen, in dem das Denken eine Erweiterung seines Verstehens erreicht: der Horizont der Metaegologie, der Metatheorie, der Metaontologie und zuletzt der Metametaphysik. Durch die Entwicklung der Korrespondenz zwischen Grundfragen und Horizonten des Denkens öffnet sich nicht nur die Perspektive einer Archäologie, sondern die Perspektive der Zukunft des Wissens
From Aesthetic to Epistemic Structures and back: Complex Dynamics between Art and Science
Full text linkWe often forget that art and science are not dissociated, nor indeed antagonistic, but rather allow a creative interplay to emerge from which arises the generation of new forms of knowledge (Miller [1995]: 190). According to Parkinson, “the analogy between the new painting and the new physics consists in that elements formerly held as cognitive or conceptual a-prioris enter as constitutive factors in the very structure of the edifices of art and science” (Parkinson [2008]: 161). How exactly does it work? If for us nowadays it’s relatively easy to think of the mimetic moment of art as a prelude to geometry, it is not so trivial to claim how higher-order representational symbolic epistemic structures (h.o.r.s.e.s.) arise from the lifeworld, or simply how both interact together. The aim of this paper is to stake out the complexity of processes going from the lifeworld and, before that, from the life of pictorial language, to h.o.r.s.e.s., in order to apply this model to further enquiries. In the first part, we will reactivate the Kantian interdependence between aesthetics and epistemology via the intersubjective dimension, in order to understand how the shaping of forms and the figuring-out patterns remain an essential component of any epistemic structure as such. In the second part, moving from Hacking, Husserl and Foucault, we will look into the way in which the evidence of symbolic structures can be maintained even alongside a genetic conception of science. Art plays an essential role in such a conception, in that it opens new horizons of figurativity in which new shapes can arise and new kinds of objectivities (Gegenständlichkeiten) can be accepted as belonging to our epistemic experience of the world
Syllogism and mathesis. Hegel and Husserl on the method of philosophy
No full textIn the essay, I address the issue of whether in Hegel's and Husserl's conception of philosophy there is a room for the modern conception of mathesis. I start from Lachterman's observation that mathesis is not an axiomatic or formalized system from which an infinity of statements can be derived, but it is rather a set of useful prescriptions for the motion of mind. From this perspective I claim that Hegel appropriates this conviction by refusing, however, to identify his logical set of prescriptions with mathesis, while Husserl leaves a room for it, thank to his criticism of the "technization" of science, even though he really never realizes it
La simplexité, ou ce que les modèles n’arrivent pas à saisir
No full textSi le concept de complexité a pu paraître dominant dans l’horizon épistémologique des sciences contemporaines, c’est la simplexité ou, au moins, le couple ‘complexité-simplexité’ qui s’impose désormais à l’attention de ceux qui, sans vouloir enfermer dans une définition formelle la complexité en tant que concept, cherchent un mode d’assomption satisfaisant de la complexité en tant que condition ou situation du chercheur, de l’homme et plus généralement du vivant. Nous tentons ici de détermine..
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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