382 research outputs found

    Cognitive Models of Gambling and Problem Gambling

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    Current research paints the picture of problem gambling as a multifaceted phenomenon, for which there is not one single explanation. A wealth of factors are implied in the development and maintenance of problem gambling, including biological mechanisms of rewardprocessing (e.g. Linnet et al., 2010a), cognitive processes of attention (e.g. Brevers et al., 2011), implicit memory (e.g. McCusker & Gettings, 1997), decision-making (e.g. Brevers et al., 2013) and beliefs (e.g. Myrseth et al., 2010), mechanisms underlying mood regulation (Brown et al., 2004) and coping styles (e.g. Gupta et al., 2004). Individual factors are thought to interact with the gambling environment and the larger social, professional and familial environment, adding to the complexity. Integrated models of problem gambling, such as the pathways model of Blaszczynski and Nower (2002), attempt to (re-)establish a holistic view in a research field that resorts to increasingly specific and intricate research designs. The underlying mechanisms and their interactions, however, are still not well understood (Gobet & Schiller, 2011)

    Cognitive modelling of language acquisition with complex networks

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    ABSTRACT Cognitive modelling is a well-established computational intelligence tool, which is very useful for studying cognitive phenomena, such as young children's first language acquisition. Specifically, linguistic modelling has recently benefited greatly from complex network theory by modelling large sets of empirical linguistic data as complex networks, thereby illuminating interesting new patterns and trends. In this chapter, we show how simple network analysis techniques can be applied to the study of language acquisition, and we argue that they reveal otherwise hidden information. We also note that a key network parameter -the ranked frequency distribution of the links -provides useful knowledge about the data, even though it had been previously neglected in this domain

    Expert memory: A comparison of four theories

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    This paper compares four current theories of expertise with respect to chess players’ memory: Chase and Simon’s (1973) chunking theory, Holding’s (1985) SEEK theory, Ericsson and Kintsch’s (1995) long-term working memory theory, and Gobet and Simon’s (1996b) template theory. The empirical areas showing the largest discriminative power include recall of random and distorted positions, recall with very short presentation times, and interference studies. Contrary to recurrent criticisms in the literature, it is shown that the chunking theory is consistent with most of the data. However, the best performance in accounting for the empirical evidence is obtained by the template theory. The theory, which unifies low-level aspects of cognition, such as chunks, with high-level aspects, such as schematic knowledge and planning, proposes that chunks are accessed through a discrimination net, where simple perceptual features are tested, and that they can evolve into more complex data structures (templates) specific to classes of positions. Implications for the study of expertise in general include the need for detailed process models of expert behavior and the need to use empirical data spanning the traditional boundaries of perception, memory, and problem solving

    The role of constraints in expert memory

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    A great deal of research has been devoted to developing process models of expert memory. However, K. J. Vicente and J. H. Wang (1998) proposed (a) that process theories do not provide an adequate account of expert recall in domains in which memory recall is a contrived task and (b) that a product theory, the constraint attunement hypothesis (CAH), has received a significant amount of empirical support. We compared 1 process theory (the template theory; TT; F. Gobet & H. A. Simon, 1996c) with the CAH in chess. Chess players (N = 36) differing widely in skill levels were required to recall briefly presented chess positions that were randomized in various ways. Consistent with TT, but inconsistent with the CAH, there was a significant skill effect in a condition in which both the location and distribution of the pieces were randomized. These and other results suggest that process models such as TT can provide a viable account of expert memory in chess

    Functional cerebral reorganization: A signature of expertise? Reexamining Guida, Gobet, Tardieu, and Nicolas’ (2012) two-stage framework.

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    International audienceIn 2012, Guida, Gobet, Tardieu and Nicolas proposed a two-stage framework to explain how cognitive changes due to practice could shape experts' brain physiologically and thus explain neuroimaging data of expertise acquisition. In this paper, after presenting the motivations for such a framework and the framework itself, we examine the idea that functional cerebral reorganization (FCR) could be used as a signature for expertise [...

    Recall of random and distorted positions: Implications for the theory of expertise.

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    This paper explores the question, important to the theory of expert performance, of the nature and number of chunks that chess experts hold in memory. It examines how memory contents determine players' abilities to reconstruct (a) positions from games, (b) positions distorted in various ways and (c) and random positions. Comparison of a computer simulation with a human experiment supports the usual estimate that chess Masters store some 50,000 chunks in memory. The observed impairment of recall when positions are modified by mirror image reflection, implies that each chunk represents a specific pattern of pieces in a specific location. A good account of the results of the experiments is given by the template theory proposed by Gobet and Simon (in press) as an extension of Chase and Simon's (1973a) initial chunking proposal, and in agreement with other recent proposals for modification of the chunking theory (Richman, Staszewski & Simon, 1995) as applied to various recall tasks

    Using a cognitive architecture for addressing the question of cognitive universals in cross-cultural psychology: The example of awalé

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    A central theme in cross-cultural psychology is the extent to which cognitive mechanisms are universal, or, alternatively, are specific to a given culture. We propose a new way to tackle this question: to use the same cognitive architecture, implemented as a computer program, for simulating phenomena in which individuals from different cultures perform a task familiar to their own culture. The CHREST architecture (Gobet et al., 2001; Gobet & Simon, 2000) has simulated a number of empirical phenomena related to the western board game of chess. Here we show that a model implemented in the same architecture accounts for several phenomena in awalé, a board game from the mancala family, which is commonly played in western Africa and in the Caribbean. CHREST first learns chunks by scanning expert-level games, and then is placed in memory experiments and problem-solving situations similar to those used with human youngsters. The model replicates empirical phenomena on memory for awalé positions reasonably well, although not perfectly, and also learns to play a fair, but far from perfect game using pattern recognition. The assumptions that learning is mediated by the acquisition of a large number of chunks and that the capacity of visual short-term memory is limited to three chunks are important in explaining the empirical data for the two games. The implications for theory development in cross-cultural psychology are discussed
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